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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with how geoengineering, specifically Stratospheric Sulphur aerosol 
Injection (SSI), could be ethically governed. Geoengineering refers to a set of technologies 
which can be used to affect the global temperature, such as SSI. Geoengineering has been 
proposed as possible response to climate change. This thesis focuses on three problems which 
the ethical governance of SSI faces: namely the problems of moral corruption, moral hazard 
and intergenerational inclusion. The result of this is that the thesis furthers our understanding 
of how SSI governance could address each of these three problems. By doing so the thesis 
contributes t an important debate on how SSI should be governed.  
The first chapter presents a case in favour of the importance of the ethical governance of SSI. 
Chapter two introduces two framings which are seldom used together, the risk-risk trade off 
frame, and the perfect moral storm frame. Chapter two argues that it is important to adopt both 
of these frames if we are going to consider geoengineering governance. The benefit of these 
frames is that they provide a context against which thinking about SSI governance occurs.  
Chapter three explains the problem of moral corruption, and argues that a well-functioning 
accountability mechanism could help to address it.  In making this argument, the chapter shows 
that transparency, publicity, and accountability are poorly understood in reports on 
geoengineering governance, in which these principles are often endorsed. The chapter offers a 
clearer account of the meaning of these principles, and why it is essential to be aware of the 
relationship between transparency and these other principles if they going to be used to address 
moral corruption or any problem in SSI governance.   
Chapter four provides conceptual clarity to the often-cited moral hazard concern about SSI. 
The chapter breaks the moral hazard problem down into five different variables. By doing so 
this analysis  highlights the lack ambiguity and disagreement in the literature about the moral 
hazard.. This chapter also provides an answer to the question of should we act on the hazard if 
the empirical evidence about the hazard effect is inconclusive.  Drawing on the work of Henry 
Shue on threshold likelihoods, I argue that we should act on the moral hazard problem even if 
the empirical evidence is inconclusive, due to the mechanisms by which the hazard can occur 
being well-understood, and that these mechanism are accumulating. .  
Chapter five explores the possibility of secrecy as a response to the moral hazard concern. The 
chapter has four components. Firstly it provides clarity about how secrecy can be understood.  
Secondly, it considers what this theoretical account of secrecy teaches us about the practice of 
secrecy. This is done by applying the theory to the historical example of the Manhattan project, 
which highlights some key components of governing in secrecy. Thirdly, the chapter shows us 
why we should expect such an approach to secrecy to be effective at addressing the moral 
hazard problem. Fourthly, the chapter has a normative component, whereby it considers 
instrumental reasons to be opposed to secrecy in SSI governance despite its promise in 
addressing the moral hazard problem.  
Chapter 6 considers the question of intergenerational inclusion in decision-making about SSI. 
It identifies representation of interests as the appropriate form of inclusion for future people. It 
argues in favour of ‘A Statement of What is Owed to the Future’, whereby the minimal interests 
of future generations are expressed and accepted by states. The chapter proceeds by considering 
different mechanisms through which these interests could be represented, and argues in favour 
of a second chamber as the ideal mechanism through which this can occur.  
. The idea of ethical SSI governance is complicated and confusing, it faces many challenges, 
and we face a genuine risk of SSI being governed in a poor or unethical way. Even if agents 
wished to govern SSI ethically it is not at all clear how this can be done. This thesis makes 
the prospect of ethical SSI governance more attainable by helping agents understand what to 
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1 The Context: Why Consider Geoengineering? 
  
It is hard to overemphasise how important the climate is. An obvious statement perhaps, but 
one I plan to expand on and explore. The climate is a background condition of life. Amongst 
other things, it can determine whether we have access to water and food, it can affect what type 
of shelter we require, and it is an indicator of what type of weather we will experience.1 Insofar 
as we value life, we clearly have an interest in the climate. The study of interplanetary 
meteorology shows this concern.  (Horizon, The Wildest Weather in the Universe: 2016). One 
of the first questions to be asked regarding newly discovered planets is: what is the climate 
there like? The reason why this question is asked is it helps to determine what the possibility 
of life is, and what types of life could exist on that planet.  
The Earth’s climate is changing. This means that the background condition of life is changing. 
The climate is changing faster than we can adapt to the changes and this represents one of the 
greatest threats of the twenty-first century to human and non-human life. Climate change will 
affect our lives, the lives of the vulnerable, the lives of those who are yet to be born, as well as 
present and future non-human life and the natural world. We are fortunate, however, because 
we know how this change is happening. Since 1990 policy-makers from across the world have 
acknowledged that humans are the driving force behind this change, due to our emissions of 
greenhouse gases (Jamieson, 2014: 33).  
As humans alive today, we know that our emissions represent a substantial part of the problem 
since they are contributing to climate change. Furthermore, this puts humanity in an incredible 
position: the twenty-first-century threat to human survival is one of our own making. Moreover, 
it is arguably one that we can stop. We can choose to put a stop to carbon emissions, and the 
threat of climate change would be reduced. Unfortunately, this would not prevent the changes 
to which are already committed, as greenhouse gases have long lives. Consider the carbon 
dioxide emitted from fossil fuels: 20–60% of carbon dioxide remains in the atmosphere for 
1,000 years or longer (Archer and Brovkin, 2008). This means that even if net global carbon 
emissions were to become zero today and stay at zero, there would still be some form of climate 
change due to the life cycle of the carbon which is already in the atmosphere.2  This changes 
                                                          
1 This concern with weather is not the British concern about whether it will be hot enough to wear shorts. It is (in 
its most extreme form) a concern about how weather conditions threaten lives.   
2 This is why the language around mitigation and adaptation dominates the literature on responses to climate 
change, as opposed to prevention.  
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the scale of the problem entirely. Moreover, we are fortunate enough to know how to minimise 
the risks we are placing on one of our background conditions of life.  
Unfortunately, the situation is not so simple. Despite policy-makers being aware of the threat 
of climate change since the early 1990s, action on the problem has not been enough to ensure 
that the change does not threaten the background conditions of life for all. The conversation in 
policy circles has focused on the idea of ensuring that there is no more than two degrees Celsius 
(2oC) of warming (Carbon Brief, 2014). Regrettably, it is doubtful that the limit of 2 degrees 
will be met, given that our current emissions trajectory appears to commit the world to warming 
of between 2.6oC and 3.1oC  (Rogelj et al., 2016: 634).3 
The Working Group II contribution to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
in 2014 provides a framework for understanding what is bad about this level of warming. 
Specifically, the Working Group II identifies 5 ‘reasons for concern’ about projected levels of 
climate change. (1) The danger is that ecosystems and cultures, some of them unique, are being 
threatened by climate change and that the number and intensity of these threats are increasing 
as the global mean temperature rises. (2) Extreme weather events such as heatwaves and coastal 
flooding are highly likely to occur more often and with a greater degree of intensity as global 
temperatures rise. (3) The risks from climate change and its impact are unevenly distributed 
and likely to have a greater impact on vulnerable communities. This is in part due to regional 
variations in the impact of climate change on important necessities of life such as the 
availability of water. (4) Global aggregate impacts relate to the concern that global phenomena 
such as biodiversity and the global economy will suffer. Climate change is already causing a 
loss of biodiversity and having an impact on the global economy, and these impacts are likely 
to grow as the global mean temperature rises. (5) The concern with large-scale singular events 
refers to sudden and irreversible changes to the Earth’s physical or ecological systems such as 
the melting of the Greenland ice sheet, which would cause up to a 7-metre increase in the global 
mean sea level.  
The IPCC Working Group II provides the graph in Figure 1, which shows how these five 
‘reasons for concern’ compound in likelihood as the global mean temperature increases. 
 
                                                          
3 Due to a commitment from states for more ambitious nationally-determined contribution levels, this number 
could become lower. However, it is also premised on states acting on their emissions reduction pledges agreed in 
Paris 2016, which many have yet to do. Hence the figure may also be significantly higher.  
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Figure 1. Five Reasons for Concern    
 
These are serious reasons for concern; they threaten society as we know it with the risks of 
mass loss of life, of culture and of states, of ecosystems and of biodiversity, of forced migration, 
and damage to health. It is harms such as these which make climate change such a pressing 
issue of justice. The 2oC target is based on the idea that these risks are unacceptably high once 
2oC is surpassed.  
These harms raise further questions of justice when we consider the fact that many of them are 
predicted to befall vulnerable communities who have contributed little to the problem of 
climate and lack a strong adaptive capacity (Gidley, et al: 2009). These features of climate 
change raise questions of justice with which philosophers have engaged. The climate justice 
literature is roughly as old as policy-makers’ awareness of the problem of climate change, with 
Dale Jamieson (1990, 1991, 1992, 1996, 1998), Henry Shue (1992, 1993, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 
1996, 1999a, 1999b), and John Broome (1992), publishing on questions of climate justice since 
the early 1990’s. 
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One of the prominent debates within the early literature on climate justice concerns which 
principle appropriately determines who should bear the burdens of responding to climate 
change: the polluter pays principle, the beneficiary pays principle, or the ability to pay principle 
(Shue, 1993, 1999b). Despite these principles offering distinct theoretical arguments regarding 
who should bear the burdens, they appear to converge on the same type of agents (developed 
countries), as the ones who should bear the burdens of acting on climate change. Sophisticated 
works have now informed the question of how to distribute the burdens of avoiding the harms 
from climate change. For example, Simon Caney (2012) has provided an egalitarian account 
of how these burdens should be distributed, while Mollendorf (2014) provides a specifically 
Rawlsian inspired account of how this should happen. For example, they both consider the 
question of how carbon emission should be distributed, in other words, who should be entitled 
to emit?  One of the key lessons from this literature is that the harms of climate change should 
be understood as issues of justice, because they interact deeply with questions of distributive 
justice. 
Distributive justice is not the only area of justice that interacts with climate change. For 
example, the idea of creating a procedurally just response to geoengineering will be central to 
the arguments in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. More generally, our responses to climate 
change raise pressing questions about how the relevant agents should be included or 
represented in decision making. This point has been made vividly by Marion Hourdequin 
(2012, 2016, 2018, and 2019) as well as being present in the work of Caney (2018) and Calles 
(2019a). 
 In 2004 Gardiner observed that moral philosophers had said very little about climate change. 
Since then, this has changed; the contribution of philosophers has resulted in the identification 
of a range of moral problems related to climate change. For example, in 2005, Walter Sinnot-
Armstrong published a paper arguing that individuals do not have a moral obligation to act on 
climate change, by performing actions such as restricting their carbon emissions (Sinnot-
Armstrong, 2010) . This has sparked a debate about whether individual emissions can be 
identified as harmful, and the nature of individuals’ climate-related obligations (Broome, 2012, 
2016; Cripps, 2013, 2016; Lawford-Smith, 2016).  
The question of what we owe future generations in light of climate change is particularly tricky. 
There is the simple fact that harms from greenhouse gas emissions compound over time. So 
not only are we imposing a risk on future generations, but we are imposing a greater risk on 
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them than the one inflicted on ourselves. It is intuitive that the imposition of great and 
unwarranted risks constitutes an injustice. Yet the literature on future generations shows that 
this is more complicated than it may first appear. There is a famous debate about whether it is 
really possible to harm future people (Parfit, 1984; Parfit, 2010). This is followed by a 
somewhat perplexing debate on whether the welfare of future generations should be 
discounted. The perplexing nature of the discounting discussion is expressed by in some works 
of philosophers argue that position that discounting simply should not happen and that is 
grounded in a mistaken conception of utilitarian ethics (Moellendorf, 2004; Roser, 2009; 
Caney, 2014). This is countered by many technical arguments (Arrow, 1999; Broome, 1994; 
Dasgupta, 2012; Stern, 2007) one of which is the point that discounting welfare is not due to a 
presentism bias, but due to the need to account for uncertainties, such as the uncertainty of 
there being any humans in 500 years time whose welfare can be affected by our actions (Stern, 
2007: 53). The point is that the idea of helping future generations is obscured by a fog of highly 
technical arguments.4  
More recently the climate justice debate has concerned questions such as climate migration, 
criminalisation of emissions, loss and damage, reform of climate governance institutions and 
the role of ideal and non-ideal theory. 
One of the debates about climate justice is that of the appropriate normative standard to use 
when considering climate change. This is one of debates with which is directly relevant ot this 
project. A cost-benefit style of analysis is adopted in prominent works such as The Stern 
Review which seek to evaluate responses to climate change. However, cost-benefit analysis 
can be ethically unsatisfactory (Pearce, 1998; Broome, 2012; Gardiner, 2016: 77). For example, 
it can invite trade-offs which do not make sense, by comparing all relevant considerations in 
monetary terms regardless of whether money is the appropriate metric to capture their value.5 
In response to the use of these cost-benefit frameworks, Simon Caney proposed that we should 
adopt a minimal rights standard for considering the problem of, and responses to, climate 
change. The minimal rights which Caney identifies are those of the right to life, health, and 
subsistence.6 The idea is simple, which is that even this minimal set of human rights is capable 
                                                          
4 Chapter 6 of this thesis does engage with part with the question of including future generations without the 
need to engage in these technical debates.  
5 The problems of a cost benefit analysis are expanded on in section 2.2 of this thesis.  
6 Caney also adopts a minimal understanding of these rights, For example the right to health is understood to mean 
agents have a human right that other people do not act so as to create a serious threat to their health, as oppose to 
much more expansive understandings of the right to health ( Caney, 2010: 167). 
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of guiding our thinking about climate change and its responses. In those circumstances under 
which climate change violates these minimal rights, we can understand that something 
particularly problematic is happening.7 Furthermore, the same is true of our response to climate 
change; they should not violate this minimal standard.  
 This minimal rights framework will be the normative standard which this thesis adopts. There 
are two reasons which, when combined, make the case in favour of adopting this standard: the 
benefit of a minimal standard, and a minimal normative standard. The benefit of a minimal 
standard is that the content of that standard is minimally controversial. In other words, people 
with a range of otherwise diverse moral commitments should be able to accept the content of 
the standard.8 The analysis which uses this standard should not suffer from the concern that the 
content of the standard is odd or unreasonable. However, a minimum alone is not sufficient for 
the purposes of a thesis which is interested in ethical governance; for that we require the 
minimum to be an ethical one. This is where the importance of the standard being normative 
emerges. By having a normative standard, we can assess how just a situation is according to 
that normative criterion. The normative standard used here is that of rights. An appeal of a 
rights standard is that they are an expression of interests which are worthy of protection.9 By 
having a minimal account of these rights, therefore, we can understand a situation as minimally 
just when this criterion is fulfilled. Moreover, when it is violated, we can understand a situation 
as failing to be even minimally just.  
There are, of course, concerns about the minimal rights position. One of them is simply that it 
is too minimal, and it therefore misses important interests which are worth protecting. A 
response to this concern is that it does not make sense to think of protecting rights beyond this 
minimum if this minimum itself is not protected. For example, protecting one's right to 
education does not make much sense if rights to subsistence, health and life are violated. This 
response is grounded in Henry Shue’s understanding of what a basic right is, which are those 
rights which need to be protected in order for other rights to be enjoyed ( Shue, 1980). This 
provides another reason for focusing on this minimum, for it is necessary that these rights are 
protected in order for any more demanding standards to be fulfilled.  
                                                          
7 From figure 1 we can see that the global mean temperature increases of 2 degrees or more will result in the 
violation of these minimal rights. 
8 The minimal standard in this thesis is uncontroversial, this can be seen by the lack of serious arguments against 
the idea of a right to life, health or subsistence. However, there are arguments about whether rights are the proper 
way to understand what is being protected here. 
9 I am using an interest based theory of rights (Shue, 1980), although there are theories of rights exists such as to 
protect autonomy or choices.  
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We find ourselves in a situation where there appears to be an unjust imposition of a grave 
injustice by a failure to prevent more than two degrees of warming. After more than twenty 
years of climate negotiations, there is little cause for optimism that the two degrees target will 
be achieved. This leads to a form of reasoning which asks what other options are available if 
our mitigation efforts are inadequate to prevent climate change. Some people, such as Paul 
Crutzen, have replied by considering geoengineering as a response to climate change (Crutzen, 
2006).10  
This proposal brings with it a great many questions. For example, is a geoengineered world 
preferable to one with extensive climate change? Are there other options available to us? Does 
geoengineering threaten the background conditions of life? Is geoengineering any more 
realistic than extensive mitigation? These are the types of questions which will be explored in 
my thesis. For the moment it is sufficient to say that geoengineering is being considered in 




                                                          
10 Crutzen’s paper is noteworthy in part because it broke a perceived taboo on publishing about geoengineering.  
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1.1 What is geoengineering?  
 
Before being able to ask questions about the ethics, governance or science of geoengineering, 
it is prudent to ask what geoengineering is. This thesis will focus on a specific form of 
geoengineering: stratospheric sulphur injection (SSI). But prior to introducing SSI, it is useful 
to have a more general understanding of geoengineering. A prominent definition of comes from 
a 2009 report by the UK’s Royal Society on geoengineering, which defines it as ‘the deliberate, 
large-scale manipulation of the planetary environment in order to counteract anthropogenic 
climate change’ (Shepherd et al., 2009: 1). Geoengineering is clearly a broad term, for there 
are many different types of ways in which this ‘manipulation’ of the climate can be achieved.  
The Royal Society report divides geoengineering technologies into two categories. These are 
carbon dioxide removal methods (CDR) and solar radiation management (SRM) (Shepherd et 
al., 2009: xi). As the name implies, carbon dioxide removal methods focus on the extraction of 
carbon from the atmosphere. This already happens naturally: think of a tree’s relationship to 
the carbon cycle. Hence CDR either speeds up a naturally occurring process or it requires the 
implementation of new technology to remove the carbon. SRM focuses on either increasing 
the Earth’s albedo or diverting solar radiation.11 Diverting solar radiation is something that 
would seem much more at home in a science-fiction situation, given that discussions of SRM 
solutions often include putting sulphur aerosols into the atmosphere or placing mirrors in space. 
However, SRM can also involve much more down-to-earth actions such as painting buildings 
white to increase their ability to reflect the sun’s rays (Shepherd et al., 2009: 23).  
 
1.1.1 Terminological considerations  
 
The Royal Society’s understanding of geoengineering has been subject to much scrutiny. This 
is probably a quite natural and healthy practice. The report is one of the first of its kind on this 
topic, and it is on an issue about which there are strong reasons to be concerned from an ethical 
perspective.12 Here I will raise a few of the most important concerns with the Royal Society’s 
understanding of geoengineering. The concerns I wish to draw attention to are those of Dale 
                                                          
11 Albedo refers to the reflective properties of a surface. 




Jamieson (2013; 2014) and Stephen Gardiner (2011), who are both established writers on the 
ethics of climate change. I will then contrast this to the position of Clare Heyward who shows 
how the terms are helpful when applied correctly (Heyward, 2013). 
Jamieson’s concern is whether it makes sense for geoengineering to be a category of action 
which is distinct from mitigation or adaptation measures. For example, the Royal Society report 
includes afforestation as a type of CDR. However, the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) categorises afforestation as a type of mitigation (Jamieson, 2013: 528).13 
Jamieson makes this point to show that there is confusion about what we call geoengineering 
and what we call mitigation.  
He pushes on this overlap and argues that we need to change the name of geoengineering and 
replace it with two separate categories of action related to either abatement or solar radiation 
diversion, abatement meaning any action which reduces GHG emission. 14 If these approaches 
are made distinct categories of action alongside mitigation and adaptation, Jamieson thinks that 
all climate change responses could fit neatly into one or other of these categories (Jamieson, 
2014: 207). For example, according to Jamieson, afforestation would then be a clear case of an 
abatement strategy. Therefore Jamieson’s concern is not only with the Royal Society; his 
argument about afforestation being a form of abatement means that he also disagrees with the 
IPCC’s understanding of mitigation. Despite Jamieson’s concern about the name 
‘geoengineering’, the term still dominates the literature on this topic. For example 
geoengineering is mentioned in the most recent report by the IPCC and it is the subject of many 
governance reports as well (IPCC, 2014: 89; Morrow, 2017).15  
Moving away from Jamieson, Stephen Gardiner’s concern with the Royal Society report is that 
he doesn’t believe there is any need to have a sharp distinction between CDR and SRM 
(Gardiner, 2011: 345). This is because we can imagine some very strong forms of CDR which 
would raise many of the same issues as SRM. For Gardiner, the type of questions we ask about 
different geoengineering technologies depends on the effects of those technologies. There is 
no reason why CDR and SRM technologies should necessarily have a different set of effects. 
                                                          
13 The IPCC is part of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The IPCC is 
tasked with providing policy-makers with the most up-to-date accounts of climate science and the impacts of 
climate change.  
14 For Jamieson abatement is distinct from mitigation because mitigation focuses on efforts to initial release of the 
greenhouse gases emissions in the atmosphere, whist abatement focuses on reducing the quantity of greenhouse 
gases which are already in the atmosphere (Jamieson, 2014: 207). 
15  I am aware there is something unsatisfactory about this logic, in that using a word because it is dominant only 
perpetuates its dominance – particularly if enough people follow the same logic. 
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Therefore this distinction has no value other than giving a different name to a different set of 
methods which produce the same effects. 
In contrast to both Jamieson and Gardiner, Heyward provides an account of how the categories 
of CDR and SRM should be used (Heyward, 2013). Heyward’s argument is that CDR and SRM 
both exist at points on the continuum of response to climate change. Importantly they should 
be kept distinct because they have different aims, the aim of CDR is that of ‘[a]voiding a given 
level of atmospheric GHG [greenhouse gas] concentration’, and the aims of SRM are 
‘[a]voiding global average temperature increases’ (Heyward, 2013: 25). Heyward’s point is 
that the names are fine, in fact useful, as long as we are sensitive to the distinct aims of CDR 
and SRM.  
Gardiner’s and Jamieson’s concerns seem to be similar, insofar as they are both concerned with 
the fact that the terminology around geoengineering does not really capture what is important. 
For Jamieson, the issue is with the word geoengineering itself, and for Gardiner it is about 
dividing geoengineering into two separate categories. It should be noted as well that this is not 
the extent of either of their concerns with geoengineering; in fact, this may be considered 
among their least forceful objections. Nonetheless I think this divide and the source of this 
division can be identified. Jamieson and Gardiner seem to have different criteria in mind when 
considering the name geoengineering. Jamieson seems to be seeking a term which is 
descriptively accurate of how geoengineering technologies interact with other systems. Whilst 
Gardiner seems to be seeking a name which does not obscure the ethical considerations at stake. 
On the other hand Heyward appears to think that descriptive accuracy can be achieved as long 
as we are clear about the aims of CDR in contrast to SRM technologies. It is interesting to note 
that these different criteria have resulted in vastly different conclusions given that they are 
clearly related. Descriptive accuracy is important for highlighting normatively salient features 
of a technology. I mention these concerns to show that the term geoengineering is one which 
we should be cautious of.16  Despite this, there are strong reasons to stick with the term, not 
least because it dominates the literature on the subject. The term dominates the literature on the 
subject, for example, geoengineering is mentioned in the most recent IPCC report and is the 
subject of many governance reports (IPCC, 2014: 89; Morrow, 2017).17 Therefore the term will 
                                                          
16 Such caution can be seen by the Carnegie Climate Governance Initiative, which removed the term 
geoengineering from its name due to the confusion that it caused. It was previously known as the Carnegie Climate 
Geoengineering Governance Initiative (Pasztor, 2019).  
17 I am aware of something unpleasant about this logic, using a word because it is dominate, would only perpetuate 
its dominance. Particularly if enough people use the same logic.  
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be used in this thesis though hopefully with the caution that it deserves. This is not a significant 
challenge in part due to the vast majority of the thesis focusing on a specific type of 
geoengineering, which is explained towards the end of this chapter. 
 
1.1.2 Geoengineering: a new idea? 
 
Geoengineering may sound like an idea which belongs to a futuristic dystopia. However, the 
idea of trying to control the weather has been around in some form for millennia. That is, the 
idea of trying to control the weather. We can trace the notion of governments having an interest 
in weather control to at least the beginning of the nineteenth century. For example, the US 
government offered funding for experiments which explored the idea of weather control for 
most of the 19th century (Fleming, 2010: chapter 3).18 An interest in controlling the weather 
can also be seen throughout the history of the Soviet Union. Lenin provided a philosophical 
foundation for this by reasoning that humans were on the precipice of being able to master 
nature (Fleming, 2010: 198). Subsequently, in 1948 Stalin announced a great plan for – among 
other things – weather and climate control.19 We can therefore see that the idea of interfering 
with the weather is not necessarily as novel as it is sometimes portrayed. Even the term 
Geoengineering is not as young as one may expect, the first use of the term ‘geoengineering’ 
can be traced to an academic publication in 1977 (Marchetti, 1977). That’s thirteen years before 
we can claim that there was an international consensus on the threat of climate change, and 




                                                          
18 The idea of controlling the weather is much older even than this. For a historical overview, see James Fleming’s 
Fixing the Sky (2010), in which he points to the idea of weather control going back to at least Greek mythology, 
when Phaeton is given control of the sun (Fleming, 2010: 16). There is also a lesson of hubris from this story – 
hubris being an idea which is explored in chapter 2 of this thesis.   
19 This plan is consistent with the philosophy of Lenin from a few decades earlier (Fleming, 2010: 198). 
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1.2 Why there should be a formal governance regime for geoengineering: 
Real-world and ethical causes for concern 
 
In this section I will explain why there should be a formal governance regime for 
geoengineering. The case for governing geoengineering which I will present is predicated on 
two conditions being met.20 Firstly, that geoengineering is being taken sufficiently seriously in 
the ‘real world’, and secondly, that there are ethical concerns with geoengineering. Once these 
two conditions are met, there is a compelling case for geoengineering to be properly 
governed.21 This section will proceed by establishing that both of these conditions have been 
met in the case of geoengineering  
Prior to making the case for geoengineering governance it is worth heeding the warnings for 
the case for such governance should be made. These warnings are often about how adopting 
certain frames to justify geoengineering governance are problematic. Here I shall draw 
attention to two such concerns, those of Heyward (2015,) and of Fragnière and Gardiner 
(2016).22 Heyward argues that we should not adopt a lens of exceptionalism when considering 
geoengineering as such lenses are simplistic and damaging to public discourse. The damage to 
public discourse is a product of the exceptionalist lens leading to agents overstating the virtues 
or vices of geoengineering (Heyward, 2015). Fragnière and Gardiner also providing a warning 
about the framing of geoengineering, one which can be understood as an argument that we 
need to avoid certain frames when discussing geoengineering and this includes making the case 
for governance. They argue that the plan B or insurance framing of geoengineering is 
misleading, for make geoengineering could more attractive than actually is by hiding important 
ethical considerations which accompany geoengineering. There are of course other framing 
concerns about SSI, and some of them are considered in more detail in chapter 2, yet these 
framing concerns are serve as a useful warning about how arguments in favour of SSI 
governance should not be made.  
 
 
                                                          
20 This is not a general argument about the circumstances according to which something ought to be governed, 
although these conditions may be relevant in many other cases as well. 
21 Janos Pasztor (2017) points to similar conditions when calling for geoengineering to be governed. 
22 Chapter 2 will draw attention to the other framing concerns which exist about geoengineering.  
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1.2.1 Geoengineering is being taken sufficiently seriously in the ‘real world’  
 
By stating that geoengineering is being taken sufficiently seriously in the ‘real world’, I mean 
that geoengineering is genuinely considered to be a plausible response to climate change among 
certain relevant agents. In this sub-section I shall point to the popularity of geoengineering 
among a diverse group of actors, as well as the different pushes for geoengineering to be 
properly governed and researched further. These types of activities are indicative of 
geoengineering being taken seriously by at least some agents. 
Geoengineering is popular among a range of agents. It is popular among certain economists, 
certain scientists and certain politicians (Barrett, 2008; Gingrich, 2008; Levitt and Dubner: 
2009: 194-202; Keith, 2013). To elaborate, there are various groups of scientists – most 
prominently a group at Harvard University led by David Keith – who take the idea of 
geoengineering seriously as a potential response to climate change and are undertaking 
research into geoengineering technologies. (Below I provide more detail about a recent 
research project they have carried out.) The popularity of geoengineering among certain 
economists is illustrated by the title of an article by Scott Barrett called ‘The remarkable 
Economics of Geoengineering’, which makes the argument that certain geoengineering 
technologies are significantly cheaper than efforts at mitigation (Barrett, 2008).  
This has resulted in some economists misrepresenting the virtues of SSI. For example, in a 
popular book called Superfreakonomics, climate change is portrayed as not being a problem at 
all due to the cheap solution provided by SSI (Levitt and Dubner, 2009: 194–202). Moreover, 
comparable errors have been made by politicians. In a blog post in 2008 Newt Gingrich 
(Gingrich, 2008) the former speaker of the United States House of Representatives argued 
against funding mitigation efforts because there is the cheaper alternative of funding 
geoengineering ‘innovation’. In short, geoengineering is a popular idea among some sub-sets 
of certain groups who have, or try to have, influence on policy.  
To elaborate on the claim that some scientists are taking geoengineering research seriously:  in 
2018 plans for a project called SCoPEx (the Stratospheric Controlled Perturbation Experiment) 
were published. Led by Keith, this project aims to perform experiments to provide additional 
information about the viability of geoengineering, via field tests (Tollefson, 2018). The 
intention is for this project to happen in 2020. The SCoPEx project is being carried out in the 
absence of any regulatory framework specifically designed to govern SSI research. Whilst the 
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project may not raise too many significant ethical questions in isolation, it is indicative of a 
willingness, and capacity, among certain actors to pursue research into and maybe the 
development of SSI technologies, independent of a governance structure that has been 
specifically designed to take account of geoengineering. Another such experiment is the SPICE 
(Stratospheric Particle Injection for Climate Engineering) project at Cambridge University, 
which proposed to pump 150 litres of water into the atmosphere, to observe how the pipe and 
water would be effected by various wind conditions (Cressey, 2012).23  
SCoPEx and SPICE are illustrative of geoengineering research projects which have happened. 
Between 2008 and 2018 there was an increase in funding of geoengineering related projects 
from $1 million to $8 million, with most of these projects being based in the UK, US and 
Germany (Necheles et al: 2018). An interesting detail is that from 2008-2018 the vast majority 
of projects in Europe were government funded, whilst in North America the vast majority were 
privately funded (Necheles et al: 2018).24 This shows us that geoengineering research is 
happening and of interest to actors in the public and private sectors across North America and 
Europe. Moreover there are small research programs in other continents such as Asia and 
Australasia.25  
Given the popularity of geoengineering among certain relevant agents, it is hardly surprising 
that geoengineering has caught the attention of the wider political community. This can be seen 
in part by the numerous reports which are being produced on the governance of geoengineering. 
Between 2009 and 2014 at least ten governance reports were produced.26 These reports can be 
produced at the behest of political actors. For example, the Royal Society report was produced 
due to a request for information from the UK House of Commons Science and Technology 
Committee. Recently, the real-world interest in geoengineering has moved beyond a desire just 
for reports. Switzerland proposed a resolution at the Fourth United Nations Environment 
Assembly calling for an assessment of potential governance frameworks and methods. Despite 
                                                          
23 Although the absence of governance may not be the main reason why the SPICE project was cancelled, there 
were concerns about a conflict of interest over a patent held by a member of the team (Cressey 2012)  
24 It is challenging to be precise over exactly how much is spent, in part due to difficult questions as to what counts 
as geoengineering research in contrast to an atmospheric physics experiment. 
25 There were no noteworthy geoengineering programs in South America or Africa between 2008-2018, but this 
should not be mistaken for a lack of interest in the technology.  
26 Namely: The NOVIM Report, The Royal Society Report, The Congressional Research Service Report, The 
Bipartisan Policy Center Report, The Kiel Earth Institute Report, The SRMGI Report, The Wilson Center Report, 
The Ecologic Institute Report, The National Academy of Sciences Report, and The EUTRACE Report. 
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this resolution being rejected, it does indicate that a conversation is already taking place about 
how geoengineering can work. 
The examples above are meant to illustrate that geoengineering already appears to be popular 
among certain actors and that moves are being made for geoengineering technologies to be 
researched and developed and also governed.27 Yet this is not enough on its own to justify the 
need for there to be principles of geoengineering governance. For that to be the case, it also 
needs to be clear that there are ethical causes for concern with geoengineering technology.  
 
1.2.2 Reasons for ethical concern 
 
Specific reasons for ethical concern will be explored in greater detail in chapter 2 of this 
thesis.28 For now it is sufficient to outline why there may be some ethical considerations with 
regard to geoengineering. As we have established, the climate is a background condition of life 
and geoengineering alters the climate, in ways that could have serious repercussions for basic 
rights.  Therefore geoengineering alters a background condition of life. This leads to ethical 
considerations such as: should humankind have the power to alter the background conditions 
of life? If the answer to this is ‘yes’, then the next questions are: should this power be 
distributed evenly? Could this power be legitimate? Would this power change how humans 
understand the other background conditions of life? I shall therefore explore how the whole 
issue of geoengineering raises questions about significant ethical considerations such as 
responsibility and harm. And by doing this, I will show how geoengineering is indeed an issue 
of ethical concern.  
Responsibility is an important notion in ethics. If we break something, we tend to think that we 
have an ethical duty either to fix it or replace it.29 Hence there are questions about whether 
geoengineering undermines our common accounts of responsibility. If we accept that 
geoengineering is a less desirable option than climate change mitigation, then if the rich nations 
which refuse to mitigate were to offer geoengineering solutions instead, it would appear that 
                                                          
27 This is not a complete account of all the reasons for real-world concern with geoengineering since one could 
also point to the poor framings of geoengineering which are prevalent in public discourse some of these framings 
are considered in chapter 2. 
28 The concerns in chapter 2 will be specific to the type of geoengineering this thesis focuses on:SSI. The purpose 
of this subsection is to outline a more general account of why we should be interested in geoengineering ethics. 
29 Responsibility is a more complicated idea than this, but this captures our intuitive concern about responsibility. 
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they were not fulfilling their responsibilities because they are failing to act in a way that would 
minimise the impact of the problem they have created. They are not adequately fixing or 
replacing what they have broken. Therefore, insofar as we value responsibility, we need to treat 
arguments in favour of geoengineering with caution. 
Additionally, there is the appeal to one of the most basic of ethical considerations, which is the 
idea of doing no harm. Geoengineering is likely to be a harmful act, but we do not know the 
extent of the harm it will cause. It might lead to an increase in acid rain, or interfere with 
weather patterns, and it may well defer harm onto future generations, in ways that would violate 
their basic rights (Shepherd et al., 2009: 32).30 This means that geoengineering technology is 
likely to create new harms which we do not currently experience as a result of climate change. 
Moreover, it is not going to prevent all the harms caused by climate change. For example, 
geoengineering technologies which divert solar radiation do nothing to prevent ocean 
acidification (Shepherd et al., 2009: xi).31 The idea of geoengineering creating new harms and 
failing to alleviate old ones means that we have reason to find it ethically troubling. And this 
is only the beginning of the harm-based questions. For example, we might be worried about 
the distribution of harms from geoengineering or want to ask if they correlate to responsibility. 
These types of question are more complicated than I am suggesting here and will recur 
throughout the thesis. For the purpose of establishing whether geoengineering gives cause for 
ethical concern, it is enough to say that it creates some new sources of harm.32  
 
1.2.3 A case for governance in light of these real-world and ethical concerns 
 
Standing alone, none of these reasons may be compelling enough to take the governance of 
geoengineering seriously, but when considered together, the case is stronger than the sum of 
its parts. Considering the real-world reasons for the governance of geoengineering on their 
own, then just because something is popular, that is not necessarily a reason to govern it. 
                                                          
30 The reason why geoengineering may defer harm onto future generations is complicated, but it is explained in 
the section on the ‘termination problem’. 
31 The reason for this is that ocean acidification is a product of the carbon levels in the atmosphere. And SRM 
technologies (such as SSI) do nothing to decrease carbon levels. If anything, SSI may well incentivise high carbon 
levels. For an explanation of why there may be higher carbon levels, see my discussion of the moral hazard. 
32 There is another way we could make the case for geoengineering being an issue of ethical concern, which is 
simply to observe that there is a huge literature on the subject of climate change as an issue of justice. 
Consequently we would expect any prospective response to climate change to address these issues. It would be 
unusual if a response to an issue of justice did not raise any ethical concerns 
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Harmless (or minimally harmful) activities can be popular without the need for governance: 
the game of squash, for example. It is only when we consider the reasons to be ethically 
concerned about geoengineering as well that a case for governance becomes clear.  
The same point is true with regard to ethics. Something being deemed an ethical consideration 
is not sufficient grounds for governing that thing. There are at least two reasons why this may 
be the case. Firstly, the issue could be deeply personal and not the type of question which is 
subject to governance. The second reason is that governance needs plausibility. For example, 
we could say that there is something deeply unethical about the destruction of other galaxies, 
yet this does not create an onus on us to legislate to govern or prevent this because there is 
currently no plausible way for us to destroy other galaxies.  
If we only focus on issues which have both real-world and ethical reasons to take into 
consideration, then we are much more likely to have a case for governance. This may not 
always be so, of course, and I am sure it would be possible to imagine a case for governance 
without any real-world or ethical causes for concern. Nonetheless, with regard to 
geoengineering, it seems that the case for governance is more compelling when we consider 
the ethical and real-world causes for concern in combination. Taken together, the fact that 
geoengineering is popular among certain actors provides a real-world cause for concern, whilst 
the potential for inflicting additional harm indicates an ethical cause for concern. We then have 
a popular idea which may be harmful, and this clearly creates a need for good governance of 
the technology. 33 Moreover this case for governance does not fall foul of warning of 
exceptionalism or plan B framings of the need for geoengineering governance. 
                                                          
33 There is an alternative type of argument which can be offered in favour of geoengineering governance, and that 
is the anticipatory governance argument. The anticipatory governance argument emphasises the importance of 
foresight, engagement, and integration (Foley, et al, 2018: 228). This approach to governance is proposed for 
governing other types of emerging technologies, such as synthetic biology and nanotechnologies (Gorman, 2012). 
This approach also has some appeal due to it apparently problems which are associated with precautionary 
approaches to governance (Foley, et al, 2018: 228. This thesis is not deeply grounded in the anticipatory approach 
to geoengineering governance, in part because there is not much literature on how this approach would look in 
the context of SSI governance, with the exception of Foley, et al, (2018). I understand my approach as one which 





Understanding geoengineering governance: what is it and what has been proposed?  
In this section I shall offer clarity about geoengineering governance and the level at which it 
can occur. The clarity which I will provide is about the levels at which geoengineering 
governance can occur. Governance is a broad term, it captures the ways in which rules or 
guidelines are used to influence the research, development, or deployment of geoengineering 
(Chhetri et al, 2018: 3; Reynolds, 2019: 6).  There are a range of ways in which such 
governance can be achieved. These range from the establishment of norms which regulate 
behaviour, to the establishment of a centralised authority, which has the power to use coercive 
force to make agents obey a set of rules and regulations. This range can be clearly seen in 
Reynolds 2019 review of geoengineering governance proposals, in which he identifies at least 
5 categories geoengineering governance (Reynolds, 2019: 15-17).  
The first level of governance which Reynolds identifies is that of the deliberative 
intergovernmental institution where such an institution has the power to make important 
decision about the direction of geoengineering research, development, and deployment. 
(Reynolds, 2019: 15-16). For example, an institution which is comparable to the UNFCCC34, 
the idea of governance at this level is argued for by Albert Lin (2009). Looking beyond the 
UNFCCC Adam Abelkop and Jonathan Carlson (2013) as well as Ralph Bodle (2014) have 
argued for other international institutions to govern geoengineering. The distinctness of this 
level of governance can be seen when comparing it to the second level of governance which 
Reynolds identifies. The second level 'of governance also concerns intergovernmental 
institutions. However, in this case their role is only that of facilitating certain agreed upon 
actions between states, such as sharing information and resolving disputes, not that of 
coordinating all or any geoengineering research, development  or deployment programs 
(Bodansky, 2013; Armeni and Redgwell, 2015; Reynolds, 2019:16).  
The third level of governance which Reynold identifies is that of a small groups of states 
together to govern SSI (Reynolds, 2019:17). There is variation between scholars about who 
these small group of states are and what powers they would have (Benedick, 2011; Lloyd and 
Oppenheimer, 2014: Reynolds and Wagner: 2019), yet the general theme appears to be that the 
number of states required is between 25-30 and they would have advisory power about SSI 
                                                          




decisions. Yet this subject to the concern that if the powers are of only advisory would this be 
really be a site of governance which is fit for purpose of adequately addressing the ethical 
challenges which geoengineering creates. If the answer is no, then such governance appears at 
best inadequate and at worst a distraction and waste of time when time is limited. Yet if such 
governance doe have the power to make meaningful decision about SSI then it runs into a 
legitimacy problem due to the decision being made by a small minority of states.  
The fourth level of governance is not focused on states at an international level (Reynolds, 
2019:17). Instead the focus is on developing appropriate norms and codes of conduct. This has 
been proposed by Edward Parson (2017). Parson’s argues that this focus would be helpful for 
the further geoengineering governance. Whilst there is an appeal to this approach, namely that 
it does not seem to suffer from the challenges of having to navigate or create an intentional 
governance institution, its not without it its problems. An important concern with the norms 
based approach is simply whether or not norms are really reliable enough to act as be a source 
of governance of geoengineering in which we should place our trust.  
The FCEA report offers a broader understanding of national level governance, pointing to how 
nations already have regulatory frameworks which could capture much geoengineering activity 
at the national level (Chhetri et al, 2018: 23). For example, environmental law may restrict the 
possibility of field tests. Moreover if such law is inadequate national governments can develop 
their own laws to regulate geoengineering activates within the boundaries of their state. Finally 
you have those who hold that geoengineering should not be used, therefore governance should 
occur via a moratorium (Reynolds, 2019: 17). This view is held for variety of reason such as 
fears that it cannot be compatible with democracy (Szerszynski 2013;Hulme, 2014),35 that it 
raises security problems (Cairns and Nightingale, 2014), and it violates international law 
(Winter, 2011).36 
This shows that when thinking of governance one could vary from thinking of high level 
international institutions, to norms at the regional level or a moratorium on geoengineering 
research, development, and deployment. Therefore geoengineering governance of some form 
is already being practiced. There are norms which inform scientific practice when 
                                                          
35 Counter arguments to the view that geoengineering is incompatible with democracy can be in found in Heyward 
and Rayner (2016) and (Horton (et al; 2018).   
36 One might think that if geoengineering is problematic then the moratorium position allows you to avoid these 
problems, this is far from true, this is demonstrated in chapter when the risk-risk trade off frame is explained.  
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geoengineering is being researched, and there are domestic laws which act as a constraint on 
the remit of research projects (Reynolds, 2019: 7). 
It should now be clear why we have an interest in the governance of geoengineering and how 
geoengineering governance can be understood. This allows us to explore how the principles 
which have been proposed would govern geoengineering. To do this I will proceed by 
introducing perhaps the most famous proposed principles of governance, the Oxford Principles. 
This will be followed by considering some of the concerns which have been raised about these 
principles. Finally, this section will end by considering the work of Morrow (2017) who 
provides a summary of the principles which have been proposed from 10 repots, importantly 
drawing attention to where there is a consensus on these principles. The subsection should 
provide a picture of what principles exist to govern geoengineering, and make clear where in 
this picture the thesis will end up sitting. 
The Oxford principles are among the most influential set of principles proposed for the 
governance of geoengineering (Rayner et al, 2013: 500). They are the product of an inquiry by 
the UK House of Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology, launched after the 
Royal Society report on geoengineering, in order to find some principles to govern 
geoengineering. These principles have a broad scope because they were required to cover the 
governance of all geoengineering technologies.  
Perhaps of the first thing to note about these principles is that they were designed to cover the 
governance of geoengineering from research and development to deployment (Rayner et al, 
2013: 500). This means that they are designed to cope with a wide variety of problems. The 
principles are as follows: 
‘1) Geoengineering to be regulated as a public good 
2) Public participation in geoengineering decision making 
3) Disclosure of geoengineering research and open publication of results 
4) Independent assessment of impacts 
5) Governance before deployment’ (Rayner et al, 2013: 502-503). 
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The function of these principles is to act in the way legal principles tend to act (Rayner, 2013: 
504). This means they are not designed for particular cases, but tot be interpreted in the light 
of the specific cases. When discussing geoengineering, we can replace the word case, with 
geoengineering technologies. 
The Oxford principles are inform norms and procedures which are used to determine how 
geoengineering activates should take place, For example the SPICE project did have public 
engagement in order to conform to the second Oxford principle (Rayner et al, 2013: 509; 
Pidgeon et al, 2013, 451).  
However, whilst the Oxford Principles are broadly endorsed by many agents, such as UK 
government and by members of the international scientific community at the Asilomar 
Conference (Rayner et al, 2013: 500), they are not without their critics. A recurring concern 
amongst these detractors is that the principles operate at high a level of abstraction (Nature 
2012). Although this point seem to a product of people failing to appreciate the purpose these 
principles (Rayner et al, 2013: 504; Gardiner and Fragnière, 2018: 145). They are designed to 
operate at a high level of abstraction, and there are benefits of their doing so, such as their not 
requiring to rule on specific issues of geoengineering governance. This is particularly important 
as their do so may mean ruling on issues prior to the existence of the information necessary to 
make such rulings. Gardiner and Fragnière (2018) do provide a critique of the Oxford 
Principles. They are concerned about the frames produced from these principles and offer an 
alternative set of principles named the ‘Tollgate principles’. These are meant to be address the 
concerns they raise about the Oxford principles. In short their fear is that the Oxford principles 
leave open the possibility of ethics being neglected. For example, they argue that the 1st Oxford 
principle, which frames geoengineering as a public good, obscures the fact that there are 
important interests at stake for both the current generation, future generations and non-human 
nature (Gardiner and Fragnière, 2018: 152). Their argument is that the first Oxford principle 
presents geoengineering as a good for all, and consequently obfuscates the fact that there are 
different agents’ interests at stake which we should consider when certain decisions about 
geoengineering are being made. Consequently, the ethical considerations are harder to spot. 
This is true if one just reads the principles, although if one reads the Oxford Pinciples paper in 
full the legitimacy of this concern may be diminished, for the paper is explicit that the first 




It is not my intention to settle the debate between the Oxford and the Tollgate principles, only 
to give the reader a sense of what principles of governance for geoengineering have been 
proposed. Whist the Oxford and Tollgate principles are among the most noteworthy principles 
proposed for the governance of geoengineering they do not stand alone. David Morrow has 
produced a comprehensive survey of the views expressed in ten governance reports on 
geoengineering. Morrow identifies a number of principles of geoengineering governance from 
these reports and, depending on the degree of support these principles have across the reports, 
categorises them according to whether there is 1) universal consensus, 2) broad agreement or 
3) unresolved questions about the particular principle. Table 1 is based on the information 
contained in Morrow’s survey and is designed to demonstrate in a simple format which 
categories Morrow places particular principles into. Each of the principles listed is quoted from 
Morrow (2017, 6–12), who uses climate engineering (CE) as an alternative name for 
geoengineering. I shall not consider these principles in a point-by-point manner, since many of 
the points listed do not play a role in this thesis. Instead, I will focus on some of the points 





Table 1. Geoengineering Governance Principles as Categorised by Morrow (2017, 6–12)  
Universal consensus Broad agreement Unresolved questions 
‘If CE is ever deployed, it 
should be in addition to 
traditional mitigation and 
adaptation measures’ 
‘Governance should be 
proactive rather than reactive’ 
‘What are the objectives of CE 
governance?’ 
‘Existing laws and institutions 
provide partial governance of 
CE but additional governance 
mechanisms are needed’ 
‘Governance arrangements 
should be flexible and adaptive’ 
‘Which institutions should take 
on which functions of CE 
governance? How should these 
institutions and the various 
governance mechanisms at their 
disposal relate to one another?’ 
‘A general moratorium on CE 
research is inadvisable at this 
time’ 
‘For now, informal, soft-law 
approaches to CE governance 
are better than formal, hard-law 
approaches’ 
‘Should there be an “allowed 
zone” for research? If so, how is 
it to be defined?’ 
‘Governance structures should 
encourage international 
cooperation and coordination 
on CE research’ 
‘Governance must strike the 
right balance between 
legitimacy and effectiveness’ 
‘How should transparency be 
operationalised?’ 
‘If research does proceed, 
transparency and openness are 
critical’ 
 
‘What form should public 
engagement take and how 
should it shape CE research and 
governance?’ 
‘Public engagement is 
desirable’ 
 
‘What role should precaution 
play in CE governance?’ 
 
Despite all the reports on geoengineering governance and all of the above principles, it would 
be a mistake for those who care about ethics to assume that we have an appropriate ethical 
apparatus for the governance of SSI. At the very least, it would be worth paying attention to 
some important ethical concerns about geoengineering and asking what a governance 
arrangement would look like which addressed this concern adequately. And asking too whether 
the geoengineering governance principles in Table 1 are adequate to address our ethical 
concerns.   
The aim of this introduction has been to present the case for why we might be interested in SSI 
being governed ethically and to introduce the reader to the idea that there are many proposed 
principles for the ethical governance of SSI and geoengineering more generally. The question 
now is: where does this leave us? There is a plethora of questions one could ask at this point. 
One could still question whether it is even appropriate to be having a discussion about the 
principles of SSI governance. Or one could choose some of the proposed principles and try to 
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evaluate critically whether they are actually desirable. Or indeed, one could take feasibility 




1.3 What the thesis will do 
 
My thesis adopts a different approach, however, because it is premised on the idea that a just 
regime for geoengineering can be designed to address certain ethical concerns about 
geoengineering. The thesis will focus on three specific concerns – the moral corruption 
concern, the moral hazard problem, and the question of how to include future generations – 
and it will provide some ways to think about whether the proposals for SSI governance might 
be capable of addressing these important ethical concerns.  
To achieve this, the thesis will proceed in the following way. Chapter 2 will provide the reader 
with the information they need to understand the thesis, to do this the chapter will introduce 
the reader to other ethical concerns with geoengineering, in order for the reader to be able to 
situate the concerns which this thesis focuses amongst the broader sets of concerns. Secondly 
the chapter will introduce two important frames which are used throughout the thesis, those of 
the risk-risk trade off and the prefect moral storm frame.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the problem of moral corruption. In short, the moral corruption fear is 
that agents will deceive themselves into thinking that SSI is ethically required or permissible 
in situations where it is not. This has a range of problematic implications, ranging from poor 
quality public dialogue on SSI to the potential for ethically problematic climate policy. The 
approach of Chapter 3 is to consider how transparency and accountability could serve as tools 
to address moral corruption. This investigation leads on to a criticism of how the principles of 
transparency and accountability have been articulated in geoengineering governance reports. 
Specifically, that these reports tend not to appreciate the necessary relationship between the 
two concepts if accountability is to function well and genuinely address problems such as moral 
corruption. 
 Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the moral hazard problem. In short, the moral hazard concern is that 
there will be a reduction in mitigation efforts due to SSI, and that this is bad, either because it 
increases the intensity of the climate change which will occur or because it increases the 
likelihood of SSI being used as a means to prevent such intense climate change. Chapter 4 
focuses on how the moral hazard complaint should be understood, drawing on both how the 
complaint is articulated in geoengineering governance reports and the philosophical literature. 
The chapter shows that the moral hazard complaint has yet to be formulated in a way which is 
fit for the purpose of being addressed via principles of governance. It rectifies this by providing 
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sufficient clarity about what the moral hazard complaint is, and this provides a foundation for 
being able to judge whether the complaint is addressed by a specific set of governance 
principles. Chapter 5 takes up part of this challenge by considering an intuitive solution to the 
moral hazard problem, namely, secrecy. This chapter has the descriptive aim of showing how 
secrecy could address the moral hazard problem, and this is then followed by a normative 
component of rejecting secrecy as a desirable principle for addressing the problem.  
Finally, Chapter 6 considers a different type of problem, which is how future generations could 
be represented in an SSI governance regime. The reason for considering this question is that if 
we accept the need for accountability in this context, then it appears that a just conception of 
accountability would require an SSI governance institution to be accountable to future 
generations in some form as well.  
There is variation in the approaches adopted in these different chapters. I understand this 
variation as a product of these chapters being interested in different kinds of questions. 
Chapters 3 and 5 are concerned with similar question of trying to understand if particular 
principles such as accountability and secrecy are capable of addressing particular concerns with 
geoengineering. Both of these chapter start by considering these principles at a theoretical level, 
but to judge their appropriateness for engaging with problems, both chapters consider what 
these principles could look like in practice. This is done by looking at examples of 
accountability and secrecy mechanisms in operation. 
 This is in contrast to the fourth chapter which is conceptual in nature, it is focused on 
understanding how the moral hazard can be understood, therefore it does not have this same 
kind of real-world practice to observe and draw upon. Instead the chapter focuses on the 
theoretical literature about the hazard, and the hazard is being used in reports on geoengineering 
governance to present an understanding of the hazard. Finally chapter 6 is interested in a 
different type of problem. I understand chapter 6 as asking an applied type of question, which 
goes if we accept a principle which requires the representation of future people how could that 
principle appropriate in geoengineering governance. This is a distinctive question from the type 
which has been asked in other chapters, and whilst the chapter can draw on certain mechanisms 
which are in the real world like that of second chambers it is considering a mechanism of which 
there is a distinct lack of in the real world, so cannot there are case of this mechanism to draw 
upon in the way that chapters 3 and 5 draw on the mechanism of accountability and secrecy.  
Therefore chapters 3 and 5 can be understood as both asking questions about the 
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appropriateness of a principle, chapter 4 as understanding the nature of a problem, and chapter 
6 as being interested in how a principle can be applied.  
By focusing on these issues, the thesis will provide some tools for judging whether a specific 
set of geoengineering governance principles established by a particular institution is well 
placed to address the moral hazard and moral corruption concerns. This is indicative of how 
just this institution might be, given that these are both strong causes of ethical concern in 
relation to SSI. Yet these questions do not exist solely in the domain of geoengineering 
governance reports. There is also a political theory literature which seeks to engage with 
questions such as these, and indeed, these concerns were first articulated in theory. 
Consequently, this thesis also contributes to the political theory literature on governing SSI. 
The value of the thesis therefore is that it contributes to at least two valuable endeavours: firstly, 
judging whether principles of geoengineering governance do actually address certain ethical 
concerns, and secondly, contributing to the development, understanding and solutions for 
ethical concerns as expressed in the political theory literature. 
 
1.3.1 Narrowing the scope of the thesis: clarifying the type of geoengineering  
 
As has been explained, geoengineering can be performed in many different ways. The options 
vary from reforestation to putting mirrors in space. Given these two extremes, it may already 
be clear that these different methods raise quite different questions of governance. 
Consequently, given that different technologies create different questions of governance, it is 
necessary for me to choose a specific technology to focus on if I am going to establish some 
specific principles of governance. In order to make this choice, I propose to draw on the criteria 
set out in the previous section and show that one particular type of geoengineering technology 
excels at meeting the condition of both real-world and ethical concerns with geoengineering. 
That technology is called solar stratospheric aerosol injection (SSI). 
SSI is the idea that geoengineering is possible by putting sulphur particles in the stratosphere. 
These particles have reflective properties, they scatter the incoming solar radiation, and 
consequently reduce the total amount of solar radiation which passes through the stratosphere. 
This will have a cooling effect, because solar radiation is a source of heat. Our knowledge of 
this is partly based on how we understand the effects of volcanic eruptions (Shepherd et al., 
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2009: 29). When volcanoes erupt, they send sulphur into the stratosphere and this has a cooling 
effect. 
Whilst SSI is thought about as a way to reduce the global temperature it does have other impacts 
as well .Modelling has shown that SSI could have the following effects: Drought in Africa or 
Asia, Ozone depletion, continued ocean acidification, impacts on tropospheric chemistry, and 
raid warming if stopped (Robock, 2016).37 The extent of these impacts is dependent in part on 
the quantity of sulphur which is injected into the stratosphere (Irvine et al, 2016: 95).  
SSI has some interesting features. It is relatively cheap. It could cost as little as $1 billion per 
year to deploy (Keith and MacMartin, 2015). The relative cheapness is clear when the cost of 
SSI is compared to the cost of mitigation efforts which could be $200-350 billion per year by 
2030 (Ritchie, 2017).38 Callies helpfully shows the relative cheapness of SSI by reminding us 
of how much damage can be done by unmitigated climate change, which Nicholas Stern 
projects would cost 5% of global GDP and William Nordhaus predicts it would be 2.5% of 
GDP (Callies, 2019a: 19).39 
 An additional interesting feature of SSI is that it starts having an impact on the global 
temperature within weeks of being deployed, this is fast by many standards, and importantly it 
is relatively really fast. This point is clearly made in the Royal Society report on 
geoengineering, which identifies SSI as the being amongst the fastest forms of geoengineering 
to have an effect on the global temperature (Shepard, 2009: 48).40  The cost and efficacy of SSI 
are appropriately described by Daniel Callies as SSI’s ‘great merits’ (Callies, 2019a: 7).  
I will now show how SSI fits the condition of real-world concerns. SSI has always had a 
prominent place in discussions about geoengineering among policy-makers and scientists. It 
had the privilege of being the example of geoengineering used in a publication by Paul Crutzen, 
which is perceived as breaking the taboo on the subject (Crutzen, 2006), and it has kept its 
place as one of most discussed forms of geoengineering. This can be seen in the work of people 
such as David Keith, who has written a book which makes the case in favour of SSI, and Mike 
Hulme, who has written a book arguing against SSI (Keith, 2013; Hulme, 2014). The economist 
                                                          
37 Some of these effects are considered in more detail in chapter 2 such as the raid warming which would occur if 
SSI were stopped.  
38 Although this understand of the cost of mitigation is one which does not account for the co-benefits of mitigation 
39 It is important to note that even the conservative number of 2.5% of GDP is significantly high than the cost of 
mitigation which are not even 1% of global GDP  (Ritchie, 2017)  
40 It can also have an impact much on global temperature much faster than mitigation efforts, due to life time of 
carbon in the atmosphere, this was explained in the first part of this chapter,  
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who engage with geoengineering such as Barret and Levitt use the case of SSI to make their 
arguments, for them the cheapness of SSI in comparison to mitigation efforts seem to motivate 
there interest. The point is that this literature, which is aimed at policy-makers, takes SSI (as 
an example of SRM) seriously. It is clear that SSI meet the real world concern criteria from 
part 1.2.1 of this introduction.  
The second condition to meet is that of SSI raising issues of ethical concern. There are many 
ways in which SSI raise ethical causes of concern (Preston, 2013).  The case in favour of SSI 
meeting the ethical causes of concern criteria becomes clearer in chapter 2 when specific ethical 
concerns about SSI are explored. For the moment it is sufficient to draw attention to the fact 
that SSI is capable of inflicting harms which violate basic rights.41 SSI gives the agents who 
control it the power to effect the background conditions of live, used poorly or maliciously an 
agent could threaten the background conditions of life for many, by doing so violate many 
basic rights, at an extreme, the agent who controls SSI holds the power to inflict a mass 
extinction upon the world. Yet even if SSI is done well it still risks violating basic rights, for 
example when sulphur leaves the stratosphere it can enter earth systems via acid rain, which 
can be fatal, hence it can contribute to the violating of basic rights. 
SSI clearly meets both the conditions set out early in this chapter of being prominent in real 
world discussion and raising ethical concerns. It is therefore an appropriate type of 
geoengineering technology for this thesis to focus on. Therefore the problems of moral 
corruption, moral hazard and intergenerational inclusion raised in the context of SSI. It may be 
the case that the ways to address these problems in the case of SSI are applicable to other 
geoengineering technologies, yet this possibility is not explored in the thesis, given the relvance 
of SSI the thesis solely focuses on it.  
 
1.3.2 Narrowing the scope of the thesis: clarifying the level of governance  
 
Any project on geoengineering governance should provide a degree of clarity about the level 
of governance which it will focus on. There are several domains of governance which could 
seek to control and legislate on geoengineering practices within their domain. This could range 
from the regional level to the national level to international blocs right up to the level of global 
                                                          
41 Earlier in this chapter the case was made that there are a plurality of reason for thinking that geoengineering 
could raise ethical concerns, and that violation of basic rights is one of them.  
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governance. There is no ‘right’ level of governance to be found, as was explained earlier all of 
these levels of governance are of interest and have a role to play. Nonetheless one needs to be 
aware of the level of governance which they are focusing on. It seems to me that the level of 
global governance is sufficiently interesting to be studied, but that does not mean that it is more 
important or interesting than other levels of governance. I will therefore explain why this thesis 
chooses the level of global governance for its focus. 
The main reason why I choose to focus on the global level of governance is that it seems 
particularly well placed to address certain ethical problems which I argue are very serious. 
These are the moral hazard problem, moral corruption and how to include future generations. 
This is due to the nature of climate change being a global problem and consequently that 
geoengineering has global implications. Hence, many of our ethical concerns with 
geoengineering also have a global scope. Consider the issue of the moral hazard. The idea that 
the mitigation behaviour of agents might be adversely affected by SSI is something which is 
true of agents in any part of the world. Therefore, even if an international bloc such as the 
European Union (EU) had perfect principles of governance in place to address the moral hazard 
of SSI, it would not be able to address the problem in its entirety, due to there being relevant 
agents acting outside the EU. As explained this is not to claim that the level of global 
governance is the most interesting or appropriate to govern SSI just that it is sufficiently 
interesting to think about. 
The appeal of focusing on the global level is compounded when we consider the different 
reasons people have to be interested in the climate. As already explained, the climate is a 
background condition of life. Consequently, everyone has a strong interest in the climate. 
Given the strength of this interest, it is difficult to conceive how a governance arrangement for 
SSI could be considered just if it excluded the representation of the strong interests of agents 
from all parts of the world. This is to say that SSI governance has to happen at the global level, 
just that the global level if sufficiently interesting to be the focus of this project42 
  
                                                          
42 Although the analysis of these problems is carried out with the global level in mind, it may well be the case that 
much of the analysis is also applicable to other levels of governance. 
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1.3.3 A comment on method  
 
Here I provide a comment on the methodological commitments underlying the thesis. There is 
no unifying methodology to this thesis in part due to the variety of tasks it performs. As 
mentioned, this thesis engages with distinct but mutually advantageous tasks of conceptual 
clarification and normative argument, as well as considering how a normative principle could 
be institutionalised. Therefore, I elaborate on the methodological commitments which are 
adopted in the normative components of this thesis.43 A reason for highlighting one’s 
methodological commitments is that they are indicative of what expectations we can have about 
a project. Thus by outlining my methodological commitments, I seek to provide a sense of the 
theoretical space in which the project is operating.  
A number of different distinctions have been drawn in the recent literature on methodology in 
normative political theory, such as whether the project is one which assumes full or partial 
compliance (Rawls, 1999: 8; Valentini, 2012), whether it is realistic or utopian (Waldron, 1999, 
Williams, 2005, Cohen, 2008; Valentini, 2012: 4), or whether it is focused on transitional or 
end states (Rawls, 1999; Sen, 2006; Stemplowska, 2008). Hence I shall comment on what I 
understand to be the most relevant of my methodological commitments, which is how I 
understand the factual constraints under which normative political theory should operate; 
specifically, how I understand political constraints. My understanding of constraints is 
informed by Gilabert and Lawford-Smith (2012), who usefully identify two types of 
constraints: hard and soft. The former are constraints which will always be present, whilst the 
latter will not necessarily be forever present.   
The distinction between hard constraints and soft constraints can be understood by considering 
two features: whether the constraint is malleable and whether it is understood in probabilistic 
terms. Phenomena which can be understood as possessing both these features can be 
understood as a soft constraints (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, 2012: 814). Social, political, and 
economic institutions are malleable; this can be seen by observing the history of these 
institutions in which we can see radical changes from ancient societies to the present day. In 
contrast, laws of science are taken as hard constraints; gravity is not malleable in the sense that 
political institutions are. 
                                                          
43 Specifically chapters 3, 5 and 6.  
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 I do not consider this thesis to be bound by soft political constraints, such as the type of 
political institutions which currently exist or which we think are likely to exist in the future. 
Instead, the thesis is interested in understanding the potential for principles to address specific 
ethically concerning features of SSI governance. Chapter 6 also considers how one of these 
principles could be realised in an institution.  This results in a novel political institution being 
proposed in order for future generations to be represented in SSI governance, as opposed to 
considering incremental changes to current institutions in the hope of representing future 
generations. This type of question is a legitimate pursuit in the realm of political theory, and is 
not contingent upon facts about prevailing or likely political institutions.  
This type of methodological approach is also not uncommon when considering questions of 
climate justice. In particular, I understand it as being consistent with the view that Gardiner 
adopts when he grounds his argument for a global constitutional convention in political reality 
(Gardiner, 2014: 306).44 Gardiner explains that by taking political reality seriously, we 
understand the gravity of the problem at hand, and the failure of current institutions to address 
it (Gardiner: 2014: 306).   In this case, we understand the seriousness of the ethical concerns 
which are faced by SSI governance, their relation with the global institutional failure to address 
climate change, and we are aware of the absence of meaningful action to address these ethical 
concerns by prevailing political institutions.45 Secondly, taking political reality seriously means 
that the proposed principles are ones which are aware of the severity of the problems and are 
fit to address them. This second feature of political reality emphasises the importance of not 
being bound by soft political constraints, which otherwise may prevent appropriate principles 
and solutions being proposed.46   
It is noteworthy that those who do take the soft constraints of existing political institutions 
seriously can criticise those of us who do not as being unrealistic. To defend the position 
adopted in this thesis, it is not obvious that those who adopt soft political constraints have a 
monopoly on the idea of being realistic when it comes to considering ethical problems which 
institutions face.  In particular, existing climate governance institutions have a 30 year history 
of failure to tackle the problem of climate change. If one wished to adopt these failed 
institutions as soft constraints, then one would require admirable optimism to think that such 
                                                          
44 An argument which is explained in greater detail in chapter 6 of this thesis.  
45 Chapter 2 which is about framing is of significant relevance, for it is that chapter which seek to find the 
appropriate frame for problem at hand. 
46 This is clear when considering chapter 6 of this thesis, the ideas proposed such as a second chamber take 
seriously the need to represent future generations, but do not take soft political constraints seriously.  
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institutions could ethically govern SSI. Swift and White observe that we do not want political 
theory to be held hostage to public opinion; I would amend this statement so it reads that we 
do not want political theory to be held hostage to public opinion or inadequate political 
institutions (Swift and White, 2009: 63). And by not taking soft constraints seriously, we reduce 




1.4 Conclusion   
 
In this introduction I started by outlining the problem of climate change and how 
geoengineering may be a tempting solution for addressing it, given our collective failure to 
tackle climate change or prevent it from happening. This raised the question of what 
geoengineering is. I used the Royal Society report to explain it, and highlighted some causes 
of concern with the Royal Society report raised by Gardiner and Jamieson. Once it was clear 
what geoengineering is, I then tried to explain why we would want it to be governed. This 
emphasised the ethical causes for concern with geoengineering. It is also clear that different 
types of geoengineering raise different questions of governance and therefore I decided to focus 
on the case of SSI. This is due to its prominence in real-world discourse and the strength of the 
ethical concerns we have with it. The introduction then outlined some principles of governance 
which have been proposed in the past by drawing on the work of Morrow. This was followed 
by explaining the aim of the thesis, which is to consider the ethical problems of moral 
corruption and moral hazard and of including future generations and to see whether the 
principles of governance which have been proposed to date are actually fit for purpose.  
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2 Context and Frameworks  
 
The previous chapter has motivated an interest in the principles of governance for SSI. The 
purpose of this chapter is to give the reader the tools they need to understand the arguments 
presented in this thesis. To achieve this, two tasks will be performed in this chapter. One of the 
tasks is that of familiarising the reader with two frames which are used in all subsequent 
chapters of the thesis, those of the risk-risk trade-off, and the perfect moral storm. The other 
task of this chapter is to provide the reader with a sense of the ethical concerns which can be 
raised about SSI. This is necessary for a proper understanding of the risk-risk trade off frame. 
It also serves a secondary purpose of contextualising the core problems of moral hazard, moral 





2.1 A brief overview of a brief history of ethical concerns with geoengineering  
 
The goal of this subsection is to give the reader a sense of the ethical terrain which exists in the 
SSI. To do this, I will draw the reader’s attention to some of the key considerations in the 
literature on SSI ethics, this will build upon the causes of ethical concern with SSI which were 
presented in chapter 1.47 This subsection is not a complete overview of the literature, there are 
a plethora of ethical concerns with SSI, nonetheless this overview will allow the reader to 
situate the ethical concerns which this thesis focuses in the context of a broad set of ethical 
concerns about SSI. Additionally, this sense of the ethical terrain should help the reader 
understand the following subsection on the risk-risk trade off frame of SSI. 
Recall in chapter 1 the case for SSI being an issue of ethical concern. The argument pointed to 
the fact that there is a plurality of reasons for finding SSI ethically concerning. Particularly SSI 
raises the prospect of egregious harm, by being able to violate people’s basic rights. 
Additionally, it opens up the prospect of an abdication of responsibility by the wealthy nations 
of the world. This chapter builds on that preliminary discussion of harm and responsibility by 
outlining four more specific sites of ethical debate about SSI: objections of hubris; concerns 
about intra and intergenerational justice; problems of framing; and questions about how SSI 
compares to other responses to climate change. I go on to show how these issues are often 
grounded in more basic concerns about harm and or responsibility. 
Prior to 2009, there is a significant absence of literature on the ethics of geoengineering, at least 
by philosophers. Dale Jamieson appears to be the only philosopher to have written an article 
about the ethics of geoengineering (Jamieson, 1996). In this article, Jamieson proposes four 
conditions which any response to climate change, including geoengineering should meet. It 
must be technically feasible, have predicable consequences, produces a state which is 
preferable on socio-economic grounds, and does not violate well-founded ethical principles 
(Jamieson, 1996, 326). And from here we have the birth of philosophical literature on 
geoengineering ethics, which seems to be immediately forgotten about for the next decade.48   
 Although an awareness of ethical concerns did exist in some legal and scientific scholarship 
geoengineering (Bodansky, 1996; Keith, 2000; Crutzen 2006). Notably, Bodansky drew 
                                                          
47 For other overviews of the literature on geoengineering ethics see Preston (2012, 2013, and 2016) or Callies 
(2019a:11-14).  
48 That is not to say that the article is forgotten about, but that the philosophical community did not really engage 
with Jamieson’s proposals on the ethics of geoengineering for a decade after its publication.  
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attention to the features of geoengineering which could be politically and legally problematic 
such as its global impact yet uneven distribution of impacts as well (Bodansky, 1996). 
Moreover, an awareness of ethical concerns can be seen in some early scientific literature on 
geoengineering, for example Keith (2000) warns of the danger of the slippery sloop, technical 
fix arguments, and moral hazard. Additionally, in the article by Paul Crutzen, which crucially 
lifted the taboo on geoengineering research, the point is made that geoengineering does raise 
ethical issues (Crutzen, 2006: 217).49 Despite these publications, there appears to be a lack of 
engagement with the ethics of SSI prior to 2009. 
Yet from 2009 there was a shift in the engagement from philosophers with geoengineering, this 
shift at least correlates well with the Royal Society report being published, in which it explicitly 
states that “the greatest challenges to the successful deployment of geoengineering may be the 
social, ethical, legal and political issues associated with governance, rather than scientific and 
theoretical” (Shepherd, 2009 p xi). This brings what Christopher Preston terms the first wave 
of publication on geoengineering ethics (Preston, 2016: x).50 Whilst I will not adopt the wave 
framing for this section,51 it does correctly indicate that 2009 onwards is the beginning of a 
significant number of publications on geoengineering ethics.  
One of the most intuitive concerns about SSI is that of the hubris objection (Jamieson, 1996; 
Hamilton, 2013a, 2013b; Hartman, 2018; Callies 2019a: chapter 2). In general, hubris 
objections are concerns about playing god, in context the fear is that performing SSI would be 
playing god. There are at least two ways that this objection can be understood, it could be a 
claim that the use of SSI requires a god like control over nature which humans should not have 
(Jamieson, 1996). Or there is the claim that humans simply cannot have the knowledge to 
understand the impact of using SSI and that this should at least have implications for how we 
approach the use of SSI (Hamilton, 2013a, 2013b).52 
Second, it is widely acknowledged that SSI raises concerns of both intra and intergenerational 
justice. The literature on intragenerational justice is motivated by a concern about how different 
                                                          
49 Although the article does not elucidate the ethical concerns, it merely draws attention to the fact that they do 
exist.  
50 For Preston the first wave is characterised by asking questions of geoengineering technologies on their own 
terms, which means in the case of SSI, the first wave of geoengineering ethics would solely ask questions of the 
benefit and burdens of SSI in isolation, not by comparing them to alternative climate outcomes. This is in contrast 
to the second wave of geoengineering ethics which is understood as publications on geoengineering ethics which 
are in compared to the harms faced by climate change ( Preston, 2016: xii). 
51 The reason for not adopting Preseton’ wave framing is that it is an unnecessarily complicated way of grouping 
arguments about SSI for a reader who is unfamiliar with the literature on SSI ethics.  
52 For a detailed account of the Hubris objection see Hartman (2018).  
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groups will be adversely affected by SSI. These concerns tend to be grounded in the fact that 
not all agents have the same adaptive capacity the adverse impacts of SSI, and that the 
distribution of these impacts is uneven. There is distinct intragenerational literature on how the 
adverse impacts of SSI would affect the vulnerable and how this raises tough theoretical 
questions about SSI, such as those of consent, legitimacy and justice (Hourdequin, 2012, 2016, 
2018, 2019; Preston, 2012; Whyte 2012; Davies, 2013; Morrow et al, 2013; Svoboda, 2016, 
2017; Carr and Preston, 2017; Calles 2019). The early texts on this subject tend to focus on 
identifying that where vulnerability exists and that such vulnerability points raises an issue of 
justice, or that it is a source of ethical concern (Hourdequin, 2012; Preston, 2012; Whyte 2012). 
Then more contemporary texts seem concerned about how we account for this vulnerability 
(Hourdequin, 2016, 2018, 2019; Carr and Preston, 2017; Smith 2018; Callies, 2019a). Such 
approaches tend to understand procedural justice as at least part of the cite to address this 
vulnerability.  
There are also intergenerational concerns raised; these concerns tend to be about how SSI could 
wrong future generations. This ranges from concerns about the type of relationship that SSI 
would create between present and future generations (Smith, 2012, forthcoming), to how we 
could wrong future generations by presenting them with a future in which they have to make 
an undesirable choice about SSI (Gardiner, 2011; Ott, 2012). One of most prominent 
intergenerational concerns is that of the termination shock, which is a concern about how future 
generations could be adversely affected if they were to stop using SSI (Ott, 2011), this concern 
is considered in risk-risk trade off section of this chapter. 
There does appear to be a difference in the development of intergenerational literature as 
oppose to the intragenerational literature. The intragenerational literature has recently focused 
on how to address issues through institutional design (Hourdequin, 2016, 2018, 2019; Preston 
and Carr, 2018; Smith 2018; Callies, 2019a). Whilst there does not appear to be any literature 
focused on designing SSI governance institutions to avoid wronging future generation.53 At 
best there are suggestions about the importance of aggressive mitigation efforts to minimise 
the degree of the dilemma that future generations are placed in (Ott, 2012).  
Thirdly, issues of framing are also amongst some of the first to be raised about SSI. These 
concerns tend to be of the same spirit, which is that certain framings of SSI mislead or obscure 
                                                          
53 This absence of literature on how to address intergenerational issues serves as a strong motive for chapter 6 of 
this thesis.  
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important ethical considerations (Scott, 2011; Carr et al, 2011; Gardiner, 2013; Gardiner 2014, 
Morrow 2014; Fragnière and Gardiner, 2016; Heyward, 2016; Mclaren, 2016; Gardiner and 
Fragnière, 2018). The plan B / insurance framing of SSI are amongst the most heavily criticised 
frames of SSI; both of these frames make SSI sound unproblematic or even desirable (Scott, 
2011; Gardiner 2013; Fragnière and Gardiner, 2016). The public good framing of SSI has also 
been subject to debate, as explained in chapter 1 this framing of geoengineering is made 
prominent by the first Oxford principle describing SSI as a public good. Since then, Gardiner 
has been critical of this framing on the grounds that geoengineering is not necessarily public 
or a good in the technical sense (Gardiner, 2013; 2014; Gardiner and Fragnière, 2018). 
Although the public good framing of the principles has also been defended on the grounds that 
geoengineering does meet the technical criteria for being a pubic good, which means that the 
use of it does not prevent someone else using it (non-rival), and that an agent cannot prevent 
others from benefitting from it (non-excludable) ( Morrow, 2014). The theme of these articles 
is to observe how certain frames hide what is ethically at stake when considering SSI. Framing 
articles tend to be negative as well, in the sense that they tell the reader, do not frame 
geoengineering in terms X, as oppose to do frame it in terms Y.  
More recently there have been a development of articles which seek to understand what should 
be done in light of alternatives to geoengineering, in fact this is the explicit theme of Preston’s 
second edited volume on geoengineering ethics (Preston, 2016). For example, it is well 
established that SSI ought to be accompanied by aggressive mitigation if it were to be deployed 
(Baatz and Ott, 2016; Morrow, 2017).  Yet a more radical position in the literature now exists, 
it accepts the idea that SSI ought to be accompanied by aggressive mitigation if it were to be 
deployed, but then goes on to state that we are likely to be in circumstances where we have a 
moral duty to in act this mixed response (Baard and Wikman-Svahn, 2016; Horton and Keith, 
2016).  
We should now have a sense of where some of the core concerns about SSI; objections on the 
grounds of hubris, concerns about intra and intergenerational justice, fears of it being framed 
poorly, and questions of how it compares to other climate change responses, these are all 
significant concerns with SSI. This sense of the ethical terrain is valuable insofar as it 
contextualises the concerns which this thesis focuses on.54 To contextualise the concerns of 
                                                          
54 As explained at the beginning of this subsection, this sketch of the ethical terrain should be consistent with the 
general causes of ethical concern which were presented in chapter 1, the ethical concerns expressed her can be 
understood as specific instantiations of the concerns about harm and responsibility in the case of SSI.  
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this thesis, the concerns of moral corruption, moral hazard and intergenerational inclusion are 
the type of concerns which could stand beside the concerns which have been sketched in this 
subsection if one wished to provide an account of the ethical problems with SSI. If one wanted 
a complete explanation of the ethical concerns associated with SSI, they would at least have to 
explore all the concerns mentioned in this subsection, we well as many others.  
At the start of this subsection I expressed the view that these specific concerns are related to 
the causes of ethical concern identified in chapter 1; in some cases these are substantiations of 
the broad concerns expressed in chapter 1 about harm and responsibility. I shall now show why 
this is the case, by doing so I will show that the causes of ethical concern from chapter 1 and 
this subsection are complementary to each other. Consider the intra and intergenerational 
concerns with SSI. Many of these concerns point to ways in which vulnerability exists in the 
intra or intergenerational context (Gardiner, 2011; Hourdequin, 2012; Ott, 2012; Preston, 2012; 
Smith, 2012; Whyte 2012). The expression of the concern of vulnerability often draws both on 
considerations of harm and responsibility. For a vulnerability complaint to exist, there has to 
be an X which the agents are vulnerable to, this X is often a harm from SSI, such as changes 
to the African and Asian Monsoons. Moreover, there is often the observation that these 
vulnerable parties bear little or no responsibility for circumstances in which SSI would be used. 
The point about vulnerable parties lacking responsibility for the use of SSI draws attention to 
the perniciousness of the harms which would occur from SSI. Considerations of harm and 
responsibility seem to be common when articulating intra and intergenerational ethical 
concerns with SSI.  
The same is true of framing, as established concerns about framing which have been expressed 
in the literature tend to point to how certain frames hide what is ethically important in the case 
of SSI. Given that harm and responsibility are important ideas it follows that framing concerns 
can be expressed when either of these points are hidden by a frame. For example, some of 
concerns about the plan B and the global public good framing is that they both divert our 
attention form the harms of SSI (Gardiner, 2013; Fragnière and Gardiner, 2016).  
This is not to claim that all ethical objections to SSI will be grounded in harm or responsibility-
based concerns, the concern of hubris might be an example of one which does not fit as neatly 
into a concern about responsibility or harm. The relationship between the general cases for SSI 
being an ethical cause of concern from chapter 1, to the specific formulations of ethical 
concerns which have been presented in this subsection should now be clear.  
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Now that we have a broad sense of the type of concerns which can be raised about SSI, we can 
explore the risk-risk trade off framing. This frame requires a sense of the risks from SSI, which 




2.2 The risk-risk trade-off frame. 
As explained in the previous section, there are many framings of SSI which are problematic, 
such as the insurance, plan B and exceptionalism framings (Fragnière and Gardiner, 2016; 
Heyward, 2016). This is indicative of a trend in the literature on geoengineering and frames, 
which is that this literature is negative: it argues against rather than in favour of particular 
frames. Yet there are also framings which are helpful for capturing what is at stake. 
Prominently, there is the risk-risk trade-offs framing of SSI, which appears to be implicit in 
many discussions about SSI and explicit in the work of Reynolds and Fleurke (2013), Baatz 
(2016) and McKinnon (2018). The premise behind this frame is that any position one could 
adopt on SSI, ranging from a moratorium to research now, is one which comes with some risks. 
Therefore when adopting any position about SSI governance, one is trading risks off against 
each other.55 The FCEA report identifies three locations of risks which this framing captures 
(Chhetri et al, 2018: 4). The locations are the risks from researching or not researching SSI, 
the risks of deploying or not deploying SSI, and the risks of governing SSI. In this subsection 
I shall give an account of these risks to clarify the framing, which will then be used in the thesis 
to contextualise discussion. There is an additional benefit of exploring this frame, which is that 
it should give a clearer sense of specific complaints which can be raised about SSI.56 
The first risk which is often raised when thinking of researching SSI is the moral hazard 
concern. As explained earlier, the intuition behind this concern is that policymakers or the 
public may reduce their mitigation efforts in response to SSI research (Shepard et al 2009; 
Hale, 2012; Lin 2013; Morrow; 2014). An additional risk is that of technology lock-in, whereby 
the fact that a technology like SSI is being researched starts creating pressure for that 
technology to be deployed even if there is a lack of consensus about whether the deployment 
is desirable (Preston, 2013; Hulme, 2014; Callies, 2019a: chapter 2; McKinnon, 2019). There 
is also a risk that this technology may end up being harnessed by special interest groups, for 
example the military (Gardiner, 2013: 29; Long and Scott; 2013).57 It may also increase the 
                                                          
55 In this respect there is a stylistic similarity between the risk-risk trade off frame and the works from Preston’s 
edited volume (2016), where a theme of the volume is that the chapters are comparative to climate change 
scenarios.  
56 The intention of this subsection is to use the risks associated with SSI which were not considered in the previous 
subsection so that the reader gets a broader sense of the ethical concerns which exist about SSI. 
57 The reason behind this concern looks more compelling if one recalls previous military endeavours into weather 
invention, as can be seen in Fleming (2010), a prominent example being how the United Sates engaged with 
weather modification actives in the Vietnam War ( Fleming, 2010 179-182) 
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possibility of rogue deployment, for more agents will have knowledge about how SSI works 
(Gardiner, 2013: 29).58  
Yet as the risk-risk trade-offs framing implies, there are also risks which exist if SSI research 
does not happen. They are risks which occur from an absence of knowledge about SSI, these 
risks appear to range from we could perform SSI in a suboptimal manner, to we would use it 
dangerously, or that we would not be able to use it all. The suboptimal complaint is that we 
would not be aware of certain direct benefits from performing SSI (Keith 2013, 2017: Horton 
and Keith 2016: MacMartin, et al 2018) and that we would lack the knowledge of SSI to 
integrate into policy to pursue co-benefits from its use SSI (Buck, 2012: Stelzer and Schuppert 
2016). One of the most appealing co-benefits is the idea of SSI being able to help alleviate 
human development problems. It could be beneficial to crop growth and subsequently improve 
food security (Robock, 2016), it could allow people in poverty to use dirty fuels which may be 
banned in an aggressive mitigation scenario, and by doing so help alleviate energy poverty 
(Buck, 2012). Yet to fully understand the potential co-benefits of SSI, proper research into the 
impacts from SSI is required, if we are going to obtain knowledge of this and the other benefits 
associated with SSI. The dangerous complaint goes that if we lack the knowledge of how to 
use SSI safely, we are more likely to be in a situation where the use of SSI results in the 
imposition of dangerous risks, therefore research is required to reduce this risk (Keith et al, 
2010). There is also the concern that if we do not research how to deploy SSI, we would be 
unable to deploy it responsibly, it is estimated that it would take 20 years’ worth of research to 
know how to do this (Chhetri et al, 2018: 4).  
The risk-risk trade off also frames a way of thinking about the deployment of SSI. Some of 
these risks have already been explained in the introduction, such as the risk of undesirable 
climate impacts such as acid rain, and the fact that they are not equally distributed for example, 
an adverse impact upon the Asian monsoon (Kravitz et al, 2009).59 Moreover, just as the 
distribution of impacts is uneven across space, they are also uneven across time. It is possible 
that future generations will face worse climatic impacts than the generation which deploys SSI 
(Gardiner, 2011: chapter 10). Additionally, there is the risk of termination shock: the fear that 
if SSI were deployed, then any generation which discontinued the deployment of SSI would 
face rapid climate change. The reason for this is that SSI only hides the effects of some 
                                                          
58 Rogue deployment could occur from non-state actors or a set of states. Gardiner terms this a coalition of the 
willing (Gardiner, 2013:29).  
59 This concern has a relation to Hamilton’s hubris objection, namely that we cannot understand earth systems 
well enough to be able to predict all the risks.  
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greenhouse gas emissions. Thus if SSI stops, it stops hiding the impact of greenhouse emissions 
and the global temperature adjusts to levels it would be independent of SSI (Brovkin et al., 
2009; Irvine et al., 2012; Jones et al., 2013; Llanillo et al., 2010; Matthews & Caldeira, 2007; 
McCusker et al., 2012, 2014). The reason why this is feared is that the speed of this adjustment 
is meant to be fast, much faster than following a climate trajectory independent of  SSI 
(Matthews & Caldeira, 2007; Llanillo et al., 2010; Irvine et al.,2012; McCusker et al., 2014). 
This faster rate of change increases the amount of harm done by CC, due to there being less 
time to adapt to these harms (McCormack et al., 2016; Trisos et al., 2018).60 This does appear 
to be one of more discussed risks about the deployment of SSI.  
The risk of not deploying SSI is the risk of facing a world in which the temperature has 
increased, if we were to the follow our current projected pathway, by 3 degrees (Rogelj, et al, 
2016). As was also explained in the introduction, we have reasons to care about the climate, a 
prominent one being the fact that we are dependent upon it. This risk appears to motivate much 
of the interest in SSI research and development, so that we could deploy SSI to reduce the 
impact of climate change. This logic can be seen in a significant number of recent writings on 
SSI (Crutzen, 2006; Barrett, 2008; Michaelson, 2013; Reynolds and Fleurke, 2013; MacMartin 
et al, 2014; Moellendorf, 2014; Horton and Keith 2016; Callies, 2019a; Svoboda et al, 2019). 
Of course, the severity of these risks is not set in stone; depending on our actions now, we 
could face a world of significantly more or less than 3 degrees of warming, and this would of 
course alter the risk of not deploying SSI. For example, no one appears to advocate for 
deployment at this point in time, they tend to advocate for the use of SSI at the point in time 
when either SSI is part of an optimal climate response or when the risks from climate change 
are simply too great (Reynolds and Fleurke; 2013; Moellendorf 2014; Horton and Keith 
2016).61     
                                                          
60 Although are also those who hold that the termination shock fear is overemphasised, Parker and Irvine (2018) 
think that the termination shock is simple to address, they do not think that political actors would choose to behave 
in such a way that the termination shock occurs, so all that is needed is to ensure that this appropriate protection 
of the infrastructure which deploys SSI, so that it cannot be damaged.  This position is vividly critiqued on the 
grounds that it depends on ‘heroically optimistically assumptions’ about the motivations of political actors 
(McKinnon, 2019). Secondly there is Florian Rabitz (2019) who argues that the termination shock carries too 
much weight in discourse about SSI, and that it is no more problematic than risk which exist in nuclear non-
proliferation agreements, are response to pandemic threats or global financial markets. All of which, if they were 
to fail would have devastating consequences.  
61 For those who are tempted by the idea of deploying SSI once climate change is bad enough, they would do well 
to heed the warning of Jamieson, who aptly observes that one person’s climate emergency is another’s bad day 
(Jamieson, 2014: 221). The point is that unless there is an agreement on what climate change being bad enough 
is then this attitude is going to result in significant disagreements.  
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There are also risk-risk trade-offs faced in the governance of SSI. For example, consider a very 
well-regulated governance regime which is designed to meet important normative criteria such 
as that of procedural justice, which requires that all relevant agents are appropriately included 
in the decision making process (Hourdequin, 2018, 2019; Callies, 2019a: chapter 6). Such a 
regime may take a long time to make decisions and effectively constrain our ability to respond 
to SSI at a meaningful speed. Vice versa, an SSI governance regime which is very fast at 
making decisions may fail to meet the standards of procedural justice, due to it restricting the 
set of agents who are able to exercise power in the decision making process. This is where the 
risk of substantial injustices to vulnerable groups exist, there is the risk that such a governance 
regime would fail to include future generations in some form and other marginalised groups 
(Hourdequin, 2012, 2016, 2018, 2019; Smith, 2012, 2018; Preston, 2012; Whyte, 2012). 
Additionally, there is the risk of poor governance creating the conditions which facilitate the 
rogue use of SSI (Keith et al, 2010). The rogue use of SSI could occur for a variety of reasons, 
military and economic reasons have both been raised in the literature (Gardiner, 2013; Wagner 
and Weitzman, 2015). The economic reason is particularly concerning in its simplicity. As has 
been established, the cost of SSI could be in orders of magnitude less than that of the cost of 
the burdens of climate change to a single state. For example, the cost of deploying SSI is 
comparable to the cost of a Hollywood blockbuster (Keith, 2013: IX), therefore, states face a 
financial incentive to perform SSI. This creates the free-driver problem, whereby multiple 
states are incentivised to go rogue and pursue SSI policy, independently of the actions of other 
states (Wagner and Weitzman: 2015; 99-101). A well-regulated and enforced SSI governance 
regime should be capable of preventing the rogue use of SSI.  
Earlier in this chapter, we considered the criticism of certain framings used in the SSI literature. 
A common theme of these criticisms is that problematic frames obscure what is ethically at 
stake by adopting inappropriate language, such as that of emergency or plan B. It seems that a 
similar concern can be raised about the risk-risk trade off frame; it could invite the reader to 
engage in an exercise of trading off benefits and burdens of climate change against those of 
SSI, in a problematic way.  
To see the problematic way that comparing risks can occur, we need to consider some 
observations by Gardiner regarding cost-benefit analysis, particularly how the term can be used 
to refer to different techniques. The first technique is that of a pros and cons analysis; this is 
simply where the positives and negatives of a situation are identified and analysed, and this 
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technique in some form seems unavoidable when making ethical judgements (Gardiner, 2016: 
77). Secondly, there is net benefit analysis; this is where the controversy starts. Net benefit 
analysis assumes two points: firstly that the benefits and costs are comparable, secondly that 
we should aim for that situation whereby the sum of the benefits is as high as possible 
(Gardiner, 2016: 77). This second assumption is particularly concerning in our case, as we are 
not indifferent between the distribution of benefits and burdens which occur from this risk-risk 
trade off. Despite the limitations of net benefit analysis, it is common place in many academic 
and public policy locations (Griffen; 1998; Pearce, 1998; Held et al, 2016) Given the 
prevalence of this net-benefit approach, I fear the risk-risk trade off frame could mistakenly 
invite a net-benefit analysis, which hides the ethical issues at stake when making a judgement 
about a position to adopt on the risk-risk trade off spectrum. The solution which this thesis 
adopts for this problem is to also use the perfect moral storm framing, which puts ethical 
considerations at the centre of our analysis; the way this works will be explained in the 
following section. 
The risk-risk trade off frame has an additional benefit, which is that it provides a way to think 
about criticisms of ways to engage with SSI. Consider the governance spectrum which was 
introduced in chapter 1: one could argue in favour of a position anywhere on the spectrum, 
from a new global governance institution, to SSI governance based on norms, or a moratorium 
on governance entirely. The risk-risk trade off frame illustrates the point that none of these 
points on the spectrum of governance are risk free. They will all require trading off certain risks 
against each other. This is highly important, since it shows that the fact that a position on the 
governance spectrum comes with risks is not a reason to reject that position. For the presence 
of some risks is unavoidable when taking a position on the type and form of SSI governance. 
Therefore, when forming judgements about SSI we know that risk is in part a price of having 
that judgement. The risk-risk trade off frame effectively draws attention to this idea.  
The risk-risk trade off frame can be used to show how strong arguments regarding 
geoengineering are underdeveloped. Nightingale and Cairns (2014), have a powerful and useful 
paper in which they systematically draw attention to the security risks which researching SSI 
creates. One of their key arguments is that SSI will end up under the control of the military not 
scientists (Nightingale and Cairns, 2014: 5). The conclusions of their paper is that there should 
be a moratorium on SSI research due to the unacceptable security risks which it poses. This is 
persuasive, but the risk-risk trade off frame shows us that their argument is not yet complete; 
the question which the risk-risk trade off frame invites us to ask is ‘would these risks still exist 
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if SSI research was banned’? Plausibly, it is not clear that banning the research of SSI would 
prevent or even reduce the likelihood of militaries researching it. The risk-risk trade off frame 
invites important critical questions to be asked regarding their paper, the omission of these 
questions makes their argument appear somewhat incomplete.  
One may accept the point about the risk-risk trade off having virtues in comparison to cost 
benefit analysis, but wonder whether it is desirable in comparison to other possible frames 
which we could adopt. As explained earlier in the chapter, most of the published work on 
geoengineering and frames is done in the negative style of criticising frames, as opposed to 
arguing in favour of a frame. Here I will provide an example of how the risk-risk trade off 
frame compares favourably to an alternative possible frame.62 The alternative frame being a 
precautionary approach to geoengineering.63  
When thinking of the precautionary principle, it is important to be clear that this principle has 
been understood and used in very different ways to generate different conclusions (Elliot, 2010; 
Hartzell-Nichols, 2012; Reynolds and Fleurke, 2013; Tedsen and Homann, 2013; Morrow, 
2014). Therefore one cannot claim to analyse what the precautionary principle will prescribe 
in this case; instead I need to specify how a particular understanding of the precautionary 
principle could function. Here I will adopt Lauren Hartzell-Nichols’ understanding of 
precautionary principle, which I think captures it well. Hartzell-Nichols defends a catastrophic 
precautionary principle when making judgements about geoengineering. This principle states 
that ‘Appropriate precautionary measures should be taken against threats of catastrophe’ 
(Hartzell-Nichols, 2012: 160).  
To demonstrate the different impacts of these frames, let’s consider what these frames tell us 
about the prospect of SSI being researched. Hartzell-Nichols comments on how the 
catastrophic precautionary principle would endorse research into SSI, as long as such research 
does not pose a catastrophic risk (Hartzell-Nichols, 2012: 167-168).64 As Hartzell-Nichols 
argues, small-scale research does not appear to generate catastrophic risks; therefore the 
                                                          
62 The risk-risk trade off frame is compared favourable to the insurance frame in part 4.2 of the thesis when 
considering why the classic insurance understanding of the moral hazard problem is inappropriate when the moral 
hazard objection is raised in the case of SSI.  
63 It is important to note that the precautionary frame is not the only way of understanding the precautionary 
approach, it is commonly understood as a principle as well. There is perhaps certain oddness in describing the 
precautionary principle as a frame, I suggest that the fact that precautionary principle is being used as a frame 
despite it not being the most natural use of the precautionary principle should be understood as indicative of the 
lack of positive frames which have been proposed to consider geoengineering.  
64 The precautionary principles of Elliot (2010), Reynolds and Fleurke (2013), and Morrow (2014), reach 
comparable conclusions of endorsing limited research into geoengineering.  
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catastrophic precautionary principle would endorse research into SSI as a guard against the 
catastrophic risks of climate change. Moreover further research into SSI would be endorsed 
insofar as there is no reason to think that such research imposes a catastrophic risk.65 In contrast, 
the risk-risk framing should bring all relevant risks to the surface regardless of their 
catastrophic nature; the insights in this case from the risk-risk trade-off frame have already 
been explained in this section.  
The precautionary principle comes with a strong normative commitment to avoiding 
catastrophe, and that normative commitment is informative of much of the analysis which 
comes out of that principle. Here we can see a distinct difference from the risk-risk trade off 
frame, which comes with no such normative commitments. This points to a distinct advantage 
of the risk-risk trade-off for this project, since the background normative commitments of this 
project have already been outlined in Chapter 1. Thus the task of this chapter is to provide a 
frame which will highlight the relevant features of geoengineering. Once we are aware of these 
features of geoengineering we can consider them in light of our normative commitments. The 
ability of the risk-risk trade off to provide a lucid description of a situation without drawing 
upon strong normative commitments is a strong reason to adopt this frame for this project.  
In summary, the risk-risk trade-off frame is helpful because it provides a way of thinking about 
the nature of the ethical challenges involved in SSI governance. It is a fact that any position on 
SSI governance, ranging from a moratorium, to extensive governance of all stages of SSI at 
the level of a global institution, comes with risks. Any position adopted in this thesis is one 
which will be making judgements and trading off some of the risks against each other.  
  
                                                          
65 The termination shock can be understood as a catastrophic risk, as things stand it appears that  the catastrophic 
precautionary principle would reject research which creates conditions for the termination shock to happen, the 
truth of this is not contingent upon how unlikely researchers think the termination shock is to happen.  
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2.3 The perfect moral storm 
 
This section shall provide an explanation of Gardiner’s perfect moral storm (Gardiner, 2011). 
The reason for using the perfect moral storm is that it offers a useful framework for 
understanding the problem of climate change, and the ethical problems which arise from SSI, 
including those of moral corruption, the moral hazard, and the intergenerational problem of 
inclusion. Importantly, this should not be seen as a competing framework to the risk-risk trade 
off, since they focus on different issues. Whilst the risk-risk trade off frame presents an 
understanding of how judgements about SSI are made, the perfect moral storm presents an 
account of the background conditions against which climate change policy occurs. The 
complementary nature of these frames is explored at the end of this subsection, once the perfect 
moral storm has been explained.  
Gardiner’s project in a Perfect Moral Storm is to understand the nature of the problem of 
climate change.66 He tries to offer an uncontroversial characterisation of this problem, by 
framing it in ways that all morally serious people should be able to accept. The purpose of the 
book is to provide a prerequisite for identifying desirable solutions to climate change. We 
cannot find appropriate moral theories if we do not understand the nature of the problem. 
Therefore, the Perfect Moral Storm is a vital tool for being able to develop appropriate moral 
theories to combat climate change. The method he chooses for this framing is centred on the 
notion of storms. The choice of the storm frame is due to storms being bad, and the fact that 
multiple storms can converge to make a situation much worse. Gardineridentifies the 
convergences of three different storms which threaten our ability to ethically respond to climate 
change:the global, intergenerational and theoretical storm (Gardiner, 2011: 11). He 
acknowledges that there are possibly more storms, such as an ecological storm, but the tools 
required to identify them require more controversial assumptions, therefore he avoids engaging 
with them.67   
The first part of the book focuses on the global storm, which describes the global environmental 
problem with a sole focus on the present generation. To understand the nature of the climate 
change problem, Gardiner considers the tragedy of the commons framing; such a frame has a 
                                                          
66 Technically Gardiner understands the storms as understanding the global environmental problem of which 
climate change is a core case. Given the focus of this thesis I shall use the perfect moral storm as a way of 
understanding climate change, not the global environmental problem.  
67 In later writing Gardiner does give more detail about the ecological storm (Gardiner, 2016), although he is still 
yet to provide a detailed account of this storm.  
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prima facie appeal to explain the structure of the climate change problem and is notably adopted 
in the work of Posner and Weisbach (2010). The tragedy of the commons is a situation where 
individually rational behaviour undermines the possibility of reaching an outcome which is 
collectively rational (Hardin, 1968). In the case of climate change, the logic suggests that it is 
collectively rational for states to limit the total amount of global emissions to avoid harms from 
climate change, yet no country wants to the bear the burden of cutting their own emissions, 
they would rather free ride (Gardiner, 2011: 28). The tragedy of the commons is a tricky 
situation, but one where is there much literature; a common solution is that of having an 
institution with coercive power to make it individually rational for agents to do what is 
collectively rational (Vogler, 1995; Hall, 1998).68 This means that the climate change problem 
could be addressed, if one were to have the appropriate global governance institution (Gardiner, 
2011: 29). 
Gardiner argues that addressing climate change is not as simple as the tragedy of the commons 
understanding would have us believe. Gardiner offers three reasons that highlight how the 
tragedy of the commons understanding of the climate change problem fails to capture the role 
of scientific uncertainty, deep roots and skewed vulnerabilities (Gardiner, 2011: 29-32). The 
concern of scientific uncertainty is that it is not clear how each nation will be affected by 
climate change, and it may be case that nations are not convinced they are better off in a world 
in which climate change it addressed.69 The case for such uncertainty is compounded when we 
consider the deep roots problem. Here Gardiner observes that those agents with a vested 
interested in the continuation of a carbon intensive system wield economic and political power 
(Gardiner, 2011; 30-31).70 Hence you have wealthy agents funding the research and 
publications of papers which deny that climate change is a problem, or even deny the existence 
of climate change (Dunlap and Jacques, 2013; Elsasser and Dunlap, 2013). Thirdly, Gardiner 
observes that there is the problem of skewed vulnerabilities. This is the problem that those 
countries which have contributed the most to climate change are those which are the least likely 
to be affected by it in the short term. The reason for this is twofold: due to their wealth they are 
better placed to adapt to the effects of climate change, and geographically they tend to be 
located in temperate zones. That means those states which are most at risk from climate change 
                                                          
68 For example, an institution could punish those who overuse their share of a common to the point at which the 
optimal use of that commons for individual is the same as what is rational for the collective.  
69 This could be in the sense of comparatively better off than other states under climate change. 
70 The concern of deep roots is also used to observe that responding to climate change may require changes in the 
way people live their lives, the extent of this change will in part depend on the availability of renewable energy 
(Gardiner, 2011: 31). 
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are those who contributed the least to it (Gardiner, 2011:119). Gardiner also makes the helpful 
point that countries do not participate as equals in the international system, some are much 
more powerful than others and history is littered with powerful countries abusing their power. 
This raises the concern that powerful countries will engage in exploitative practices when 
responding to climate change, this has been labelled as compound injustice (Shue 1996; 
Gardiner 2011). Combined, these concerns show why the problem of climate change is worse 
than the tragedy of the commons approach would have us believe, as it is not the case that all 
states are equally affected and equally able to respond to climate change. 
The rejection of the tragedy of the commons model brings many useful lessons. One which 
bears particular relevance to this thesis concerns the danger of skewed vulnerabilities and 
compound injustice. The lesson of skewed vulnerabilities is that some agents will be 
particularly vulnerable to decisions made about SSI. This is a product of geography, and 
lacking the means to adapt to the effects of SSI. Moreover, SSI governance could contribute to 
compound injustice by perpetuating current unjust global power structures. 
The second storm is the intergenerational storm. One would be right in already feeling 
depressed about the global storm, yet the problems posed by the intergenerational present an 
even greater challenge. When setting up the intergenerational storm, Gardiner reminds the 
reader that climate change is resilient; carbon emissions will stay around for much longer than 
present generation, 20–60% for at least 1,000 years, therefore we cannot prevent the effects of 
climate change purely from mitigation efforts (Gardiner, 2011: 33).71 Moreover, Gardiner 
reminds the reader that the total increase in temperature from the present generation’s emission 
will not be felt until these emissions have had their life in the atmosphere. This means that the 
full impact of our emissions is not experienced by us, but by future generations. Gardiner then 
asks the reader to assume that states do not represent the interests of the citizens significantly 
far into the future, a plausible assumption (Gardiner, 2011: 35).  
Gardiner then considers the question of how succeeding generations would behave in this 
situation.72 He thinks that most generations would rationally prefer the outcome when there is 
sufficient mitigation, in order to avoid harms from climate change.73 Yet when each generation 
has the power to mitigate, they prefer not to mitigate. The logic being that each generation 
                                                          
71 This is assuming an absence of scalable geoengineering technologies.  
72 For the purposes of the analysis he asks us to imagine that generations do not overlap (Gardiner, 2011: 170).  
73 The reason Gardiner say most is because the first generation is not is not affected by the behaviour of any other 
generation, so does not have the same rational interest in other generations mitigating.  
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receives the benefits from its emissions, but burdens are borne by future generations.74 Gardiner 
names this the pure intergenerational problem. Solving this problem is even harder than the 
conflict in the global storm, since with the global storm the question seems to be how you can 
design an institution which can get parties to behave in the way that they should do to each 
other. Yet in the intergenerational storm you cannot even get the relevant parties to partake in 
a coercive institution at the same time (Gardiner, 2011: 37). This raises the possibility of what 
Gardiner terms the tyranny of the contemporary, whereby each generation pursues its self-
interest to the detriment of future generations. A reason why the tyranny of the contemporary 
is particularly nasty is that when a generation fails to mitigate, the severity of climate change 
experienced by future generations will increase. Given that we can have grounds to fear that 
each generation will fail to sufficiently mitigate the situation, it appears that the severity is 
going to compound over time.75 The pure intergenerational problem also shows the inability of 
the tragedy of the commons system to understand the climate change problem, which instead 
appears to assume that a state represents the interests of all its future citizens. The usefulness 
of this for the thesis is that the intergenerational storm draws attention to the danger of the pure 
intergenerational problem and the danger of the tyranny of the contemporary in climate policy 
decision making.  
 The theoretical storm reflects the failure of moral and political theory to cope with challenges 
raised by climate change: in this list are “intergenerational equity, international justice, 
scientific uncertainty, persons whose existence and preferences are contingent on the choices 
we make, and the human relationship to animals and the rest of nature” (Gardiner, 2011: 213-
214). Yet political theory is not alone in having theoretical limitations when it comes to 
engaging with climate change. Take cost benefit analysis, a tool which seems very poorly 
equipped to deal with analysing climate change despite being used to do exactly that, notably 
by William Nordhaus (2009), and Nicholas Stern (2007). The inadequacy of cost benefit 
analysis stems from the fact that it requires questionable moral judgements to work in the case 
of climate change, ranging from choosing a discount rate, to putting a monetary value on many 
components of the analysis, including statistical lives and environmental quality (Broome 
                                                          
74 Gardiner provides a technical analysis of why this situation is worse than an intergenerational prisoners dilemma 
account of the problem would have us believe., I shall not explain that here, since it does not add much to the 
analysis of this thesis (Gardiner, 2011; chapter 5)  
75 Gardiner does provide an analysis of how this can result in a tragic future where severely burdened generations 
may have to emit if it is there best form of generating the energy and wealth required to adapt to the harms of 
climate change, but by doing so poses an even greater burden to the next generation (Gardiner, 2011: 39-41). And 
this could happen indefinitely, every generation unnecessary bears a huge burden and passes an even greater one 
onto the next generation.  
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1992, 2012; Gardiner, 2016). One of the main points that Gardiner wants to make is that many 
of our key theoretical tools in society are inadequate for dealing with the climate problem. 
Therefore, even if policy makers did want to overcome the global and intergenerational storm, 
we would struggle to provide them with the appropriate theoretical tools for action. Despite 
this, Gardiner thinks we can deal with the climate crisis in the short to medium term, by using 
techniques such as identifying cases of moral failure. 
With this in mind, we should recognise that the perfect moral storm is a helpful account of the 
current situation in which climate change policy occurs. It proves a vivid rejection of the 
tragedy of commons framing of the climate change problem, which one might otherwise be 
tempted to adopt. By doing this, it draws attention to important considerations such as skewed 
vulnerabilities, compound injustice and the pure intergenerational problem. In the subsequent 
chapters, I will draw attention to how my arguments relate to these parts of the storm. For 
example, the following chapter on moral corruption is a product of the perfect moral storm as 
a whole. Additionally, chapter 6, which seeks to address the problem of intergenerational 
inclusion, is acting at the intersection between the intergenerational and theoretical storm. 
Broadly speaking, the perfect moral storm provides an account of the conditions against which 
our discussion of SSI is happening and why we might find it particularly tricky to address the 




2.4 Combining the risk-risk trade-off and perfect moral storm frames 
 
This chapter has introduced two different frames which will be used throughout this thesis. I 
shall provide a brief comment on the relationship between these two frames. The perfect moral 
storm provides a sophisticated account of the situation against which climate change policy 
occurs. Specifically, this account shows why it may be so hard for the current generation to 
make just responses to climate change. Given that the perfect moral storm can be understood 
as an important background condition against which judgments about SSI are made, the risk 
risk-trade off frame is a useful account of the type of judgments which one must make when 
choosing a stance on SSI policy. Trading off these risks may seem daunting in the best of 
circumstances, yet the perfect moral storm shows that we do not make that judgement in the 
best of circumstances, instead we make it in thoroughly challenging circumstances. The prefect 
moral storm then gives us reason to suspect that we will struggle to identify a just position 
when making these risk-risk trade-offs. A benefit of adopting the perfect moral storm 
framework to accompany the risk-risk trade of framework is that the perfect moral storm helps 
mitigate the concern that ethical concerns could get lost in a net benefit analysis approach to 
the risk-risk trade off frame. This is due to the perfect moral storm effectively highlighting the 
ethical challenges that responses to climate change face.  
Earlier in this chapter, I argued that the risk-risk trade-off frame alone would invite ethically 
suspect action. Hence the need for a moral framework such as the perfect moral storm to be 
combined with the risk-risk trade off frame to mitigate this danger. Now I shall consider a 
different question and provide a reason for thinking that it is beneficial to have the risk-risk 
trade-off frame in addition to the perfect moral storm frame. By doing so I illustrate how each 
frame benefits from being combined with the other. The perfect moral storm is a very effective 
frame for understanding that there will be ethical problems to be found when engaging with 
geoengineering. Yet it does not provide guidance on how these ethical concerns should be 
evaluated. For example, one may use the perfect moral storm to identify a set of ethical 
problems which are associated with SSI. This tracks the style of the first wave of ethical 
concerns which were raised with geoengineering, which tended to solely focus on identifying 
and understanding ethical problems which exist with geoengineering (Preston, 2016: xi). Yet 
there is a distinct limitation to this approach, which is that it misses the comparative nature of 
judgements about geoengineering. It is not enough to make a judgement about the ethics of a 
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particular response to geoengineering in isolation; such a judgement should involve 
comparisons with other possible approaches (Preston, 2016: xii). The risk-risk trade off frame 
is very useful for drawing our attention to the comparative nature of judgements about SSI. By 
the risk-risk trade-off highlighting this it guides ethical analysis via frames such as the perfect 
moral storm to help prevent these judgements falling foul of the error of forgetting about the 
comparative nature of these judgements.   
Overall, by combining these frames we create a framework which is simultaneously sensitive 
to the comparative nature of judgements about SSI, but does not allow the ethical causes of 
concern with SSI to fall out of sight.   
One could accept the point that the risk-risk trade off frame alone invites ethically suspect 
reasoning, and that we need an ethical framework to mitigate this, yet resist the idea that the 
perfect moral storm is the appropriate framework. Specifically, one might observe that the 
thesis has already introduced a normative framework of minimal rights. Perhaps all we need to 
do is recall this framework when considering the risk-risk trade off and we can see what is at 
stake in decisions about geoengineering governance, since many of the risks of SSI will 
endanger these minimal rights. This raises a question about whether we need the additional 
perfect moral storm frame in order properly to engage with the ethics of geoengineering 
governance. Indeed, we might be concerned that the addition of theperfect moral storm will 
confuse our analysis, by introducing two potentially competing normative standards. Yet the 
mistake lies exactly here, in thinking that the perfect moral storm is a normative standard 
comparable to the minimal rights framework, and one which serves a similar function. The 
perfect moral storm is descriptive in nature; it is a description of the challenge of climate change 
and the challenges we face in trying to address this issue. The great benefit of the perfect moral 
storm is that its description of these challenges is one which vividly draws attention to ethical 
problems. Yet it does not provide a normative standard by which to judge whether these 
problems have been adequately addressed. Therefore, there is no tension between the perfect 
moral storm framework and the minimal normative standard outlined in chapter 1. The thesis 
will show how drawing on both frames, together with a commitment to minimal rights, can 
help us to identify three key ethical challenges in SSI governance, and to begin to think about 





2.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has endeavoured to give the reader the tools they need to in order to engage with 
the following chapters of the thesis. To this end, it has provided the reader with a wider picture 
of the ethical concerns with SSI, which the problems of moral corruption, moral hazard and 
intergenerational inclusion sit among. Moreover, it has provided the reader with two frames 
which can be used to help make sense of what we are doing when trying to address the problems 










Moral corruption is a problem which our responses to climate change are susceptible to 
(Gardiner: 2011). A core case of moral corruption is the abuse of power in the belief that such 
behaviour is morally acceptable. To explore how the risk of moral corruption can be reduced 
in the governance of SSI, I will first provide an account of moral corruption. This will be 
followed by the conceptualisation of relevant concepts to address moral corruption, those of 
transparency, publicity and accountability. Before exploring who these concepts will be used 
to address moral corruption I will consider the language of geoengineering governance reports 
to show that these reports have failed to appreciate the relationship between this concepts. The 
chapter then proceeds by considering whether transparency, publicity or accountability holds 
any promise for addressing moral corruption. The analysis concludes that accountability does 
hold the potential to address some symptoms moral corruption, but that accountability does 
this if the conditions of transparency and publicity being met. The benefit of this analysis being 
that we now have a possible way of addressing moral corruption in SSI governance. 
This chapter also has value insofar as it contributes to understanding how SSI should be 
governed, independent of our concerns about moral corruption. By exploring the relationship 
between transparency and accountability in the context of SSI, the chapter shows how poorly 
this relationship has been understood by SSI governance reports. Such reports tend to highlight 
the virtues of transparency (Morrow, 2017: 8) but appear to misunderstand its value 
independent of effective accountability. Notably, accountability is absent from the Oxford 
Principles, which is one of the most well-regarded set of principles for geoengineering 
governance (Rayner et al., 2013). Consequently, the authors of these reports misunderstand the 
value of transparency which they place such weight on, and they are less likely to achieve their 
desired outcomes, for which effective accountability is required.  
The relationship between transparency, publicity, and accountability is still neglected and 
poorly understood, even in contemporary works on the topic. Recently, a report was produced 
called The Governing Solar Radiation Management Report: Academic Working Group on 
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Climate Engineering Governance (Chhetri et al., 2018). This report fails to account for this 
relationship, which is deeply concerning, and it appears that no report has yet been produced 
which is sensitive to the relationship between transparency and accountability. Moreover, the 
contemporary literature on the ethical principles of SSI governance also fails to fully appreciate 
this. Consider the Tollgate Principles as proposed by Gardiner and Fragnière. These principles 
are designed to explicitly to capture important ethical considerations (Gardiner and Fragnière, 
2018: 167). Whilst Gardiner and Fragnière’s paper does emphasise the importance of 
accountability, it fails to appreciate the importance of transparency for accountability to be 
well-functioning. The value of the current chapter is to highlight how the relationship between 
transparency, publicity, and accountability should be understood if accountability is going to 
function well. By doing so, it will draw attention to a systemic error in the literature on SSI 





3.2 What is moral corruption and why should we care about it in the case 
of SSI governance? 
 
Stephen Gardiner presents the idea of moral corruption in his book A Perfect Moral Storm 
(2011). Recall that the perfect moral storm provides an account of the challenging situation we 
are in when responding to climate change. The temptation to succumb to moral corruption is 
increased by the challenges of the perfect moral storm. Thus, when considering proposals to 
engage with moral corruption, we should be sensitive to the broader context in which they 
arise: the perfect moral storm.  
Gardiner does not provide a definition of moral corruption, instead he points to the core features 
which moral corruption possesses.76 The first of these is self-deception, because the morally 
corrupt person convinces themselves they are reasoning in a moral way. Self-deception is a 
complicated idea, in part due to the implication that it requires an individual to believe 
something they think is false at a particular point in time, or over time (Deweese-Boyd, 2016). 
Those who hold that self-deception is possible tend to divide on the question as to whether the 
self-deceit is intentional or not. Those who reject intention as the grounds for self-deception 
replace intention with other forms of motivation. Both accounts have some intuitive appeal 
and, importantly, they are both able to tell a story about self-deception. 
The second feature of moral corruption is the alignment of self-deception with self-interest 
(Gardiner, 2011: 307). This is based on a narrow understanding of self-interest rather than an 
account of an individual’s genuine self-interest, since that would include an interest in acting 
morally and avoiding self-deception. Thirdly, the actions committed as a consequence of moral 
corruption create victims who are unable to effectively resist the behaviour of morally corrupt 
actors (Gardiner, 2011: 46). In the case of climate change, these victims comprise the global 
poor, future generations and (arguably) non-human nature.  
The fourth aspect of moral corruption is that it shifts the terms of the debate, so that we do not 
focus on the right types of questions (Gardiner, 2011: 302). Consider, for example, how we 
speak of animals being harmed by climate change, where the vocabulary is that of species not 
individual animals. The category of species focuses our attention on keeping certain species in 
existence or plentiful, rather than considering the harm that animals experience, independent 
                                                          
76 These core features are not necessary and sufficient conditions of moral corruption but rather they are the 
features that are associated with core cases of moral corruption.  
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of the species they happen to belong to. If animals have moral rights then that value is hidden 
by the debate being conceived of in terms of species (Kapembwa and Wells, 2016). Finally, 
moral corruption weakens our commitment to moral norms (Gardiner, 2011: 304). This might 
follow as a consequence of the shift in the focus of the debate, because on that basis such norms 
are not then taken seriously. Together, these core features of moral corruption present a 
particularly troubling phenomenon.  
There are further concerns with moral corruption, independent of our concern with self-
deception.77 Let us consider an individual’s character as well. In the extreme case, someone 
who is morally corrupt seems to have lost their grasp on what morality is; they might seem 
condemned to a life devoid of moral behaviour, except perhaps on those occasions where 
morality and self-interest align. Insofar as thinking and behaving morally is part of a good life, 
it looks like an individual is unable to lead that life whilst being subject to moral corruption.  
As previously explained, moral corruption also has a strong influence on our capacity for moral 
reasoning. This leads to a problem concerning the quality of public discourse. Moral corruption 
dilutes the quality of public discourse, to the extent that public discourse is not about what is 
morally at stake, but about arguments in the name of morality which actually serve the interest 
of those making the arguments (Gardiner, 2016: 40). An additional reason that we might have 
for caring about moral corruption is the tendency for moral corruption to lead to undesirable 
outcomes, such as inflicting harm on the helpless.78 And indeed, as already noted, we have 
reasons to be troubled by moral corruption even if it does not lead to such outcomes. The 
concern of moral corruption is pervasive throughout responses to climate change, given that 
our temptation for moral corruption is amplified due to the perfect moral storm. The likelihood 
of moral corruption happening when engaging with a particular response to climate change 
seems to be contingent on how self-serving that response to climate change can be made. No 
response to climate change appears to be free from the danger of self-serving interests. 
Nonetheless we may think that this danger varies between responses to climate change. For 
example, we may think that reforestation does not present many opportunities to be self-
                                                          
77 There are clear consequentialist grounds for being worried about moral corruption, insofar as if one acts on 
morally corrupt reasoning, it looks as if this will produce harm. However, there are also important non-
consequentialist concerns to be found in the self-deception literature, which are relevant to understanding why 
moral corruption is bad (Deweese-Boyd, 2016).People need not exhibit all of these flaws in the case of moral 
corruption, although they all seem intuitively plausible. However, taken together, these features of behaviour 
ground a general argument as to the undesirability of moral corruption. 
78 Given the seriousness of climate change, we want actors to possess a high quality of character alongside a high 
quality of reasoning, and for this to happen with a high quality of discourse. That is to say, the seriousness of 
climate change might make us considerably worried about our vulnerability to moral corruption in this context.  
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serving, therefore the fear of morally corrupt reforestation may be weak. SSI, as explained in 
chapter 1, definitely provides the opportunity to be self-severing in multiple dangerous and 
unethical ways, hence we have particular strong reasons to be concerned with moral corruption 
in the case of SSI. 
As has been explained, there are a variety of reasons to be concerned about moral corruption 
in general. Given the high ethical stakes of SSI, good governance is of particular importance. 
Even if we have the purest of actors in the governance process, SSI still raises difficult 
problems. Moral corruption seems to attack the quality of actors – be it by corrupting their 
consciousness, or by causing them to underestimate their ‘courage and self-control’ (Deweese-
Boyd, 2016). If so, our general concern with moral corruption in the case of governance is that 
it results in unfit actors forming part of the governing process. Hence it is clear that we have 
strong causes for concern about moral corruption within SSI governance.  
I shall briefly comment on the types of agents who I have in mind and the stage of SSI. The 
agents who I will focus on being the subject of moral corruption are policymakers. This is for 
two reasons, firstly that policymakers could be subject to moral corruption given the challenges 
of justly responding to climate change. Secondly if policy makers are subject to moral 
corruption then this could be impactful. Now we have a clearer sense of the relevant agents we 
can consider the stage of SSI. I understand the relevant stage of SSI as that of research and 
development, although the concern of moral corruption could of course occur at other stages 
of SSI.79 I will now explore how the risk of such corruption can be reduced by considering the 
idea of transparency. 
  
                                                          
79 This point may seem underdeveloped, indeed there is much more which could be said about the type of agents 
who could experience moral corruption and the stage at which is occurs. Yet not much of the analysis is 
contingent upon these features. Additionally if one desires a more detailed account of who policy makers are, 
they can insert the account of the formal role holders of power as explained in part 4.5 of this thesis.  
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3.3 Why consider transparency? 
 
Transparency is a powerful tool. It is argued that it can reduce the risk of war, compensate for 
the lack of accountability in international organisations and improve regime effectiveness 
(Lindsedt and Naurin, 2010: 301). This is an impressive list of powers. Additionally, it is an 
idea which has had broad appeal, with arguments in favour of transparency coming from 
enlightenment thinkers such as Jeremy Bentham (1931 [1802]), Adam Smith [1776, chapter 
2], Jean-Jacque Rousseau ([1772], 1985:72) and Immanuel Kant [1795], as well as Woodrow 
Wilson, parts of the Christian tradition, and the feminist movements of the 1960s and 70s 
(Hood, 2006: 6-8).80 Within the geoengineering governance literature, transparency also 
appears to receive near universal endorsement (Morrow, 2017: 8). There is empirical evidence 
which indicates that transparency reduces corruption: bribery, for example (Lindstedt and 
Naurin, 2010: 317). 
This raises two questions: (1) how are moral corruption and corrupt practices related; and (2) 
why should a solution to the latter be of any relevance to the former? The answer to question 
one is that corruption takes a variety of different forms, for example bribery and nepotism. We 
can understand, oral corruption as a distinct subtype of corruption, alongside these more 
familiar forms. Gardiner explains that, despite the lack of a philosophically rigorous account 
of corruption itself, we understand corruption as having two core features (Gardiner, 2010: 
303). These features are those of distorting or altering for the worst, as well as the corruption 
being immoral or dishonest and particularly with the use of power (Gardiner, 2010: 304). If we 
accept these as core features of corruption, the difference between moral corruption and other 
instances of corruption is where this corruption takes place. Moral corruption can occur when 
thinking and engaging in discourse about climate change. Moral corruption contains the core 
features of corruption, insofar as it results in a distortion of thought and dialogue on climate 
change in such a way that reduces the quality of our moral reasoning. This could, in turn, result 
in what we recognise as corrupt practices, such as wealthy nations using international climate 
negotiations as a means to advance their economic self-interest. 
Moral corruption is a very useful concept, because it warns about the poor quality public 
dialogue we can expect to see surrounding decisions about climate change. Yet there are two 
                                                          
80 The reasons for these agents being interested in varies, for example Smith was interested in transparency due 
reasons relate to taxation (1776, book 5, chapter 2), whilst Kant was interested transparency in the international 
arena and the role it could play in helping peace exist between nations (Kant, 1795).  
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parts of moral corruption which are less clear. Firstly, what is the relationship between poor 
quality public dialogue and poor decisions? Secondly what is it that really concerns us about 
moral corruption? 
 
To answer the first question I will propose a hypothesis that will be granted as true during this 
thesis. We can grant that the quality of decisions is in part an effect of the quality of the 
dialogue. Therefore, if moral corruption infiltrates that dialogue, then not only will the quality 
of discussion will be worse, so will the subsequent decision-making. This present provides a 
simple way to understand the link between dialogue and decisions.  
 
Moral corruption is something we should care about and seek to prevent. Our reasons for this 
were explained in the previous section: they range from concern about the character of agents 
who experience self-deception, to the consequences of actions which result from moral 
corruption. When decision about SSI are made moral corruption has the potential to contribute 
to poor choices being made.  
 
These outcomes of moral corruption are the focus of this chapter, and I consider principles and 
mechanisms which could reduce or prevent the negative effects of moral corruption on 
decision-making about SSI. There are multiple reasons for focusing on this part of the moral 
corruption problem. One is about our capacity to address the problem: there is a sense in which 
it is easier to address and regulate the outcomes of moral corruption (such as corrupt behaviour) 
as opposed to genuinely moral corrupt thoughts or dialogue. The second reason is that some 
actions which result from moral corruption are harmful and unjust. Therefore, the outcomes of 
moral corruption need to be addressed. 
 
 Given the importance and relative ease of focusing on the outcomes of moral corruption, this 
is the part of moral corruption which this chapter will seek to address. It is a further interesting 
question of what measures might affect the moral corruption of thought and dialogue, yet one 
which is also hugely challenging and one which this chapter will not address.  
 
The answer to the question of why moral corruption are corruption are related is that the two 
phenomena share core features. As identified by Gardiner, these are: (1) the abuse of power for 
illegitimate personal gain; and (2) the presence of victims who lack a voice (Gardiner, 2011: 
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304). Due to these common features, it makes sense to ask whether the ways of engaging with 
corrupt practices have any impact on moral corruption as well.  
Despite the intuitive appeal of transparency, there are also many reasons to be cautious about 
placing too much trust in the transparency mechanisms. There is the question of how 
transparency manages to reduce corruption: is it transparency itself which does the work, or is 
transparency part of a mechanism which produces these results? Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) 
argue that publicity and accountability are necessary for transparency to reduce corruption, and 
I will use their framework here. I will show that transparency on its own has little hope of 
reducing the likelihood of moral corruption and that it is therefore important to consider it in 
the broader context of publicity and accountability. The reason why there is little hope of 
transparency reducing moral corruption by itself is because additional mechanisms are required 
to increase the likelihood of regimes responding to the concerns which effective transparency 
procedures might prompt. For example, if people want to disapprove of moral corruption (or 
evidence of it), then suitable mechanisms are required for this disapproval to be expressed. 
Accountability is one such mechanism, but transparency alone is not. 
To consider transparency, publicity and accountability it is useful to have an account of the 
relationship between these three concepts. There is a debate in the contemporary literature 
about how transparency and accountability ought to be conceptualised and the relationship that 
these conceptions stand in to one another (Naurin, 2006; Fox, 2007; Hood, 2010; Lindstedt and 
Naurin, 2010; Meijer, 2014; Mabillard and Zumofen, 2017). Unfortunately such literature 
neglects the role of publicity,81 therefore I shall account for publicity after considering the 
relationship between transparency and accountability. Christopher Hood identifies a helpful 
approach to thinking about the relationship between transparency and accountability concepts 
(Hood, 2010). He argues that there are three different understandings of the relationship 
between transparency and accountability, which he names; Siamese twins, matching parts, and 
awkward couple (Hood, 2010). The Siamese twins account argues that transparency and 
accountability are interchangeable terms for the same idea (Hood, 2010: 990). The matching 
parts account understands them as distinct concepts which are complementary to each other 
and produce good governance (Hood, 2010: 992). The Awkward couple account also 
acknowledges that they are separate concepts but fears that they concepts have the potential to 
produce low quality governance, for example when there is transparency agents will be 
                                                          
81 The exception being Naurin (2006) and Lindstedt and Naurin, (2010), both of which engage with publicity.  
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concerned about avoiding blame as oppose to taking the risks to do what is good. There is not 
a general conceptual or empirical relationship between transparency and accountability in all 
case, instead different relationships will exist in different instances of transparency and 
accountability (Hale, 2008; Hood, 2010; Meijer, 2014; Mabillard and Zumofen, 2017).  
I shall consider why and how Hoods matching parts understanding of the relationship between 
transparency and accountability. The reason for this is that the matching parts conception of 
their relationship is sensitive to the idea that transparency and accountability are distinct 
concepts, this is not true of the Siamese twins account which argues that they are the same. The 
idea of them being distinct concepts has initial plausibility and bears out in the analysis in this 
chapter. Moreover the matching parts account of their relationship has the benefit of being 
implicit in much literature and practice on good governance. There is a justification which is 
that this account seems the promising, if it can be made to work in the case of SSI governance, 
it should contribute to the good SSI governance in general and is the account which I think 
may be the most use for addressing moral corruption. This is the reasons for choosing the 
matching part over the awkward couple account which brings the opposite promise of poor 
governance.    
Broadly speaking transparency refers to the accessibility of information, whilst accountability 
refers to the possibility of sanctioning agents. Based on these broad understands of the term we 
can make sense of the idea that there is a missing concept if we are to achieve the matching 
parts relationship between transparency and accountability in this case. That concept is 
publicity which broadly refers to the idea of transparent information standing a reasonable 
chance of reaching the relevant agents (Naurin, 2006; Lindstedt and Naurin 2010).  
We can now move on from the broad conceptions and ask the specific question, how should 
the terms transparency, publicity, and accountability be understood? There is vast 
contemporary literature on these question. When considering transparency there is much that 
one could disagree about (Heald, 2006; Etzoni, 2010; Mabillard and Zumofen, 2016) for 
example does transparency require that is possibility of being able to access information, such 
as via freedom of information requests (Michener, 2011). Or does it require the active 
publication of such information (Mabillard and Zumofen, 2016: 2). What is it that needs to be 
transparent, an event or the process which produces the event, and the for who does 
transparency need to be achieved (Heald, 2006). I shall adopt an understanding of transparency 
which is helpful for the matching parts conception of transparencies relationship with 
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accountability. I understand transparency in what Mabillard and Zumofen (2016), term active 
transparency. Whereby the relevant institution voluntarily publishes relevant information about 
its decisions and the processes by which such decisions are made.82 This conception of 
transparency is useful for the matching parts account of the relationship between transparency 
and accountability due to it insuring that the relevant information is available to hold the 
relevant agents to account.83 
Given that transparency is understood as the publication of relevant information, publicity 
builds on this to require that this information has a reasonable chance to reach the relevant 
agent and that the information can be easily understood by that agent ( Naurin, 2006; Lindstedt 
and Naurin; 2010).84 To be clear, this means that publicity has two components, one of which 
is that there is a reasonable chance of the information being received by the relevant public, 
secondly that it is reasonable to expect them to understand this information. Publicity is only 
achieved when both of these conditions are met. Transparency is a necessary condition for the 
achievement of publicity, given that any instance of publicity will require that the relevant 
information is published. The distinction between transparency and publicity is useful due to 
the fact that transparency alone does not appear to ensure that the information is accessible.  
The distinction between transparency and publicity is illustrated well by the following case 
from The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy. In the opening chapter of Douglas Adams’ science-
fiction novel, an official from the local council comes to the house of Arthur Dent in order to 
knock it down. When Arthur protests about the demolition he is told that the plans have been 
publicly available to view and contest for many months. Arthur’s terse reply provides us with 
a humorous insight into transparency and publicity. 
“On display? I eventually had to go down to the cellar to find them.” 
“That’s the display department.” 
“With a flashlight.” 
“Ah, well, the lights had probably gone.” 
“So had the stairs.” 
                                                          
82 There is of course scope for variation in how sincerely an institution does this, for example we might think of 
an institution as translucent if it publishes some relevant information about why a decision was made but withholds 
vital information.   
83 This conception of transparency is also adopted in Buchanan and Keohane (2006: 427) to describe what 
transparency is for global governance institutions.  
84 I understand the comparative lack of literature on publicity as in part a product of the how some definitions of 
transparency seem to include a publicity condition (Cotterrell 2000; Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch 2012).  
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“But look, you found the notice, didn’t you?” 
“Yes,” said Arthur, “yes I did. It was on display in the bottom of a locked 
filing cabinet stuck in a disused lavatory with a sign on the door saying 
‘Beware of the Leopard.” (Adams, 1995: 19-20). 
  
Is there transparency in this case? The plans to knock down Arthur’s house are in the planning 
department. If Arthur was to go into the planning office and overcome the respective obstacles 
inside the department, he would be able to find a piece of paper which clearly states that his 
house will be demolished on a particular date. The plan is transparent, insofar as the plan can 
be accessed by Arthur. Yet we are clearly troubled by Arthur’s case, because though there is 
transparency there is an absence of publicity; the information is not communicated in a 
meaningful sense. Information has to be communicated so that the relevant public have a 
reasonable chance of accessing and understanding it. In this case, it is clear that there was no 
reasonable attempt to communicate this information clearly to Arthur. Therefore, whilst 
transparency is present, publicity is absent.85 This case is troubling and humorous and absurd, 
and this is all due to the absence of publicity.86 
This account of transparency may appear to be odd, and the oddness of it was highlighted by 
an objection from one of my examiners. They asked whether on this understanding of 
transparency their diary would be considered transparent. Their diary is also hidden in the 
safety of their home, but if someone were to overcome the relevant obstacles (perhaps 
comparable to the obstacles Arthur Dent faced), then they could access the diary. It would 
clearly put pressure on this account of transparency if it understood the diary as 
transparent.  Here I will remind the reader of one of the core features of transparency which is 
that information is published, in the sense that it is put in a place where it is legally permissible 
for the general public to access it. The reason why the diary does not meet the relevant 
conditions of transparency is that it is not published. The plans to knock down Arthur Dent’s 
house are published, it is just that this published information is hidden from public sight. Part 
of the value of this account of transparency is that it helps us understand what is important; it 
                                                          
85 One might object and argue that a broader understanding of transparency would include the publicity condition. 
This broader view is held by some, such as Cotterrell (2000); Grimmelikhuijsen and Welch (2012). Yet those who 
hold this broader view would have to provide an account of what happens in the hitchhikers guide case, where by 
information is obtained despite the lack of transparency.  
86 This thought can be also be seen in the work of Onora O’Neill on transparency, who argues forcefully that 
transparency alone does not ensure good communication (O’Neill, 2006: 82). 
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is not enough for information to be published, we also want something akin to the publicity 
condition to be met. 
The last term to define for this analysis is accountability. As is the case with transparency, there 
are a variety of ways in which accountability can be understood. Koppell (2005) argues that 
this is a product of many approaches one could adopt when studying accountability (see also 
Mabillard and Zumofen, 2016).87 Accountability is broadly understood as denoting an agent or 
institution who is answerable for their affairs (Hood, 2010: 989).88 Mabillard and Zumofen 
(2016) observe that Hood’s (2010) understanding of accountability is consistent with a three 
stage process of power transition outlined by Boven (2007, 454). The three stages are: 
1: The actor is obliged to inform the forum about his or her conduct (information 
phase) 
 2. The forum can question the adequacy of the information or the legitimacy of the 
conduct (debating phase) 
3: The forum may pass judgment on the conduct of the actor (consequences 
phase).’ (Boven, 2007:454)  
One of the main divides in the accountability literature is the third stage, specifically whether 
the forum requires formal sanctioning power. Those who adopt a soft account of accountability 
do not think that formal sanctioning power is required; instead they think that accountability 
occurs when an agent is asked to answer for their actions, even if the agents asking lack formal 
sanctioning power, such as the media (Fox, 2007: 668). On the other hand, there are those who 
think answerability is not enough and that formal sanctioning power is also required; this is 
known as a hard conception of accountability (Fox, 2007: 668). Both of these forms of 
accountability have a proper place; it is appropriate that the media does not have formal 
sanctioning power, but nonetheless holds relevant agents to account by scrutinising and 
publishing their actions. Yet hard accountability also has an appropriate place. A clearly 
desirable circumstance for hard accountability is when such sanctioning power can legitimately 
be used to incentivise agents to ‘behave themselves’. I am going to accept the premise that it 
                                                          
87 Regarding whether accountability is a virtue or a mechanism, I shall understand it as a mechanism, which is not 
to deny that it can also be a virtue.  
88 Accountability can be understood both as a principle and a mechanism. The mechanisms of accountability 
would refer to how an agent is held answerable for a state of affairs which they produce, whilst the principle of 
accountability refers to the ideal of accountability. The mechanism is a way in which this principle can be 
achieved. Therefore, we could have different mechanisms for achieving the same principle of accountability, or 
different mechanisms for achieving different understandings of the principle of accountability.  
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is legitimate for SSI governance to sanction agents who partake in SSI governance (this point 
is explained in more detail in section 3.7 of this chapter), therefore I will adopt a hard 




3.4 The argument about transparency in the context of SSI governance 
 
I noted earlier that the relationship between transparency, publicity, and accountability is often 
poorly understood in geoengineering governance reports, and that this limits the effectiveness 
of the recommendations that these reports produce, at least in regard to transparency. As stated, 
the relationship with publicity and accountability is vital for understanding the force of 
transparency. I will now try to present the relevance of this argument by showing how it seems 
that transparency is often conceived of without any consideration of accountability in SSI 
governance reports. In the Royal Society report we read:  
The Royal Society in collaboration with international science partners should 
develop a code of practice for geoengineering research and provide 
recommendations to the international scientific community for a voluntary research 
governance framework. This should provide guidance and transparency for 
geoengineering research, and apply to researchers working in the public, private 
and commercial sectors. (Shepherd et al., 2009:p. xii) 
 
Additionally, a report by the US Bipartisan Policy Center (2011) states: 
Principle 4: Importance of Transparency. Federal officials and federally funded 
scientists must keep the public informed about CDR and SRM research, especially 
when that research itself could be harmful or the method could be implemented at 
scale without substantial effort. Research plans and research results, both positive 
and negative, should be made public. The federal government should develop 
transparency protocols for all potentially risky forms of climate remediation 
research. Those protocols should be appropriate for the magnitude and extent of 
potential impacts for the specific experiment under consideration – that is, 
protocols should be based not only on the risks posed by related research, but also 





Both of these quotes highlight the importance of transparency, and both fail to mention its 
relationship with accountability.89 This is true all the way through both of these reports, in that 
accountability is not mentioned at all in the Royal Society governance report, and only twice 
in the Bipartisan Policy Center report (although one of these uses is in naming a reference, so 
to be strictly accurate the idea of accountability is only mentioned once in the main text).  
The same is also true of the following reports: The Congressional Research Service Report 
(2010); the Kiel Earth Institute’s ‘Large-Scale Intentional Interventions into the Climate 
System? Assessing the Climate Engineering Debate’ (Rickels, et al: 2011); ‘Solar Radiation 
Management: The Governance of Research’ by the Solar Radiation Management Governance 
Initiative (SRMGI) (2010); ‘Geoengineering for Decision-Makers: Science and Technology 
(2011); the Ecologic Institute Report (2014); the National Academy of Science (NAS) Report 
(2015); the EUTRACE Report (2015); and the report of the Academic Working Group on 
Climate Engineering Governance ‘Governing Solar Radiation Management’ (Chhetri et al., 
2018).90  
 
We have yet to see a report which seems to have a clear grasp of the relationship between 
transparency and accountability! Despite this, the idea of transparency has received a wide 
variety of endorsements, as is shown by following quotes. These quotes also show that there is 
some confusion about how transparency ought to be operationalised. I understand this to be 
partly due to confusion about how transparency could be put into practice in a manner similar 
to other concepts such as accountability.   
 
There is consensus on the need for transparency, but there still is much 
disagreement over the scope and design of a disclosure mechanism. (Turkaly et al., 
2017: 1) 
 
However, there was broad agreement that a well-designed transparency mechanism 
would provide a common, central source of current information and is necessary, 
if not sufficient, to ameliorate polarization and inform the climate policy 
conversation. (Turkaly et al., 2017: 4) 
 
                                                          
89 Publicity is also absent from these quotes, yet that seems less surprising and noteworthy given its specific and 
contested technical nature 
90 These reports tend to be produced by government agencies, or non-governmental organisations.  
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If research does proceed, transparency and openness are critical. The reports agree 
that CE [climate engineering] research, and especially research in solar 
geoengineering, must be transparent and open, rather than proprietary or secret. 
The reports do not always specify or agree about exactly what transparency 
requires. (Morrow, 2017: 8) 
 
4. How should transparency be operationalized? While the need for transparency 
is among the most commonly cited principles for CE research, the reports say 
relatively little about how to operationalize this principle. The primary literature 
contains some more detailed suggestions. (Morrow, 2017: 12) 
 
It is clear, thanks to Morrow (2017:8) that transparency is endorsed by nearly every 
geoengineering governance report. And, also, that publicity and accountability is neglected by 
nearly all of these reports. I will show that this is seriously problematic, at least in the context 
of transparency as a tool to engage with moral corruption. Moreover, this is also likely to be 
problematic if transparency is to be a meaningful tool to engage with any problem of 
governance. If I am correct, I will show that many of the geoengineering governance reports 
have failed to recommend what they would desire because they do not understand the 




3.5 What does transparency have to offer in the case of moral corruption?  
What can transparency do to engage with moral corruption? An analysis of this question will 
show that transparency is not the whole story in regard to moral corruption and that 
accountability is going to be vital to reducing the risk of it. However, transparency does have 
significant instrumental value as a means of holding actors to account for moral corruption, as 
I shall explain. 
When considering transparency we need to consider not just the information which is available, 
but also who will be able to access this publicised information.  Transparency in relation to an 
SSI global governance regime can clearly be achieved for at least one set of people throughout 
the world, namely, those with internet access to global governance regime websites or internet 
access to those who report on global governance activities, such as non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and research councils. As I have explained, transparency is based on the 
availability of information, and that information can be made freely available on the internet.91  
However, would this lessen moral corruption policymakers? The answer depends on at least 
two things. Firstly, there is an empirical question in terms of whether knowing that people can 
access this information would lead to a change in the type of reasoning which actors in SSI 
governance engage in. There are reasons for thinking that this might be the case and there is a 
whole literature about how people’s behaviour changes when it is subject to observation (a 
simple example is that of how people’s behaviour changes when washing their own hands if 
they think they are being observed (Sunstein and Thaler, 2008) ), but is this observation enough 
to ensure a change in behaviour in cases of moral corruption?  
An important element in regard to moral corruption is the move towards an agent’s narrowly 
construed self-interest, and how they maintain or even strengthen their sense of moral 
integrity.92 Therefore, if the morally corrupt agent fails to recognise there is anything wrong 
with their morally corrupt state, then the prospect of the public becoming aware of it will not 
motivate a change in behaviour. Also, even if they do recognise something wrong with it, it is 
nonetheless unclear how they will respond. Given the lack of sanctions and the strength of self-
interest, it seems foolhardy to expect there to be a substantial decrease in moral corruption. 
                                                          
91 Examples of the kind of information to which I am referring will be provided in the next section, in which I 
apply transparency concepts to some of the domains of SSI governance. 
92 The sense of moral integrity is achieved because the actor thinks their behaviour is moral.  
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The second, related, reason for doubting the impact of transparency concerns who the 
information becomes transparent to. If information only becomes transparent to those actors 
who would benefit from the relevant decision, then it is questionable whether that would lead 
to any change in behaviour by the regime. However, if the behaviour of a regime becomes 
transparent to those who are vulnerable to the actions of that regime, then the regime may be 
more likely to change its behaviour so that it does not appear to be harming those who are now 
aware of its actions. The extent of this change in behaviour may be contingent upon the powers 
of the vulnerable. This is also conjecture, based on the assumption that the regime in question 
has some reason to care about how it is perceived by those groups who are affected by its 
actions, and that the regime in question is responsive to certain actors.  
I will now consider whether transparency can be achieved for those who are truly vulnerable 
to the effects of moral corruption in this situation. Whilst it is an open question as to whether 
the governance of SSI can be made genuinely transparent to the global poor, clearly this cannot 
be done for future generations.93 Therefore it is unclear what transparency can do for vulnerable 
people if this information cannot be made clear to them. Similarly, if transparency is 
understood as the provision of information, then it seems to be impossible to provide it to future 
generations at this point in time.94 This also brings us back to the question of why transparency 
alone would lead to a change in behaviour. Unless actors care about how they will be perceived 
over time, it seems unlikely that this will lead to a change in behaviour.95 
To summarise. For transparency alone to be effective, it would need to be achieved for 
vulnerable groups. However, transparency cannot be achieved for all those groups who are 
vulnerable to the effects of moral corruption in an SSI governance regime. Therefore, it appears 
that transparency on its own will not reduce the risk of moral corruption.   
  
                                                          
93 Given the barriers which the global poor face in terms of poverty and quality of education, it is clearly a 
challenge to make information about a global governance regime transparent to them. Moreover, it is doubtful 
whether it would be appropriate to try to make SSI governance transparent to people who face such barriers 
without at the same time providing action to alleviate them. 
94 Things could be made transparent for future generations upon their temporal arrival – the preparation of 
information which will become available to people at a certain point in the future – but this removes a lot of the 
transformative potential of transparency in the here-and-now.  
95 This is based on the premise that relevant actors do not currently care enough for the interests of future 
generations, although they may care about their relationship with future generations. For a possible explanation 
of this, see McKinnon on moral shame (McKinnon, 2012: 134–135).  
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3.6 Transparency and its friends: considering publicity and accountability 
in SSI governance 
 
I will now consider two concepts which are related to transparency: namely, publicity and 
accountability (Naurin, 2006). If transparency is concerned with the provision of information, 
then publicity is restricted to the scope of transparency and whether people understand the 
information that is available to them.  
As was established in the previous section, it seems doubtful that transparency alone 
would lead to a change in an actor’s behaviour or reasoning, unless that actor also cared about 
how they are perceived. Whilst the condition of publicity means that those who receive 
information as a result of transparency ought to be able to understand that information, it does 
not obviously provide a reason as to why an actor may care about how they are perceived. 
Moreover, neither does it seem to provide any additional reasons for reducing the risk of moral 
corruption happening. Given this, I am forced to draw the same conclusion as I did from my 
analysis of transparency: publicity alone is not a useful tool for engaging with moral corruption.  
When thinking of the role of publicity in this case it is worth drawing to attention to 
what is required for the publicity to be met. Information about SSI has to have a reasonable 
chance of reaching the relevant public and it has to be easily understandable to them. Both of 
these conditions may be demanding. The demandingness of the first conditions is in part 
contingent upon how the relevant public is understood, if it is broadly understood this could 
require that the majority of people in the world need a fair chance of receiving this information. 
Again this raises general questions of whether enough people across the world have the 
appropriate means to access this type of information. Moreover this relevant public has to find 
this information easy to understand. This raises a huge question about what information is 
meant to meet the publicity condition. The following consideration can this information be 
made easily understandable. This question presumably turns on considerations such as how 
well this information needs to be understood for the publicity condition to be meet.96  
                                                          
96 The feature of demandingness would not be nearly as strong in the case of achieving active transparency. As 
explained, active transparency does not require that the information has a fair chance of reaching the public or 
that is easy for them to understand., Merely publishing the relevant information on the internet may be enough 
to satisfy the demands of active transparency.  
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Let us turn then to accountability. In the context of SSI governance and moral corruption, 
accountability is concerned with the ability of people to impose sanctions upon institutions. 
Sanctions are a tool used to influence behaviour, in the knowledge that they can be used to 
punish a certain type of behaviour. The scope of transparency is not necessarily the same as 
the scope of accountability, and as Christopher Hood explains, you can have accountability in 
the absence of transparency (Hood, 2010: 992–993). He illustrates this by pointing to the 
example of how civil servants can be held to account by ministers, and how intelligence 
services can be held to account by legislatures, yet transparency can be absent or limited in 
both these cases (Hood, 2010: 992-993).  
We also know that accountability can lead to an institution changing its reasoning and 
behaviour. Consequently, we can conclude that the type of accountability which is able to hold 
an institution to account for how its behaviour affects those who are most vulnerable to it is the 
type of accountability that could lead to a positive change in reasoning and behaviour from that 
institution, not only in regard to present generations, but also in regard to future generations 
and non-human nature.  
Accountability is clearly very important here. However, we need to pause and consider how it 
is that accountability has such force. This is linked to publicity and transparency. The idea of 
publicity is concerned with understanding the information that an institution produces. If one 
wishes to hold an institution to account effectively, then it would appear that one first needs an 
understanding of how that institution has behaved and why it has behaved in a particular 
manner.97 However, this information would not be available without there also being 
transparency. Therefore, in terms of the account of transparency, publicity and accountability 
provided here, transparency and publicity are of huge instrumental value to accountability, and 
accountability is the way in which the likelihood of moral corruption is reduced. This also 
shows that faith in transparency per se is misplaced, and that the power of transparency should 
rather be understood in relation to how it enables processes like accountability to function 
effectively.  
The question to ask here, then, is: how does holding an institution to account on behalf of 
vulnerable groups reduce the risk of moral corruption? Whilst it is clear that accountability can 
                                                          
97 The condition of publicity – at least, the minimally acceptable scope of publicity – has to be met for those who 
are meant to hold the governance institutions to account. However, this should not necessarily be considered the 
optimal level of publicity. There are probably strong reasons to say that the scope of publicity should be greater 
than it is, but the outline here relates to the minimum rather than the optimal level of publicity. 
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affect the behaviour of those who are morally corrupt, it is less clear how it can engage with 
those experiencing corruption. That being the case, it appears that accountability engages 
merely with a symptom of corruption and not the problem itself. If we consider self-deception, 
of which moral corruption is an example, we can identify two general concerns: 
Self-deception violates an epistemic duty to properly ground self-ascriptions 
(Fernández 2013) or violates a general duty to form beliefs that conform to 
the available evidence’. (Deweese-Boyd, 2016) 
When an actor can be held to account via a process of transparency, they will presumably be 
incentivised to present themselves in such a way that sanctions are not implemented against 
them. We can assume that one of the standards against which their statements will be measured 
is that of consistency with the publicly available evidence. If this is the case, it is likely that 
some actors who might have been vulnerable to moral corruption would not now succumb to 
it, given the presence of these conditions of transparency and accountability.98 
  
                                                          
98 Of course, there are relevant questions which have not been answered here, most notably: what type of sanctions 
are required to change the behaviour of an SSI governance institution? Whilst this question will not be answered 
here, it is clear that an answer to it is required if this logic is going to be applied to SSI governance. 
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3.7 An illustration of accountability in SSI research and development  
 
So far, this chapter has argued that accountability is a way to address the issue of moral 
corruption – given certain conditions being met – such as transparency and publicity. Up to 
now this has been quite an abstract argument (although it has drawn on some ‘real-world’ 
examples such as that presented in the The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy), which is helpful 
for clarifying the theoretical distinctions between transparency, publicity and accountability. 
Moving away from the abstract to a concrete example, I will now try to illustrate how 
accountability (specifically) could be designed for SSI governance by considering how an 
international accountability mechanism currently functions. This is the mechanism adopted by 
the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OCPW). By looking at how this 
mechanism functions I will show how we could make sense of an accountability mechanism 
for SSI governance.  
Prior to considering how the accountability mechanism in the prohibition of chemical weapons 
functions, it is worth considering who should be held accountable for SSI research and 
development. In other words, which type of agents do we wish to hold to account? Is it the 
scientists who perform the research, the person or institution which funds the research, the 
institution where the research takes place, policymakers in a state, or the state which allows it 
take place? (It should be understood that this is not an exhaustive list of those whom we may 
wish to hold to account. Importantly, it is not even at all clear which agents ought to be held to 
account.)  
A common intuition for accountability is that the person who performs an action can be held 
to account for the performance and consequences of that action.99 I take this to be what 
Jamieson means when he refers to a notion of responsibility which is a product of common 
sense morality.100  
                                                          
99 It is worth noting that there is a difference between whom we may wish to hold accountable and who should be 
held morally responsible. This is expressed by Duff as well as Hart, who explains that the individual whom we 
wish to hold legally responsible is not necessarily the one who is morally responsible or blameworthy (Hart, 2008: 
217; Duff, 2007: 20). The reason that Hart offers for this is that the substance of legal and moral rules is different 
(Hart, 2008: 225). 
100 Of course, responsibility and accountability are not synonymous concepts, but they are clearly strongly related. 
When someone is held legally responsible for something, it appears that a condition has been met to hold that 
person legally accountable as well.  
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I shall now consider a simple case to show why we have reasons to be concerned about this 
account of common sense morality in the case of SSI. We need to ask whether it is appropriate 
for individual scientists to be held to account to a global SSI governance body. One might think 
that scientists are not the appropriate type of agent to be held to account by a global governance 
institution.101 Such a view would require justification. Nonetheless, it is not uncommon for the 
international arena to be selective about who it is willing to hold to account. Consider for 
example international agreements by states where only states are liable under them.102 
Therefore, a compelling reason that could be offered is that scientists do not have the 
appropriate power to compensate for the wrongness of their action. This type of reasoning can 
be seen in Joel Feinberg’s discussion on collective responsibility (Feinberg, 1970: 228–229).103 
The resources available to scientists are much more limited than those available to other types 
of actors such as states. Therefore, a state is more likely to have the appropriate power to 
provide compensation.  
There are various forms of responsibility which are designed to hold an agent responsible for 
the actions of others. One such form is vicarious responsibility, as defined in this extract by 
Feinberg: 
There is vicarious liability, on the other hand, when the contributory fault, or some 
element of it, is properly ascribed to one party (or group of parties), but liability is 
ascribed to a different party (or parties). In such cases we say that the latter party is 
responsible for the harmful consequences of a faulty action or omission of the former 
party. The person who did or caused the harm is not the one who is called upon to answer 
for it. (Feinberg, 1970: 226) 
As Feinberg’s quote shows, fault could be given to an individual agent such as a scientist, but 
liability could be assigned to a different agent, such as the employer of the scientist. This is 
useful for the person who would be troubled by the idea of holding the scientist to account. 
Nonetheless, I take this to be problematic, given that we are considering a global governance 
institution. I think that we have reasons to consider the state as the relevant actor to hold to 
account, such as the state having the appropriate power to remedy some of the harms from 
                                                          
101 In this case scientists are illustrative of any agent who is not the state, you may hold view indicated earlier in 
this chapter that policymakers are the relevant agent instead, and the same question would arise whether they are 
the appropriate agent to hold responsible by an SSI global governance institution.   
102A reason for this is that states are more likely to have appropriate power to correct the wrongness of their 
action. 
103 These reasons could of course be related: a reason for holding states to account may well be that they are the 
type of agents who tend to have the appropriate power to compensate for harms.  
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illegal SSI research and development. Yet this is not the end of the story, it is at least expected 
of a state to create a domestic legal framework which is consistent with international law. 
Therefore, a state may take action domestically against an agent who risks the state being held 
vicariously responsible by using domestic legal instruments. This is the first lesson from 
international accountability that I will draw attention to: it is common practice to hold states 
vicariously responsible for actions which are performed within that state, even if they are not 
authorised by that state.  
The idea of vicarious responsibility is clearly helpful for having a clearer idea of how an 
accountability mechanism could function for SSI governance. But it still leaves an important 
question unanswered. Namely, how should the relevant agent be held to account? Returning to 
my starting point in this section, I shall now consider how the Organisation for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons holds actors to account. This organisation is an institution which is a 
product of the Chemical Weapons Convention which seeks to prevent the use of chemistry in 
warfare. The reason for considering the accountability in the organisation for the prohibition 
of chemical weapons is that the mechanisms that the organisation has are ones which do exist 
in the international arena. In this sense, we could understand these mechanisms as showing 
what type of accountability mechanisms could be achievable in the international setting. To be 
clear, this comparison is not based on the premise that chemical weapons and SSI are similar. 
Far from it. Chemical weapons are weapons (a tautology, but one which is worth stating), and 
SSI is not a necessarily a weapon.104  
There appear to be transparency and publicity mechanisms built into the Organisation for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The organisation’s Technical Secretariat covers the 
inspection and verification of state parties conforming to the OPCW’s Convention. This 
requires at least part of the Technical Secretariat to have access to the relevant information 
from state parties in order for the inspectors to confirm that the standards of the Convention 
are being conformed to. Transparency requires that this information can be made sense of once 
the inspectors access that information. Publicity is achieved for the Technical Secretariat if the 
relevant information is easily accessible for them. Of course, the set of actors to which 
transparency and publicity apply is very limited. Neither aspect is achieved for the general 
public in this case.  
                                                          
104 Although it could clearly be used in an aggressive or military manner.  
81 
 
The Conference for State Parties of the OPCW seems to exercise the accountability 
mechanisms that the organisation has in place. The Conference has the power of: 
restriction or suspension of a State Party’s rights and privileges under the 
Convention; the recommendation to States Parties of collective punitive measures 
in conformity with international law and in cases of serious damage to the object 
and purpose of the Convention; and, in cases of particular gravity, bringing the 
issue to the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council. 
(Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2019) 
These are clearly accountability mechanisms. Recall that accountability exists when sanctions 
can be applied to the agent who is meant to be held to account. Depriving states of rights and 
privileges is a form of sanctions. Additionally, it appears that Conference is in a position to 
recommend collective sanctions to state partners and to the United Nations General Assembly 
and Security Council. It is perhaps disappointing to note how weak these sanctions appear to 
be. The ability to deprive a state of rights and privileges sounds strong, but the rights and 
privileges which can be restricted are only those which are conveyed by the institution. 
Therefore, the force of these sanctions is at least in part contingent upon how the sanctioned 
state values the rights and privileges that are conveyed by the OPCW. Whilst these benefits 
may be desirable, it seems doubtful that depriving a state of them comes even moderately close 
to being appropriate as a proportionate sanction to hold a state to account. Nonetheless, despite 
the arguably weak nature of this accountability mechanism, it does exist, and it does show that 
this type of mechanism can be agreed upon by the vast majority of states.  
The OPCW does have the potential for additional sanctions. These are the ability to recommend 
‘collective punitive measures’ (Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, 2017: 
1), and the ability to bring issues to the attention of the United Nations General Assembly and 
the Security Council. The General Assembly and Security Council are both institutions which 
have significant sanctioning power. Therefore, the OPCW can have a causal role in other 
sanctions occurring. We can imagine a comparable mechanism in the case of SSI governance. 
That is, such an institution could bring violations of SSI treaties to the attention of the UN 
General Assembly and Security Council, and by so doing, expose the offending agent to the 




This raises the question about what type of accountability mechanism would be appropriate for 
an SSI global governance institution, and this will be the focus of the discussion which follows. 
It is disappointing – although perhaps unsurprising – to note that SSI governance reports do 
not propose how accountability mechanisms could function in the case of SSI governance.105 
If one were to adopt the type of accountability mechanism presented by the OPCW, then an 
SSI global governance institution would be able to impose sanctions upon its members by 
restricting their access to, or denying all the benefits which are associated with that institution.  
This therefore raises the question as to what type of rights and privileges could be granted to 
members of an SSI governance institution. A full account of these rights and privileges cannot 
be provided here, due to the rights and privileges of being part of an SSI governance institution 
being determined in part determined when an institutions is created. Yet we can predict a 
minimal account of these privileges. An SSI governance institution could deprive a state of the 
right to partake in decisions which are made in that institution. We can conceive of much 
stronger powers that the institution could have, just imagine if membership of other beneficial 
international institutions (such as membership of the United Nations) were contingent upon 
being part of an SSI governance regime. Other possible rights and privileges include the ability 
to make recommendations to the relevant UN agencies to inflict economic sanctions upon that 
state, or even for there to be a military response. This is illustrative of the type of powers which 
they can have. I am not advocating that UN membership should be contingent upon SSI 
governance, but such a governance institution would certainly have much more sanctioning 
power if it were able to deny members access to the SSI governance institution, and by doing 
so access to the UN as well. Although the effectiveness of such sanctions would be contingent 
upon the value of the rights and privileges that an SSI governance institution could provide and 
deprive a state of. 
To conclude this section, there are accountability mechanisms which currently exist in the 
international system that could be applied to the case of SSI governance. The core lesson from 
the example of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is that the 
sanctioning power available is that of restricting access to the benefits that membership of the 
                                                          
105 To be more specific, this is clearly true of the following reports: The Congressional Research Service Report 
(2010); the Kiel Earth Institute’s ‘Large-Scale Intentional Interventions into the Climate System? Assessing the 
Climate Engineering Debate (Rickels et al, 2011); ‘Solar Radiation Management: The Governance of Research’ 
by the Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative (SRMGI) (2010); ‘Geoengineering for Decision-
Makers: Science and Technology (2011); The Ecologic Institute Report ( Bodle, et al;2014); the NAS report 
(2015); The EUTRACE Report (2015); and the report of the Academic Working Group on Climate Engineering 
Governance ‘Governing Solar Radiation Management’ (Chhetri et al., 2018). 
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organisation provides. As explained, the force of this sanction would seem to be contingent on 
the benefits of participating in an SSI governance institution, and it is unclear what those 
benefits would be or how appealing they would be.  
In addition to the question of how an accountability mechanism might function for SSI 
governance, there is the question of who the relevant agent is. As I have explained, we have 
reasons for not wanting scientists to be subject to sanctions from an SSI governance body. I 
have also explained that it is common practice to hold states vicariously responsible for the 
acts of agents within that state. This seems even more appropriate when we consider that the 
sanctioning power of international regimes is to deprive members of the benefits provided by 
these regimes. Those benefits are provided to member states rather than individual scientists. 
Therefore, restricting the benefits which a regime provides to a state is not a meaningful way 




3.8 Conclusion  
 
I propose that accountability should be a principle of SSI governance in light of the problem 
of moral corruption. Yet this comes with a caveat, which is that efforts must be taken to ensure 
that the mechanism of accountability is well functioning. This requires an understanding of 
how accountability relates to other concepts such as transparency and publicity. This chapter 
has provided an account of this relationship in the context of SSI research. Additionally, to 
ensure that accountability is well functioning it is necessary to understand how accountability 
can be achieved in the various relevant domains of SSI governance.  
David Morrow observes from the reports on geoengineering governance that transparency is 
consistently recommended (Morrow, 2017: 8). However, he also observes that there is no 
consensus on how the term should be operationalised. This chapter has endorsed the consensus 
that transparency is important, due to its relationship with accountability. Therefore, when 
operationalising transparency, we should do so with an eye to accountability, because after all, 
accountability is one of the tools we want to apply in the case of moral corruption.  
However, accountability appears to be neglected as a principle in proposals for geoengineering 
governance. For example, it is not mentioned by name in Morrow’s summary of 
geoengineering reports. Moreover, it is notably absent from the most significant set of 
proposals for geoengineering governance, namely, the Oxford Principles (Rayner et al., 2013). 
Given the near consensus on the value of transparency and the lack of attention paid to 
accountability, this raises a question as to whether these reports really understand the force of 
transparency independent of ideas such as accountability, which they seem to neglect. By 
highlighting the relationship between transparency and accountability, hopefully the 
conversation on transparency in geoengineering governance can progress with a better 
understanding not only of why we may value transparency, but also why we may want to give 
additional thought to accountability.  
Finally, if moral corruption is to be taken seriously, then accountability should not be seen as 
the solution on its own. Nonetheless, it is still more useful that transparency. At best, 
accountability is a way to engage with the problem. This is in part due to a particular feature 
of moral corruption, which is that it concerns an aspect of our reasoning process. Whilst tools 
like accountability may affect reasoning, they are probably better at engaging with the 
outcomes of such reasoning and negating those outcomes, rather than the reasoning itself. 
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Therefore, given the difficulties of addressing moral corruption, accountability should be 
subject to scrutiny before being used as part of any arsenal to tackle moral corruption in SSI 
governance, and scholars should continue to consider the alternative ways in which moral 
corruption can be reduced.  
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4 Understanding the Moral Hazard Complaint: Addressing 




The purpose of this chapter is to provide a clear account of what the moral hazard concern 
entails when it is applied to SSI, so that the proposals to address the hazard can then be 
thoroughly analysed in the two chapters which follow. In the broadest terms, the moral hazard 
complaint is the fear that there will be a reduction in mitigation efforts due to SSI. I will begin 
by presenting the concept of the moral hazard complaint in relation to SSI, for which I draw 
upon the work of Ben Hale (2012), Adam Corner and Nick Pidgeon (2014), and David Morrow 
(2014) in applying the moral hazard concern to SSI.106 The work of these authors draws 
attention to the three main components of a moral hazard complaint. Hale’s work is helpful for 
understanding what the moral hazard complaint is, Adam Corner and Nick Pidgeon’s work is 
useful insofar as it considers the question of who experiences the hazard, and Morrow’s 
relevant contribution is that of thinking about how the hazard may happen. When exploring the 
insights from these authors, it will become clear that two more considerations are necessary in 
order to provide a complete account of the hazard; namely, the specific stage of the SSI process 
at which it occurs, and why the hazard would be bad. Consequently, this chapter will argue that 
a complete account of the hazard needs to include five variables: what the hazard is, the stage 
of SSI at which it occurs, who the relevant agent is, the mechanisms by which it occurs, and 
the impact of the hazard.  
These five variables have not been fully explored within the same pieces of work, yet an answer 
to each of these questions is useful if one is going to make sense of the moral hazard complaint 
and consider ways to address the problem. Consequently, the contributions by Hale, Corner 
and Pidgeon, and Morrow all have significant gaps if we wish to use their accounts of the 
hazard for this project. Specifically, Morrow’s account of how the hazard happens is not 
sensitive to potential variations in who the relevant agents are. Hale’s account is silent on 
variations regarding both who the relevant agents are and how the hazard occurs. Corner and 
Pidgeon have a narrow understanding of how the hazard may happen and also lack 
                                                          




sophistication in their understanding of who the agents could be. For example, whilst Corner 
and Pidgeon identify that the hazard could happen at the political level, they fail to delineate 
the different relevant actors at this level, which is one of the tasks of this chapter.  
The main contribution of this chapter is to provide a degree of conceptual clarity about the 
moral hazard which is absent from the literature. The five-variable understanding of a complete 
moral hazard complaint provides a helpful way of looking at the moral hazard literature and 
for formulating moral hazard complaints. This will be seen in section 4.6 below, where a table 
is generated based on how authors and reports seem to answer these five variables. This enables 
an analysis of moral hazard accounts to be undertaken, which helps point to strong and weak 
accounts as well as pointing to general limitations in the literature.  
There is also an important question about the role which empirical evidence should play in 
determining whether we should respond to the moral hazard problem. This chapter observes 
that empirical evidence has been used in problematic ways by the likes of Reynolds (2015), 
who use it to cast doubt on the existence of the moral hazard problem. It then proceeds to 
provide an account of the role empirical evidence plays by drawing on the work of Shue (2010) 
around threshold likelihoods. The application of this approach provides an alternative account 
of the role of empirical evidence; one which, this chapter will argue, is more appropriate. 
To summarise: this chapter seeks to make two contributions to understanding how the moral 
hazard problem is used in the context of SSI. The chapter provides a clearer conceptualisation 
of the hazard by identifying and considering the five variables which a complete hazard 
complaint requires. Secondly, it justifies taking this account of the hazard seriously, despite the 
inconclusive nature of the empirical evidence which is available.  
 
4.1.1 The moral hazard complaint in governance reports: vague and ambiguous  
 
The moral hazard concern is one which has a noteworthy place in public discourse on 
geoengineering ethics. A substantial number of geoengineering governance reports at least 
acknowledge the concern (Shepherd et al., 2009; the SRMGI report, 2010; Climate 
Intervention: Reflecting Sunlight to Cool Earth, 2015 Schäfer et al, 2015; and the report of the 
Academic Working Group on Climate Engineering Governance ‘Governing Solar Radiation 
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Management’ by Chhetri et al., 2018). Many of these reports also appear to take the moral 
hazard concern seriously, as shown by the following examples. 
The Royal Society:  
The very discussion of geoengineering is controversial in some quarters because of 
a concern that it may weaken conventional mitigation efforts, or be seen as a ‘get 
out of jail free’ card by policy-makers (Submission: Greenpeace; Submission: IOP; 
Submission: Lewis-Brown). This is referred to as the ‘moral hazard’ argument. 
(Shepherd et al., 2009: 37)  
The Solar Radiation Management Governance Initiative (SRMGI):  
Research into SRM could present a ‘moral hazard’. If people (or governments) feel 
that they could be protected against the potential consequences of climate change, 
they may be less likely to take the actions necessary to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. In that case emissions would continue and rise (probably at a faster rate) 
and conceivably increase the eventual desire to deploy SRM technology. (SRMGI, 
2010: 20)  
And the National Academy of Science (NAS):  
Early discussions on albedo modification research focused on the so-called ‘double 
moral hazard’ issue – that on the one hand research into these proposed techniques 
could lead to policy-makers deciding to lose focus and/or urgency for reducing 
emissions. (NAS report, 2015: 152)107 
These reports capture the idea that the moral hazard represents a concern about how SSI 
implementation could have an undesirable impact on the approach to mitigation. Yet the 
concept of the hazard is under-specified in these reports, and insofar as they do specify what it 
means, they fill out the idea in divergent ways. There is divergence about the stage of SSI at 
which the hazard occurs, for example. The Royal Society report points to ‘discussions of 
geoengineering’ as being enough for the hazard to occur, without specifying which discussions 
matter or by whom (Shepherd et al., 2009: 37)  . Whilst the NAS and SRMGI reports identify 
the hazard as occurring when research into SSI takes place, they diverge on the question of 
who the relevant agents are. The NAS report focuses on ‘policy-makers’ makers’ (NAS report, 
                                                          
107 The quote proceeds by explaining an alternative type of moral hazard argument where there is a situation in 
which SSI would need to be deployed but has not been properly researched.  
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2015: 152) whilst the SRMGI report focuses on ‘people (or governments)’ (SRMGI, 2010: 20). 
Nonetheless, they are more specific than the Royal Society report, which does not specify 
which agents it has in mind when considering the moral hazard problem. This level of 
vagueness about who the relevant agents are is deeply problematic if one wishes to address the 
moral hazard problem. For example, a response to the hazard which sought to regulate the 
behaviour of individuals may be inappropriate if the relevant agents are multinational 
corporations.  
These instances of variation and vagueness across reports are symptomatic of a lack of 
conceptual clarity about what the hazard actually is. However, despite this lack of conceptual 
clarity, there is a consistent core claim across these reports, which is that SSI could have an 
undesirable impact on the process of mitigation. As explained, to achieve conceptual clarity, 
this chapter will answer the questions of what, who and how, which these reports fail to answer. 
 
4.1.2 A comment on the wider moral hazard literature.  
Before exploring how the moral hazard concern should be understood in the case of SSI, it is 
important to clarify the approach of this chapter. In particular, it is helpful to explain why the 
chapter does not draw more extensively on the broader literature about moral hazards which 
exist throughout the economics literature, on issues ranging from car (Weisburd, 2015) and 
health insurance (Einav et al, 2013), to the behaviour of banks (Boissay et al, 2016). This 
classic presentation of the hazard in the economics literature understands the hazard as 
occurring when there are two parties, an insurer and the insuree, and the insuree takes more 
risk than they otherwise would have done in light of being insured against the full consequences 
of that risk. There are two classes of objections to the insurance frame which are relevant in 
this case. As explained in chapter 2, Fragnière and Gardiner provide a normative argument 
against the insurance frame. Among other points, they argue that the insurance frame makes 
SSI look like a legitimate and desirable response to climate change, and by doing so hides the 
causes of concern with SSI (Fragnière and Gardiner, 2016: 16-17). Yet there is also an 
argument against the insurance frame which is more descriptive in nature; the argument is that 
the insurance frame simply does not fit the case of SSI. The difficulty of understanding the 
moral hazard of SSI in terms of the insurer-insuree relationship becomes clear when we seek 
to identify the parties who would occupy each of these roles. 
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Here I shall explore the idea that that insurance frame simply does not fit, by pointing to the 
significant conceptual obstacles one would need to overcome if SSI were to be described as a 
case of insurance. To demonstrate these obstacles, I will outline some of the work by Jonathan 
Wolff (2011, 2019) on risk, which demonstrates the varying structure of decisions about risk 
involving multiple parties, one of these situations being when the moral hazard exists. Wolff 
seeks to provide a framework for understanding situations in which risks exist which cannot 
appropriately be analysed via cost-benefit analysis in a public policy decision.108  
 
(Wolff, 2019:10) 
I shall only focus on Wolff’s understanding of the moral hazard at the moment, as that is all 
that we require to have a sense of the technical understanding of the hazard. The other situations 
of risk which this table identifies are considered in chapter 5 as possible responses to the hazard. 
Wolff’s understanding of the hazard is representative of the technical account of the moral 
hazard. The first feature to note of this account is that there are two distinct parties, in this case 
party A and B. Secondly, these parties have different roles in this case. One of them will have 
decision making power over the risk and will benefit from any risk-seeking behaviour, whilst 
the other party will bear the burdens of the risk-taking. This is a simple and fair account of the 
hazard, yet consider the following obstacles and barriers which exist when applying this 
account to the case of SSI.   
There is a deep problem of understanding who the provider of the insurance is, and who the 
insured parties are. Are the insured parties those who are vulnerable to the effects of climate 
                                                          
108 Recall the argument from part 2.2 of this thesis about cost-benefit analysis, where the point was made that it is 
inappropriate for many decisions about SSI due to it hiding ethically important considerations.   
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change which SSI seeks to prevent? This may make sense at first glance, but it is tainted by the 
fact that those ‘insured parties’ are likely to be vulnerable to some of the consequences of SSI. 
Does it make sense to say that you are meaningfully insured against a significant risk via a tool 
which would impose a new set of significant risks upon you instead?  Moreover, if the 
hazardous behaviour is a product of certain actors not mitigating, then these non-mitigating 
parties are the ones who experience an increase in their risk-taking behaviour. So perhaps it is 
those parties who change their mitigation behaviour who benefit from SSI, so are they party 
A? Yet if this is true it contradicts the idea of SSI being insurance for the vulnerable against 
the harms of climate change, because it is not the vulnerable actors who we think of as 
experiencing this change in their mitigation behaviour. We think of  those agents who already 
have high carbon emissions as those whose behaviour might change as a result of SSI.  
These questions are indicative of the challenges one would face if they wished to engage with 
classic literature on moral hazard, which is dependent on there being the insurer and insuree 
relationship. This is theoretically challenging and possible answers to these questions appear 
to be convoluted, for SSI does not appear to have the simple insurer-insuree relationship. Yet 
the core claim of the hazard in the case of SSI is not contingent upon such a relationship. This 
is recognised in the work of Baatz (2016), Hale (2012), Morrow (2014) and Reynolds (2015), 
none of whom draw deeply on the wider moral hazard literature, when considering the moral 
hazard of SSI. In fact, despite their constructive engagement with the moral hazard in the case 
of SSI, none of them answer the above questions about the insurer insuree relationship. Hence 
this chapter is following a trend in the literature on SSI and the moral hazard, by not engaging 
deeply with the broader moral hazard literature.109  
The challenges of adopting the insurance frame provides a reason to adopt a different frame 
which does not have these challenges. The risk-risk trade off frame is immune to the challenges 
the insurance frame faces, for nothing about the risk-risk trade off frame requires the A- B 
relationship between agents, and the subsequent challenges this creates. Yet the risk-risk trade-
off is also informative of how we should think about the moral hazard problem. The moral 
hazard concern rightly points to the risk of there being an adverse impact on our mitigation 
                                                          
109 One insight to draw attention to from the classic moral hazard literature is that this is an ex ante hazard, which 
is to say the hazard occurs prior to the event (such as the use of SSI). Whilst there may be an ex post hazard to be 
had from SSI, that is not the focus of this thesis, or any ethical analysis of the moral hazard from SSI so far. The 
ex post hazard would be a hazard which occurs after the event. If the event is the use of SSI, then the ex post 
hazard would be a concern about how our mitigation behaviour is affected  
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behaviour due to our research and development of SSI.110 However, the moral hazard problem 
does not invite consideration of the danger of taking the moral hazard seriously. Yet the risk-
risk trade off frame requires us to ask that question: What are the risks of taking the moral 
hazard seriously? The answer to this question is contingent upon how we would respond to the 
hazard. If our responses to the hazard restrict our knowledge of, or capacity to research or 
ability to deploy SSI, it would adversely impact the possibility of SSI being used to respond to 
certain risks of climate change.111 Therefore responses to the moral hazard problem of SSI may 
increase the likelihood of certain risks from climate change being experienced.112 Hence the 
importance of the risk-risk trade-off frame, which vividly reminds us of the importance of 
asking what the risks are of proposed responses to the hazard. 
 
4.1.3 The difference between the moral hazard concern and the slippery slope 
concern.  
It is also helpful to clarify how the moral hazard concern relates to the slippery slope objection, 
which is sometimes raised in the context of SSI. In the context of geoengineering the slippery 
slope concern is one of how initial action on geoengineering (which lies at the top of the 
proverbial slope), such as creating mechanisms of governance or doing lab-simulations, puts 
pressure on us to take further steps to advance geoengineering. This pressure could occur via 
some form of vested interested in SSI. For example by scientists who careers are progressing 
via this research, or by businesses and governments who have invested in the initial research. 
This pressure could lead small scale research to progress to large scale field tests and ultimately 
resulting in the deployment of SSI (which is at the bottom of this slope) (Callies, 2019b: 676). 
This is distinct from the moral hazard concern, which is a concern about how our mitigation 
                                                          
110 This understanding of the hazard is explained in more detail in the following section of this chapter. 
111 These are plausible ways to address the hazard problem, chapter 5 argues that restricting knowledge via secrecy 
is an effective (but not desirable) way to address the hazard. The thought behind restricting research or deployment 
capabilities is that this should reduce the confidence which an agent has in SSI to be used to address risks from 
climate change.  
 
112 However, the picture is even more complicated than this, because these possible restrictions on SSI are 
designed to avoid the effect of the moral hazard. Therefore these restrictions on SSI subsequently restrains some 
risks from climate change (via the change in mitigation efforts) which SSI would seek to prevent. Yet the insight 
of using the risk-risk trade off frame still remains, which is when considering responses to the moral hazard 




behaviour is affected by geoengineering. Even if both of these concerns ultimately result in the 






4.2 Why would the use of SSI technology pose a moral hazard?  
 
In this section I will explore how moral hazards should be understood in the context of SSI 
according to Ben Hale (2012). Hale explains that there is ambiguity regarding how the hazard 
should be formulated (Hale, 2012: 120). This will therefore provide a helpful foundation for 
understanding what the hazard is in the case of SSI (although, as Hale acknowledges, the hazard 
is still not completely clear even after these questions have been answered).113 This section is 
therefore a starting point to show what key parts of the literature on the ethics of SSI have to 
offer in terms of understanding the hazard, and it provides a springboard for the further inquiry 
into understanding the specific hazard which this chapter does address. Therefore, after an 
initial engagement with Hale’s work, the chapter will move on to engage with further 
components of the hazard for the purposes of our analysis.  
If we take SSI technology seriously as a way of engaging with climate change, are we more 
likely to end up in a situation in which it will be required? If you think the answer to this 
question is ‘yes’, or you can see why one might think it is ‘yes’, then you can see the intuition 
behind the concern that SSI creates a moral hazard. Yet this is too ambiguous for the purpose 
of our analysis. Hale illustrates the ambiguity of the moral hazard by observing that the hazard 
can refer to at least three different objections in relation to different emission pathways.114 
These are the business-as-usual, the counterfactual trajectory, and the perverse behaviour 
objections. The three objections can be represented as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. Three Different Outcomes of the Moral Hazard 
The business-as-usual objection 
There will be no change in our collective 
mitigation behaviour.  
The counterfactual trajectory objection 
Whilst mitigation efforts will increase, they will 
not increase by as great an extent as previously 
thought. 
The perverse behaviour objection We will mitigate less than we currently intend to. 
The table is based on Hale’s understanding of these objections (Hale, 2012:120–122). 
 
                                                          
113 To be more specific, this means that at this stage of the chapter certain features of the hazard will remain 
ambiguous, such as who the relevant agents are or how the hazard occurs.   
114 Hale’s account relates to geoengineering technologies in general, not specifically SSI.  
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The concerns identified by Hale indicate that the hazard can be understood in significantly 
different ways. Despite this, these three concerns are all of the same metric: namely, emission 
levels. The fact that these concerns are of the same metric allows us to understand them as 
existing on a spectrum. Figure 3 contains a diagram which I have created to illustrate this point. 
 




4.3 When would SSI create a moral hazard? 
 
Despite the clarity gained by understanding the moral hazard complaint in terms of SSI 
implementation having an adverse impact on emission levels, there is still some ambiguity in 
Hale’s formulation of the moral hazard complaint. This is because it is not clear when SSI can 
have this hazardous effect. Is it when agents have knowledge of the concept of SSI? Or once it 
has been researched and developed? Or when it is ready to be deployed? Or at some other stage 
in the development of SSI? There is a range of points in the process of SSI development where 
one may fear that the moral hazard exists. 
In order to clarify the nature of the moral hazard concern which this thesis will analyse, I will 
focus on the concern when it is expressed in relation to the research and development of SSI. 
Moreover, by focusing on the research and development stage of SSI, the thesis retains its 
relevance for governance reports, many of which express concerns with the moral hazard at the 
stage of research and development:  
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Research into SRM could present a ‘moral hazard’. (SRMGI, 2010: 20) 
There is a risk that research on albedo modification could distract from efforts to 
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. (NAS, 2015: 152) 
[T]he ‘moral hazard’ argument (the concern that research on climate engineering 
would discourage the overall efforts to reduce or avoid emissions of greenhouse 
gases). (Schäfer et al, 2015: 14) 
An additional reason for focusing on the research and development stage is the fact that this 
stage may occur soon, given the moves which are being made for experimental research on 
certain aspects of SSI to take place (Tollefson, 2018).115 The relevance of focusing on the 
research and deployment stage of SSI is supported by the thought that agents are more likely 
to take an idea seriously if it is being researched and developed, particularly if the research 
supports the possibility of SSI. Therefore this chapter will proceed by understanding the moral 
hazard complaint as the concern that the research and development of SSI may have an adverse 
impact on mitigation levels.  
4.4 Why is the moral hazard bad? 
The final variable to consider in this section is why the moral hazard may be considered to be 
bad. This is a valuable exercise, for if the hazard was not bad in some sense, then it would be 
unclear why we should be taking it seriously and why it is being taken seriously in public policy 
domains. This chapter will understand the badness of the hazard as a product of how it increases 
the likelihood that we will face risks from climate change, the use of SSI, or both. The idea 
here is that an adverse impact on mitigation efforts will lead to a scenario in which there is a 
greater degree of climate change and/or a scenario in which SSI is more likely to be used 
because there is a greater risk of climate change. This seems to be an implicit assumption in 
much of the literature, given that much of it is written in the context of debates about climate 
justice or producing reports which hold climate change to be a problem.  
  
                                                          




4.5 Who are the relevant agents?  
 
This next section considers the question of whose behaviour changes in order for an adverse 
impact on mitigation efforts to occur. There has been an attempt in the literature on moral 
hazard and geoengineering to identify the relevant agents. Corner and Pidgeon (2014) identify 
three relevant levels where the hazard could occur. Firstly, where an individual adversely 
changes their mitigation efforts (Corner and Pigeon, 2014: 2). Secondly an individual may not 
change their mitigation behaviour in direct response to the prospect of SSI, but in response to 
the fear that others in society will do so, then society as a whole may change its attitude towards 
mitigation as a consequence. Thirdly, there is a political hazard concerning where climate 
policy is formed and how the resources at hand could be moved away from mitigation efforts 
(Corner and Pigeon, 2014: 3). 
If we are going to understand who the relevant agents are, we will need to build on Corner and 
Pidgeon’s trichotomous account of individual, societal and political actors. I am going to focus 
on the political actors; a reason for doing this is that political actors are the appropriate agents 
to be governed by a global governance institution.116This is because if we were to accept their 
analysis and focus on the political level, there would still be an absence of necessary detail, for 
it would still not be clear who the relevant actors are in climate policy at the political level. To 
answer the question of who the relevant actors are at the political level I will consider what a 
polycentric approach to climate policy formulation tells us. This section of the chapter will 
therefore identify a sub-set of relevant agents at the political level, namely: the formal role-
holders of power. The formal role-holders of power are understood as the relevant agents of 
the moral hazard complaint for this thesis. By the formal role-holders of power, I mean those 
agents who are members of the three branches of government within a state: the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary.117 This is done in the knowledge that there is a certain tension, 
which is that polycentrism, in part, encourages us to think beyond the state in terms of how 
policy formation occurs. However, it does not deny the importance of the state, it simply points 
                                                          
116 There would be a distinct strangeness to individuals being directly governed by a global governance institution.  
117 The relationship between these branches will of course vary between states. If we were to consider the case of 
the United States of America the total number of formal role holders of power is 545, the number 545 comes from 
the 535 members of Congress plus the 9 members of the Supreme Court plus the President. The number is higher 
if the Cabinet is also included, but the number of Cabinet members can vary within each administration. The 
formal role holders of power should be identifiable in each state, by summing the members of the legislature and 
executive ad judiciary, although if one were to engage in this exercise there would be a question to be asked about 
double counting where there is overlap between these branches, for example in the UK members of the legislature 
are also members of the executive. 
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out other relevant agents alongside the state. The point of drawing attention to polycentrism is 
that it reveals who the possible relevant political agents are for the purpose of mapping different 
accounts of the moral hazard. 
The descriptive claim of polycentric governance is that climate policy is made at many different 
levels of governance ranging from international fora such as the UNFCCC to local councils 
(Jordan et al., 2018). Moreover, these policies are in part a product of the perceived interests 
of many groups, including the government, the people, local governments, businesses and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). For example, NGOs and businesses are capable of 
independently pursuing policies and norms regarding climate change within their domain. 
Consequently, this would have a degree of influence on climate policy. The thought is that 
climate policy is not only the product of monocentric action by states at the international level; 
it is also the product of complicated relationships between states and other agents.  
Polycentrism helps make sense of the importance of actors who are outside the government in 
affecting climate-related polices. These are all those actors who could have an adverse impact 
on mitigation if they were to experience the moral hazard.118 Yet it is not necessary for all of 
these agents to be subject to the moral hazard for the unwelcome consequences of the hazard 
to materialise. Instead, there is likely to be a threshold number of relevant agents who need to 
experience it in order for the hazard to have an adverse impact on mitigation.119 This variety of 
actors who are relevant to mitigation policy and therefore also susceptible to the hazard points 
to a difficulty with trying to understand how SSI could create a moral hazard.120 Different types 
of agents might experience the hazard under different circumstances and due to different 
reasons. For each type of agent there is a story to tell about the conditions which would lead 
them to be susceptible to the hazard.  
Although this threshold image might be misleading, for not all agents wield equal power in 
being able to influence the likelihood of the moral hazard that occur in public policy. Public 
policy dynamics are complicated and are not going to be explained here. But the point is a 
simple one, that even if many agents who do influence public policy do not experience the 
                                                          
118 Their impact on mitigation could occur in a variety of ways, ranging from reducing their personal emissions 
to their ability to influence others, and they could affect decisions at the regional, national or global level. 
119 Even if we do not know what this number is, it seems unlikely that all agents would have to be subject to the 
hazard in order for the hazard to have an adverse impact on mitigation.  
120 The hazard can of course also be experienced by those outside the policy process. For example, individuals 
could change their own behaviour in light of SSI.  
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moral hazard, this may be insufficient to prevent the moral hazard occurring if particular agents 
who inform public policy do experience the hazard. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I will focus on one of these relevant groups of actors in the 
knowledge that my subsequent analysis only addresses the moral hazard problem for those 
actors, and not the question of the hazard as a whole. I will therefore focus on the formal role-
holders of power as the relevant agents in my analysis of the moral hazard of SSI.121  
The relevance of the formal role-holders of state power can be seen when one considers why 
the state itself is such an important agent in climate change policy. The importance of states in 
a polycentric account of climate change policy is vividly made by Nachmany and Setzer 
(2018). They make the point that states are responsible for formulating and implementing 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) as set out in the Paris Agreement (Nachmany and 
Setzer, 2018: 48). The NDCs are an integral part of the current strategy to address climate 
change, and this strategy relies on states playing their part and acting to meet their NDCs.  
Crucially, the state has the power to regulate the behaviour of other actors and to encourage 
them to behave in certain ways (Nachmany and Setzer, 2018: 49). The state wields its power 
in a unique way, and in regard to the power to regulate behaviour, no other institution has as 
much legal force to regulate the behaviour of agents within a state’s territory.  Additionally, 
the state is uniquely placed to motivate behaviour at home – and to some extent abroad – given 
the range of incentives it has to offer, ranging from tax breaks to favourable laws. This 
combination of power to regulate and incentivise behaviour leads Nachmany and Setzer to 
conclude that the state has a ‘central role’ in climate governance which cannot be performed 
by non-state actors. These powers of the state are indicative of the state being the primary 
institution with governing power in regard to climate change.  
The powers of the state that Nachmany and Setzer (2018) identify are powers which are 
formally exercised by the formal role-holders in the state. For example, the power to regulate 
behaviour is formally a product of the relationship between the executive, legislature and 
judiciary. Given the importance of these powers, I take those agents who formally exercise 
them as offering a sufficiently interesting level of agency to focus on for the analysis of the 
moral hazard problem in the case of SSI. It is important to emphasise the word formal role-
                                                          
121 This is done in the knowledge that there is a certain tension, which is that polycentrism in part encourages us 
to think beyond the state in terms of how policy formation occurs. However, it does not deny the importance of 
the state, it simply points out other relevant agents alongside the state.  
100 
 
holders here. Members of Parliament (MPs) can be seen as the formal role-holders of legislative 
power, yet there could also be agents outside the parliamentary process who are capable of 
exerting great influence on the decisions which are made in Parliament. These other agents are 
not the unit of analysis for this thesis.  
To summarise, the preceding discussion was motivated by the premise that a complete 
formulation of the moral hazard account requires an account of who the relevant agents are in 
the moral hazard concern. Polycentric accounts of climate policy formulation draw attention to 
the fact that there are a range of relevant agents involved in climate change policy formation. 
Nachmany and Setzer argue that states are one such relevant agent due to the regulatory and 
incentivising power which they have. Given Nachmany and Setzer’s insights about the 
importance of the state’s powers, the chapter proceeds by taking those who are in a positon to 





4.6 What mechanisms may account for these agents to experience the moral 
hazard?  
 
In this section I shall consider what mechanisms could lead the formal role-holders of power 
to experience the moral hazard when SSI is being researched and developed. Whilst this section 
focuses on the formal-role holders of power there is nothing about these mechanisms which is 
unique to the formal role-holders of power, therefore this section also continues the mapping 
exercise of thinking about what mechanisms could lead to agents in general experiencing the 
moral hazard.122 The thought is that by understanding these mechanisms we will be better 
placed to identify ways to address the hazard. Morrow (2014) identifies three mechanisms 
which will be informative for the analysis. These are: informational failure, psychological 
failure, and ethical failure.123 This section will therefore proceed by exploring each of these 
mechanisms.  
 
4.6.1  Informational failure  
 
Broadly speaking, informational failure occurs when the relevant agent fails to understand or 
have access to all the relevant information they need to make a decision. The informational 
failure which Morrow refers to is grounded in economic models (Morrow, 2014: 7). Economic 
models of a certain kind tend to assume that an agent has full information of a risk when making 
their decision. In short, the informational failure would occur if the policy-maker is unaware 
of the probability of all possibilities and the possible effects from each possible policy 
(Morrow, 2014: 7). Morrow rightly observes that the assumption of full information does not 
necessarily hold in the case of climate engineering policy-makers (Morrow, 2014: 7). This is 
hardly surprising, given that in the case of SSI there is a huge amount of information to be 
understood if one is to truly understand the outcome and magnitude of each possibility. This 
                                                          
122 Although different agents may be effected by these mechanisms to different degrees.  
123 A limitation of Morrow’s analysis is that he focuses on policy-makers without defining the term. Morrow does 
not appear to be sensitive to the insights of polycentrism, i.e. the fact that there are other agents who may 
experience the moral hazard and that their experience of the hazard is relevant for mitigation efforts. Or, if Morrow 
does capture all these agents in his understanding of policy-makers, then his analysis suffers from not being 
sensitive to how the responses of different agents would vary in line with these mechanisms. 
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sub-section will proceed by elaborating on what an informational failure is in the case of SSI 
and why such a failure may contribute to the moral hazard.  
It is important to note that the informational failure is a descriptive claim in context, not a 
normative claim. Whether an agent is blameworthy, responsible or should be punished is a 
separate set of questions. Morrow identifies an informational failure as occurring in the case of 
climate engineering when policy-makers ‘remain ignorant or even develop false beliefs’ about 
the ‘promise, efficacy and risks of climate engineering technologies’ (Morrow, 2014: 7). 
Therefore, the descriptive claim is that if the formal role-holders of power remain ignorant, or 
have developed false beliefs about the promise, efficacy and risks of SSI, then there is an 
informational failure.  
It appears likely that informational failure will be quite pervasive among the formal role-
holders of power in the case of SSI. The question to ask is how particular instances would 
contribute to the moral hazard happening? The concern is that the informational failure could 
contribute to the hazard due to the formal role-holders of power perceiving SSI as being more 
effective and risk-free than it actually is. For example, if a formal role-holder of power is 
ignorant of the risks of SSI, they may perceive it as a sufficient response to climate change. 
Such an attitude can be seen in the blog post of Newt Gingrich (Former Speaker of the United 
States House of Representatives) (Gingrich, 2008).124 Yet not all informational failure about 
SSI would contribute to the moral hazard. For example, if an informational failure results in 
one only knowing about the risks of SSI but none or few of the benefits of SSI such as 
preventing or reducing temperature increases, this may result in the agents having an unduly 
unfavourable view of SSI. Our concern is whether through ignorance or false belief the formal 
role-holders of power will have an unduly favourable view of SSI, since this may have an 
adverse impact on mitigation efforts, which is the cause of our fear about the moral hazard.  
For each of the three mechanisms which contribute to the existence of the moral hazard it is 
useful to think about why these mechanisms may occur. We therefore need to ask why might 
an informational failure occur which could contribute to the hazard? Here I shall focus on 
ignorance rather than the development of false belief, a reason for this focus is that at this point 
in time ignorance about SSI is common. Survey data in the US revealed that 74% of the general 
population knew nothing about geoengineering (Leiserowitz et al, 2010). A similar degree of 
ignorance  has been shown in the UK where 75% of respondents to a study claimed to know 
                                                          
124 Gingrich’s position has been explained in section 1.2.1. of this thesis. 
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nothing or almost nothing about geoengineering (Spence et al, 2010: 20) It is reasonable to 
extrapolate that many formal role holders of power would also be ignorant of geoengineering.   
When considering ignorance about SSI, it is important to draw attention to the fact that this is 
the default setting for many people. Formal role-holders of power may educate themselves 
about SSI, listen to experts, read reports, meet advisers, etc. in order to overcome this 
ignorance, but the default state is one of ignorance about the risks, efficacy and promise of SSI. 
Even when a formal role-holder does educate themselves about SSI, there is no guarantee that 
this would be to a sufficiently high standard to escape the state of informational failure. This is 
not a claim about the intelligence of formal role-holders of power; it is simply pointing to the 
fact that SSI has many technical, social, ethical, political and scientific implications which are 
challenging for many people to understand. What I mean is that we do not need to look for a 
deep complicated theory to account for the ignorance of the formal role-holders of power on 
this issue, since ignorance to a degree is natural and to be expected in this case.  
To summarise, an informational failure occurs when the formal role-holders of power are 
ignorant or have false beliefs about the promise, risks and efficacy of SSI technology. 
Informational failure which leads to formal role-holders of power having an unduly favourable 
perception of SSI could result in the moral hazard occurring. We have reason to fear that an 
informational failure could be pervasive among the formal role-holders of power due to the 
fact that ignorance of the risks, promise and efficacy of SSI is the default state of knowledge 
for many role-holders. A more complete account of informational failure in relation to SSI 
would also consider how those who formally hold power come to develop false beliefs. 
 
4.6.2 Psychological failure 
 
The second mechanism which Morrow identifies is that of psychological failure, or cognitive 
bias (Morrow, 2014: 7). Cognitive biases are ‘unconscious psychological mechanisms’ which 
skew a judgement (Morrow, 2014: 7). Judgements about SSI are judgements about risk 
(broadly speaking).125 Kahan et al. (2015) present three conflicting models of risk perception. 
These are the rational actor model, the irrational actor model, and the cultural cognition thesis. 
This sub-section will show why we have reason to suspect that SSI proposals could interact 
                                                          
125 This is clear if we remember the risk-risk trade-off frame, moreover this view is prominent in other works on 
the moral hazard, such as Baatz (2016) and Morrow (2014).  
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with the irrational actor or cultural cognition accounts of risk and so contribute to agents 
operating in the manner predicted by the moral hazard concern.126 By doing so this sub-section 
will show that we have reason to suspect that SSI may interact with well-established cognitive 
biases.  
The cultural cognition thesis has a story to tell in this case. The thesis states that when 
evaluating risk, the valuation will be skewed by that agent’s own values. Specifically, it is 
skewed so that the risk coheres with the agent’s own values (Kahan et al., 2015: 194). Kahan 
et al. provide the example of an agent with individualistic values127 who would oppose a 
response to climate change which would curtail their liberty (Kahan et al., 2015: 194). The 
relevance of the cultural cognition thesis to the SSI case seems to be dependent on whether the 
risks are ones which interact with an agent’s value judgement as to how society should 
function. That would definitely appear to be the case, since the risks from SSI are physical, 
social, economic and political. Albert Lin draws attention to the fact that SSI interacts with 
how people value ‘human innovation, faith in technology and the dominance of nature’ (Lin, 
2013: 700).  
The moral hazard could therefore occur if people hold values which result in them being unduly 
optimistic or trusting in the capacity of SSI to be a good response to the problem. Consider the 
example of the techno-optimist who holds the view that technology will solve the problem of 
climate change. Upon learning about SSI, the cultural cognition thesis would expect the techno-
optimist to look favourably upon SSI because it is consistent with their image of how society 
should be. Consequently, they may reduce their support for mitigation efforts because they 
believe that SSI is the technology which will solve the problem. Hence they behave in a way 
which would appear conducive for the moral hazard to occur.  
I shall now identify an alternative account of how the mechanism of psychological failure could 
lead to the moral hazard, namely the irrational actor model (Kahan et al., 2015: 195). This 
model is premised on the idea that an agent’s perception of risk is affected by a set of heuristics 
and biases (Lin, 2013: 694). This model is well established in the psychological literature 
(Slovic, 2000; Kahneman, 2003; Weber, et al 2006) and has started to infiltrate other academic 
                                                          
126 There are two reasons for not paying much attention to the rational actor model. Firstly, the idea of all actors 
being rational utility maximisers is outdated and the cultural cognition thesis and the irrational actor model both 
appear to be more plausible accounts of human psychology. Secondly, the model would say very little of value in 
this case, apart from that agents will engage in behaviour which contributes to the moral hazard when it is in their 
perceived rational self-interest to do so.  
127 For Kahan et al. this means they value having a broad sphere of liberty (Kahan et al., 2015: 194). 
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disciplines as well. Recently the Nobel Prize for Economics was awarded to Richard Thaler 
for his work in the area of behavioural economics, which is premised on this irrational actor 
model (Thaler, 1991; 1994; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).   
When the irrational actor model is applied to a formal role-holder of power who is making a 
judgement about SSI, the theory would seek to identify whether the agent is making a 
judgement about risk. Each judgement about risk opens a window for heuristics and biases to 
come into play. In the case of SSI there are plenty of risks involved, ranging from what one 
thinks of the physical impacts of SSI to the political ramifications of taking SSI seriously. 
Hence there are plenty of opportunities for heuristics and biases to come into play as well. The 
question is whether we have any reason to suspect that certain heuristics or biases would cause 
the formal role-holders of power to contribute to the moral hazard?  
Lin identifies quite a few relevant heuristics and biases, namely: optimism bias, 
overconfidence, hyperbolic discounting, and outrage (Lin, 2013: 695). Lin explains that the 
optimism bias is when people do not believe they will suffer the consequences of a 
phenomenon like climate change if there is any uncertainty about whether harm will occur or 
not (Lin, 2013: 696).128 The optimism bias could manifest in the case of SSI. An instance of 
this would be if the formal role-holders of power were aware that there is a set of risks 
associated with SSI, yet believed that these risks are more likely to be experienced by other 
countries than their own.129 The formal role-holders of power who experience this 
overconfidence may be more willing for SSI to be adopted as a response to climate change, 
given that they do not think their own country is at risk. Consequently, this may have an adverse 
impact on the willingness of those formal role-holders to engage with demanding efforts for 
climate change mitigation. This is merely meant to illustrate why we may have reason to 
suspect that heuristics and biases could be part of the causal mechanism for the moral hazard.  
It is important to remember that judgements about SSI are not occurring in a vacuum, whether 
it is one’s values, heuristics or biases which are informative of how SSI is perceived; they are 
all operating against the background conditions of the perfect moral storm. Consider an agent 
                                                          
128 The idea of an optimism bias is well supported in the psychology literature (see Sharot, 2011; Sharot et al., 
2007; and Weinstein, 1980). Moreover, the idea that individuals experience an optimism bias in the case of climate 
change is well explored (Nicholls, 1999; Hatfeld 2001; Gifford, 2011; Van Der Linden, 2015).  
129 There is a challenge in regard to identifying the optimism bias in the case of SSI, since the risks of SSI are not 
distributed evenly. Therefore it may well be statistically accurate for the formal role-holders of power to think 




who has the value of technology optimism: it becomes even more appealing to place weight on 
that value if they consider the demandingness of the alternative strategies to navigate the 
perfect moral storm. Consider a heuristics or bias, such as overconfidence: it is one thing to be 
overconfident in the promises of SSI, it is perhaps even easier to be overconfident in the 
promise of SSI if you are an agent who does not bear the significant risks of SSI failing. When 
an agent has the values, biases or heuristics which we would expect to lead to the moral hazard, 
then we need to understand that they are occurring in the context of the perfect moral storm, 
which could exert an influence on them and even compound the force of these values, biases 
and heuristics. 
This sub-section has considered two well-established theories of risk perception and illustrated 
that according to these theories we could make sense of how the moral hazard could occur 
among certain agents. This is not proof that the moral hazard would necessarily occur due to 
the psychological mechanisms in play; it is just to show that some of our best theories about 
responses to risk lead us to expect the moral hazard to occur. If we do want a greater 
understanding of how psychological mechanisms could contribute to different agents acting on 
the moral hazard, it would beneficial for there to be psychological research specifically focused 
on this question. Such research appears to be desirable if we do want to design effective 
mechanisms to prevent the moral hazard.   
 
4.6.3 Ethical failure  
 
The third mechanism which Morrow identifies is that of ethical failure (Morrow, 2014: 8). In 
this context, Morrow understands an ethical failure as one where ‘politicians rely too heavily’ 
on SSI. Morrow understands that politicians may be tempted to do this if they think that SSI 
would involve fewer costs than mitigation. One might think that making a decision about SSI 
on the grounds of cost does not represent a case of moral failure, since relative costs are a 
legitimate consideration in public policy decisions. Whilst this is true, a decision on SSI should 
not be made solely on the grounds of cost. As explained in chapters 1 and 2, there are many 
ethical salient consideration when one makes a judgement about SSI, and cost is not the sole 
or even a particularly important consideration when weighing these considerations. 
The question is whether we can understand why politicians may experience an ethical failure 
in this case. Ethical failure in the case of climate change policy has been well highlighted by 
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Jamieson (2014), and Shue (2014). Moreover, Gardiner has provided a detailed account of why 
this failure occurs; as discussed in sections 2.3 and 3.2, he understands such failure as a product 
of the perfect moral storm. The key points to remember are that there are at least three storms 
– the global, intergenerational and theoretical storms – which converge to challenge our ability 
(and that of the formal role-holders of power) to act in an ethical manner in response to climate 
change.   
Gardiner applies the perfect moral storm to provide an analysis of some cases of 
geoengineering. A case which Gardiner has given particular attention to is the ‘Arm the Future’ 
argument, whereby research into geoengineering is justified on the grounds that it will allow 
future generations to create a ‘less bad’ state of affairs for themselves (Gardiner, 2011: Chapter 
10). A key feature of Gardiner’s analysis is that geoengineering policy is highly susceptible to 
moral corruption. As explained in Chapter 3, one of the dangers associated with moral 
corruption in the case of SSI is how it could give rise to a dialogue about SSI policy where SSI 
is pursued in the name of it being ethically required, but really this is done due to it being in 
the self-interest of powerful agents. We have reason to fear that an SSI policy which aligns 
with the self-interest of the formal role-holders of power is one which meets Morrow’s standard 
of ethical failure, whereby politicians are too reliant on SSI as a solution. The idea here is that 
SSI policy is much less costly to politicians than mitigation efforts. And moral corruption will 
tempt them to justify to themselves, and to others, an excessive reliance on SSI because it 
relieves them of the (perceived to be) more costly burden of acting on mitigation.  
It is helpful here briefly to review the relationship between the concepts of ethical failure, moral 
corruption and the perfect moral storm. This subsection has drawn the link between moral 
corruption and ethical failure, by observing that moral corruption can be understood as a 
specific instance of ethical failure. Chapter 2 argued that our judgements about climate change 
in general, and SSI in particular, occur against the background conditions of the perfect moral 
storm. These judgements include ones which we can understand as ethical failures. Therefore 
we have a reason to understand the problem of ethical failure, and of moral corruption more 
specifically, in the context of the perfect moral storm.  By contextualising instances of ethical 
failure against the perfect moral storm, we are able to have clearer understanding of the 
circumstances of these failures. In the case of moral corruption we can see the structure of the 
perfect moral storm makes moral corruption particularly tempting. Trying to address moral 
corruption without awareness that the perfect moral storm compounds the temptation of agents 
would be foolhardy.  
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Moral corruption is not the only way that ethical failure could occur. The morally corrupt agent 
at least cares about trying to justify their actions as being ethically permissible or even required. 
Yet we could also have ethical failure brought about by agents who simply do not value acting 
ethically, or even appearing to act ethically. A more complete analysis of ethical failure would 
also take into account such agents who do not care about ethics. Despite this, we do now have 
an insight into how ethical failure could occur in the case of SSI, which is consistent with, and 
grounded in, the broader literature about the ethical failure of climate policy.  
To conclude this sub-section, ethical failure represents a possible mechanism by which the 
moral hazard could occur. Moral corruption provides a helpful way for understanding how 
ethical failure in the case of SSI could happen. We have strong reason to suspect that agents 
are susceptible to moral corruption, and the likelihood of moral corruption is compounded by 
the background conditions of the perfect moral storm. The behaviour resulting from moral 
corruption meets Morrow’s standard of ethical failure, given that politicians would be relying 
too heavily on SSI. 
4.6.4 A summary of the causes of the moral hazard  
 
I have used this section to try to make sense of the different mechanisms which may create a 
moral hazard for the formal role-holders of power. By doing so, the chapter has provided a 
level of clarity about the moral hazard concern which is absent from geoengineering 
governance reports; these reports fail to provide any account of how the moral hazard occurs. 
This section has adopted Morrow’s account of the three relevant mechanisms which can induce 
the moral hazard. Morrow identified these as: informational failure, cognitive bias and ethical 
failure. This is not a complete explanation of how the moral hazard can occur, not least because 
the processes of cognitive bias and informational failure for the formal role-holders of power 
are not yet well understood in this case. There may also be other mechanisms involved which 
Morrow does not consider.   
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4.7 The moral hazard table  
  
Thus far the chapter has identified five variables which need to be included for any account of 
the moral hazard to be complete. These are (1) the stage at which the moral hazard occurs; (2) 
who the relevant agents are; (3) the mechanisms by which the hazard occurs; (4) the impact of 
the moral hazard; and (5) why it is a bad thing.  
This next section now seeks to illustrate the usefulness of the five-variable understanding of 
the moral hazard. To do this, I shall apply the five variables to test how the term has been used 
in the SSI literature. By test, I mean I will explore the accounts of the moral hazard which exist 
in the geoengineering literature to see whether they take each variable into consideration, and 
if so, how. The benefit of this is that it clearly articulates how the moral hazard complaint has 
been formulated by others. This allows us to engage in critically exercises, a simple and helpful 
exercise is to observe whether authors have a complete account of the hazard or not. Moreover 
we can then observe where this is deviation in the literature about how these variables.130  
 
4.7.1 Applying the five-variable test 
 
David Morrow in his 2014 paper seeks to understand why the moral hazard may be bad. He 
adopts the following understanding of the hazard: 
Roughly, their argument is as follows: researching climate engineering would 
induce policy-makers to mitigate less than they otherwise would. (Morrow 2014: 
2) 
Morrow is clear that he is interested in the research and development stage of geoengineering, 
which is his answer to the first variable (Morrow, 2014: 2). As for the second variable regarding 
who the relevant agents are, it is clear from the above quote that this is policy-makers. Yet at 
no point in his article does Morrow elaborate as to how ‘policy-makers’ should be understood 
– should it be those who formally exercise policy-making power, or those who substantively 
                                                          
130 This table could also be helpful for a more complicated type of analysis, whereby one could seek to determine 
better and worse accounts of the hazard by critically comparing them. 
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do so? This lack of clarity means it would be hard to address Morrow’s account of the hazard 
without further detail about how the ‘who’ variable should be understood.  
As we saw in section 4.3, Morrow is very clear about the mechanisms by which the moral 
hazard occurs. He argues that the moral hazard comes about through informational, 
psychological and ethical failings (Morrow, 2014: 7–8). The fourth variable focuses on what 
the impact of the hazard is. Morrow clearly states that the impact will be less mitigation than 
there otherwise would be (Morrow, 2014: 4–5). The final variable asks why the hazard would 
be a bad thing. Morrow answers this by arguing that it would be bad in circumstances where it 
resulted in there being a worse state of affairs than would otherwise be the case (Morrow, 2014: 
4–5). Morrow does nonetheless provide a quite well-rounded account of the moral hazard, with 
answers to all five variables in his paper.  
Corner and Pidgeon (2014) try to explore whether the moral hazard might exist at the level of 
the general public. The stage of the hazard which they consider is that of contemplating the use 
of geoengineering. This can be seen by the fact that their paper explores how the general public 
reacts to the possibility of geoengineering (Corner and Pidgeon, 2014:7). The second variable 
is that of who the relevant agents are. For Corner and Pidgeon, this is the general public and 
those who act at the political level (Corner and Pidgeon, 2014: 2–3). Corner and Pidgeon make 
it clear that they understand the political level as being the actions of politicians (Corner and 
Pidgeon, 2014: 7). This gives scope for plenty of questions to be asked. For example, why are 
politicians the only relevant political actors at the political level for this account?  
The third variable concerns the mechanisms which would lead to the moral hazard occurring. 
Corner and Pidgeon do not provide an account of any mechanisms, but they do shed light on a 
related question, in that they consider how people may respond differently to the hazard 
depending on the different values that they hold. This may account for variation in the effect 
of mechanisms which may cause the moral hazard. Nonetheless, Corner and Pidgeon’s account 
of the moral hazard concern leaves a variable to be desired, given the absence of mechanisms 
from their account. They hold the common view that the moral hazard complaint is about the 
introduction of SSI having an adverse impact on emission levels (Corner and Pidgeon, 2014: 
1). As for the final variable – why the moral hazard is bad – this does not seem to be considered 
in Corner and Pidgeon’s paper. This makes sense, given that their paper is concerned about 
whether the moral hazard exists rather than normative questions such as whether the moral 
hazard is bad.  
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Albert Lin’s paper seeks to understand whether geoengineering could present a moral hazard 
(Lin, 2013). Lin provides a clear expression of his understanding of the moral hazard concern 
thus: 
The moral hazard concern is that research and development in geoengineering may 
undermine public and political support for mitigation and adaptation, 
notwithstanding geoengineering’s limitations. (Lin, 2013: 678)  
 Lin’s answer to our first variable is clear; he is focusing on the research and development stage 
(Lin, 2013: 677). And he understands the ‘who’ as ‘public and political support’. It becomes 
clear in the following pages that by political support Lin means the support of policy-makers. 
This is clearly seen in the last sentence of Lin’s article:  
In assessing geoengineering options, policy-makers and the public must remain 
cognizant of the moral hazard danger and take steps to counter it. (Lin, 2013: 711–
712) 
As for the third variable, Lin is useful in providing an analysis of how the psychological 
mechanism could play a role in creating the moral hazard (Lin, 2013: 694–699). Lin 
understands the impact of the moral hazard as one of undermining mitigation efforts (Lin, 2013: 
711). And he does appear to be concerned with the risks of both climate change and SSI which 
may result from the moral hazard (Lin, 2013: 678). Lin does provide quite a complete account 
of the moral hazard since it is possible to answer all five of our variables by reading his paper. 
Yet if his account is the one which we wish to address, then we require more information about 
the ‘who’ variable, because, as with the others, the who for Lin is couched in the vague terms 
of ‘policy-makers’, and there is significant scope for variation in interpreting who the policy-
makers are.  
There is a frequently cited letter by Martin Bunzl in which he is critical of arguments which 
are used against the research and development of geoengineering technologies. One such 
argument is the moral hazard argument (Bunzl, 2009). Bunzl identifies the stages where the 
moral hazard could occur as being research and development as well as implementation. For 
the second variable – who – it is very unclear who Bunzl has in mind. Likewise, he does not 
consider our third variable; he does not offer an account of how the moral hazard could happen. 
As for the fourth variable, Hale (2012: 121–122) argues that Bunzl holds the perverse 
behaviour view of what the hazard is, due to Bunzl stating that the moral hazard would lead to 
an increase in the output of greenhouse gases. Finally, Bunzl does not articulate why the moral 
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hazard would be bad. Bunzl’s scepticism about the moral hazard argument is hardly surprising, 
given that his account of what the problem is appears to be very incomplete, missing out three 
of the key variables (the agents, the mechanisms and why it would be bad). Given the 
incompleteness of Bunzl’s view, this would seem to be a poor account of the moral hazard 
concern.  
The five-variable test can also be applied to assess how the moral hazard concern is expressed 
in governance reports. I shall therefore proceed by applying the test to three reports. The Royal 
Society report is one of the first reports to be written on geoengineering, and in this report the 
moral hazard concern is understood like this: 
In the context of geoengineering, the risk is that major efforts in geoengineering 
may lead to a reduction of effort in mitigation and/or adaptation because of a 
premature conviction that geoengineering has provided ‘insurance’ against climate 
change. (Shepherd et al., 2009: 37)  
The Royal Society report is inconsistent as to what stage of geoengineering it thinks the moral 
hazard may occur at; it warns that the ‘very discussion’ may be enough for the moral hazard to 
occur (Shepherd et al., 2009: 37). Yet in the quote above the Royal Society clearly thinks that 
the moral hazard could occur if there are major efforts at geoengineering. ‘Major efforts’ could 
plausibly be understood as representing more than mere discussion, yet the report does not 
elaborate on what exactly it means. Therefore I understand the report to be imagining that the 
moral hazard occurs at the stage of contemplating SSI.131 The report does not state who it thinks 
the relevant actors are, the mechanism by which the hazard could occur, or why the hazard 
would be bad. The only other variable the report is clear about is the impact of the moral hazard 
and that it leads to a reduction in mitigation and/or adaptation efforts (Shepherd et al., 2009: 
37). Given that this report raises the moral hazard problem as one which ought to be addressed 
if the empirics show that it does exist, it is troubling that conceptions of the moral hazard are 
so incomplete. Also, if the moral hazard is to be addressed, then we need to know who the 
relevant agents are, the mechanism by which the hazard occurs, and why it is bad.  
The EUTRACE report (Schäfer et al, 2015) seeks to provide a broader understanding of 
geoengineering’s scientific, social and governance challenges (Schäfer et al, 2015: 13–15) and 
                                                          
131 I get the language of ‘contemplating’ SSI from Preston’s literature on the ethics of geoengineering, in which 
he deifies that concerns about geoengineering can occur at the stages of; contemplating geoengineering, research 




it devotes at least three pages to considering the moral hazard problem (Schäfer et al, 2015: 
58–60). The report presents its understanding of the moral hazard concern thus:  
A prominent concern around climate engineering has been the fear that discussing, 
researching, and developing climate engineering techniques may have negative 
effects on efforts to reduce emissions. (Schäfer et al, 2015: 58) 
The report understands the moral hazard as potentially occurring at two stages of the SSI 
process, namely at the decision stage as well as during research and development. Later in the 
report it states that the relevant agent (the ‘who’ variable) is society. Of course society is a 
vague term, as has been indicated in section 4.5, hence it is problematic to use it in this context. 
Considering the mechanism variable, the report points to phenomena such as increasingly risk-
prone behaviour and the creation of dangerous incentives. I understand this as referring to at 
least psychological failure and ethical failure which can lead to the moral hazard. The above 
quote from the EUTRACE report makes it clear that the impact variable is to be understood as 
a negative impact on efforts to reduce emissions. And the badness of this seems to be 
understood in how it increases the risk of harms from climate change and SSI (Schäfer et al, 
2015: 59).  
The report by the National Academy of Science (NAS) is motivated by the idea that our 
technical capacity to engage in SRM techniques is greater than our understanding of the ethical, 
political and environmental impact of such techniques (NAS, 2015: viii).  The NAS report 
understands the moral hazard concern as follows:  
[R]esearch into these proposed techniques could lead to policy-makers deciding to 
lose focus and/or urgency for reducing emissions. (NAS, 2015: 152) 
The relevant stage of SSI for the NAS report is research and development. And the relevant 
agents are policy-makers. The NAS report does not appear to have an account of the mechanism 
by which the moral hazard could occur. It is clear that the impact of the hazard is a reduction 










The table below summarises how the moral hazard complaint has been formulated by different authors and governance reports 
Table 3 The Moral Hazard Table 
 
 
Key: Red is a point the work is clear on. Blue is a point which can be found in the work but which is not explained clearly 
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4.7.3 Analysis of the moral hazard table  
 
The fact that the moral hazard is a confused term in the context of SSI is a point which has 
been made by many authors. Hale observes that ‘moral hazard arguments against 
geoengineering are beset with concerns of ambiguity and vagueness’ (Hale, 2012: 129). Table 
3 above brings an important – if not the prime – source of confusion into sharp focus. It is 
simply that none of the authors or reports examined have understood the moral hazard in the 
same way. It is unsurprising that the term has such vagueness and ambiguity associated with 
it, given that everyone is using it in a different way. There is a sense in which this is somewhat 
remarkable, given that these authors are not acting in a vacuum independently of each other 
and are aware of each other’s work; indeed, sometimes they actively criticise each other’s 
work. This should not be taken as a criticism of these authors or reports, but it does indicate 
that the term ‘moral hazard’ is still at the stage of being contested.  
Not all moral hazard complaints are created equally. Some are much less compelling than 
others. We can see from the presentation of the literature in Table 3 that one author particularly 
stands out, namely Bunzl,132 as does one report, namely the Royal Society report. Both Bunzl’s 
and the Royal Society’s accounts are incomplete. They lack an answer to three important 
variables in terms of who the actors are, the mechanisms involved, and why geoengineering is 
a bad thing. For this reason, neither Bunzl’s nor the Royal Society’s understanding of the moral 
hazard should be adopted due to their incomplete nature.  
Table 3 also shows that some authors provide more complete accounts of the moral hazard, 
namely Morrow, Lin, and Corner and Pidgeon. Each of their accounts appears to be complete 
due to providing an answer for each of the five variables. This is also true of the account in the 
EUTRACE report. Despite this, it does not appear that any of them have provided a completely 
sufficient account of the moral hazard, if it is truly a problem which we wish to address. The 
reason for this can be seen in the table, in that they all have at least one variable in blue 
(meaning it is insufficiently explained).  
Hence all of these accounts suffer from vagueness on at least one point, which means it would 
be hard to address any of these accounts of the moral hazard in their current formulation. It is 
interesting to note how these more complete accounts seem to have emerged at a similar point 
                                                          
132 Bunzl is not alone in having an incomplete account of the moral hazard. If one was to examine Keith’s account 
(2013), I would argue that it is even less complete than Bunzl’s.  
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in time, whereas the less complete accounts precede them. The stronger accounts were all 
published between 2013 and 2015 whereas the weaker ones pre-date 2013. This perhaps gives 
cause to be optimistic about the trend in the hazard literature of at least providing more 
complete accounts of what the moral hazard complaint is now.  
There are some variables on which there appears to be a consensus, namely in regard to what 
the impact of the moral hazard is, and why it is bad. The impact of the moral hazard is arguably 
the fundamental starting point of the moral hazard literature. An indicator of this is that even 
the most incomplete account of the hazard seems to accept what the impact of the moral hazard 
complaint is. The idea that the fear of a moral hazard relates to it having an adverse impact on 
mitigation efforts is one which has not been challenged in any of the literature presented in 
Table 3. Indeed, any prospect of this idea being challenged may have become significantly 
harder since the work of Hale (2012), who clearly articulated how the impact variable can be 
formulated.133 
As for the variable of why the moral hazard is bad, none of the authors presented in the table 
spends much time articulating why this is the case. Something that this chapter is also guilty of 
to an extent. It seems clear that many of the articles and reports are motivated by avoiding the 
risks of climate change and SSI. And whilst it is important to know that there is a moral hazard, 
there seems to be little of interest to say about why it is a bad thing.134  
If we consider the variable concerning the stage of SSI at which the moral hazard could occur, 
there appears to be something close to a consensus that it occurs at the research and 
development stage. There are two comments to be made about this. Firstly, it is clearly the case 
that research and development is not the only stage of SSI where the moral hazard could 
plausibly occur, and Bunzl (2009) at least was aware of this. There is no reason to think that 
the moral hazard is exclusively a concern of research and development. Indeed, the moral 
hazard may be even greater at a different stage, such as that of SSI deployment. The dominance 
of research and development as the relevant stage for this variable could be understood as being 
a product of where the discourse on geoengineering is currently focused. It appears that we are 
at the dawn of geoengineering research and development and so it is unsurprising that there is 
particular interest in the various problems which could arise at the research and development 
stage, of which the moral hazard could be one. This may be particularly true of the reports 
                                                          
133 Ben Hale’s account was explained in section 4.2.  
134 It should be said that Hale does provide a broad account of why we may think moral hazards are bad by 
considering consequentialist, deontological and virtue ethics-based concerns with hazards (Hale, 2012: 116-118). 
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which are being produced with an eye on geoengineering governance. This is why research and 
development dominates in discussions about the stage of SSI when the moral hazard could 
occur. 
This leaves two variables to consider: those of who the relevant agents are, and the mechanism 
by which the moral hazard occurs. These are the two variables which appear to be commonly 
ignored in the early literature on the moral hazard. In the post-2013 literature there also seems 
to have been a shift in the debate around both of these variables. Much of the post-2013 
literature – namely that by Lin, Morrow, and Corner and Pidgeon – appears to be particularly 
interested in the question of which mechanisms cause the moral hazard. When looking at Table 
3 one may think that these authors are in agreement about the psychological mechanisms 
involved. This is not the case, however. Even though these authors all acknowledge the 
important role that psychological mechanisms may play, they do not all understand these 
mechanisms in the same way. On the question of mechanisms, I argued in section 4.4.2 that 
more information was required from psychologists to generate a clearer account of which 
psychological mechanisms are in play if the moral hazard occurs.  
The final variable is that of who the relevant agents are. As just stated, this variable appears to 
be ignored in the literature prior to 2013. In relation to the post-2013 literature, ‘who’ appears 
to be the perpetually under-theorised variable. Much of the literature and reports point to a 
political level where the moral hazard could occur, but none of them make it clear how this 
level is to be understood, and nor do they appear to be sensitive to the dramatic scope for 
different interpretations of how this level could be understood. This chapter made a move to 
address this in section 4.3, where it adopted a polycentric account of climate change policy to 
identify which agents could be relevant to the moral hazard story. I then chose one agent from 
this account to focus on. This approach is sensitive to the fact that there are many potentially 
relevant agents and that any account of the moral hazard may need to narrow the scope of 
possible relevant agents. Given the general level of vagueness about who the relevant agents 
are and the mechanism by which the moral hazard occurs, it is unsurprising that any satisfactory 
solutions have yet to be proposed to address the moral hazard in the case of SSI. 
The above demonstrates the benefit of the five-variable framing of the moral hazard problem. 
By categorising moral hazard components in this way, we are able to see many interesting 
points about the hazard, ranging from where authors tend to disagree to where certain variables 
are under-formulated. Moreover, we are able to have a sense of whether an author has a clear 
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understanding of the hazard problem or not. The analysis has provided a way of making sense 
of why the moral hazard complaint is so confused. Perhaps most importantly, it provides a way 
of thinking and talking about the moral hazard with clarity.  
 One limitation of this five-variable analysis is that it fails to draw attention to potential 
disagreement around any particular variable. For example, two authors could understand the 
relevant mechanism for the moral hazard as being psychological, but they may have very 
different accounts of what psychological mechanisms actually are.  
In light of this, I shall identify an account of the moral hazard which strikes me as particularly 
appropriate. The stage of SSI that I will focus on is that of research and development. The 
reason for this has already been explained, since this is currently where we are in the SSI 
process and therefore if the moral hazard does exist at this stage, then it is prudent to think 
about how it could manifest itself and how we may wish to address it. In terms of who, as 
explained in section 4.3 I shall focus on the formal role-holders of power. And as for 
mechanisms, I adopt Morrow’s account of there being informational, psychological and ethical 
mechanisms. Regarding the impact and why it is bad, I follow the dominant view in the 
literature, namely that the moral hazard has an adverse impact on mitigation efforts and is bad 




4.8 What role should empirical evidence play?   
 
[I]f it could be shown empirically that the moral hazard issue was not serious, one 
of the main ethical objections to geoengineering would be removed. (Shepherd et 
al., 2009: 39)  
The quote above from the Royal Society report proposes a condition which, if met, would 
render the moral hazard objection not serious; namely, if empirical evidence were to show that 
the moral hazard was not serious. Some academics mistakenly imply that this condition has 
been met (Bunzl, 2009: 2; Goeschl et al., 2013: 102; Kahan et al., 2015: 203). Reynolds 
explicitly argues that the empirical evidence undermines the idea that the moral hazard exists, 
or even shows a reverse hazard (whereby people want to mitigate more due to SSI) (Reynolds, 
2015: 175).  
In this section I shall argue that such a view is mistaken. This is due to the empirical evidence 
currently being insufficient to establish whether the moral hazard does or does not exist. This 
is followed by an argument grounded in the work of Shue on climate change (2010). The 
argument will state that under certain conditions we have reason to take the moral hazard 
seriously when faced with such inconclusive evidence about its existence. Consequently, it is 
argued that if we did not take the hazard seriously due to a lack of empirical evidence, we 
would be making a moral mistake.  
The empirical claim against the moral hazard is often grounded in focus group data which 
indicate that the general public does not experience a moral hazard (Shepherd et al., 2009: 43; 
IPSOS Mori, 2010: 2; Mercer et al., 2011: 5; Merk et al. 2016). Although there are also more 
sophisticated experimental methods which have been used to determine whether the public 
experience a moral hazard. This can be seen in Kahan et al (2015), where participants where 
split into two groups, and only one of those groups was given information about SSI, the other 
group being the control group. The group who received the information about SSI were in 
favour of more mitigation action than the control group, indicating the reverse moral hazard. 
We can grant that the data conclusively establish that the general public does not, never has 
and will not experience a moral hazard from SSI (note that the claim made that strongly in 
these articles), but would this be sufficient to say that there is no moral hazard from SSI? Of 
course not, for the reason provided in section 4.3 of this chapter. Namely, climate policy is a 
product of a polycentric process in which a variety of different agents are formative of the 
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policy which is produced. The general public is one of those groups of agents, and probably an 
important one. But the general public is not the only relevant group.135 The views of NGOs, 
businesses, politicians and states also inform mitigation policy.  
Recall that I have selected the formal role-holders of power as the agents of interest for my 
exploration of the moral hazard complaint. As noted, there is a lack of empirical evidence about 
whether these agents do experience the moral hazard. It also appears that it would be 
challenging to obtain such data. Not only do the formal role-holders of power tend to change 
within a ten-year period in democratic countries,136 but there is also scope for significant 
variation in the types of people who can hold this office. Therefore, the idea of using empirical 
evidence to conclusively establish that any potential formal role-holders of power do or do not 
experience the moral hazard seems very challenging. This would appear to be particularly true 
if one accepts the cultural cognition thesis as a predictor of whether agents experience the moral 
hazard, because this would lead to there being very significant variation in the value 
judgements of all agents who might be or become the formal role-holders of power. 
At the moment there is an apparent absence of data about whether the moral hazard would be 
experienced by all the relevant agents – or even just the agents which this thesis is interested 
in. Hence it appears that we cannot yet make any empirical claims about whether the moral 
hazard will or will not occur. If such data do exist in the future, then one could reconsider how 
seriously the moral hazard should be taken in light of this empirical evidence.137 In the 
meantime, however, there is the question of how seriously the moral hazard should be taken, 
given the inconclusive nature of the empirical evidence available. In the following sub-section 
I shall argue that the moral hazard should be taken seriously despite the absence of empirical 
evidence about whether the formal role-holders of power experience the hazard or not.   
 
                                                          
135 The policy level is subject to pressures which individuals are not. For example carbon intensive industries may 
well apply pressure to the formal role holders to get them to succumb to the logic of the hazard. Moreover formal 
role holders of power are subject to complicated polarising policy dynamics which individuals are not (Boven et 
al, 2018), whilst this thesis does not explore these dynamics, these dynamics clearly put different types of pressure 
on the formal role holders of power which mean it is plausible for them to reach different conclusion than that of 
the general public on policy issues, and this includes their views on SSI. 
136 That is to say there will new members of the legislature and the executive.  
137 Although the pursuit of such data may be misguided, for it is doubtful whether it could establish the absence 
of the moral hazard conclusively. Some reasons as to why this is the case are provided in the previous footnote.   
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4.8.1 Why should the moral hazard be taken seriously if we are uncertain whether 
it will happen? 
 
To make the case for the moral hazard being taken seriously in the absence of conclusive 
empirical data about its existence, this sub-section will draw upon the work of Henry Shue. 
Shue provides an account of why action to mitigate the harms of climate change should happen 
even if we do not know the precise probability of the harms which could occur from climate 
change (Shue, 2010). In short, he argues that action to address climate change should happen 
if (1) there are massive losses at stake; (2) the likelihood of the loss is significant; and (3) the 
cost of acting is non-excessive. In this sub-section I shall make two arguments. Firstly, that 
Shue’s account is a compelling one, and secondly, that the case of SSI and the moral hazard 
does meet Shue’s criteria for action. By doing so this sub-section will explain why we should 
take the moral hazard seriously despite the inconclusive nature of the empirical data we have 
about it.  
One of the great appeals of Shue’s account is that it is action guiding. Shue asks us to consider 
three conditions, and if each of these conditions is met, then there is an imperative to address 
the problem. This is much clearer than alternative accounts of why action should happen in the 
face of climate change, such as generalised accounts of the precautionary principle.138 
Additionally, there is also a precedent of using Shue’s framework in the context of 
geoengineering, as presented by Hartzell-Nichols (2012: 160) and McKinnon (2018: 446). 
The account of the badness of the moral hazard which was considered in section 4.4 shows 
how the hazard meets Shue’s first condition of massive losses being at stake. In short, the moral 
hazard has increased the likelihood of some of the worst harms of climate change and SSI 
happening. McKinnon vividly makes the case for this condition being met by focusing on the 
risk of the termination shock posed by SSI (McKinnon, 2018: 448). This is one among many 
of the sources of badness for the hazard which was pointed to in section 4.4. If the termination 
shock is sufficient to meet Shue’s first criterion, then the reasons provided throughout this 
chapter likewise easily meet it, for they can be understood as the termination shock plus many 
other risks besides.  
                                                          
138 This is not an argument against precautionary approaches. Shue’s account is also a formulation of the 
precautionary principle, yet it is quite specific and clear.  
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Shue’s second condition is the most contentious one, that of the likelihood of the loss being 
significant. For Shue, this condition is met on the basis of two components. The first component 
is that the mechanism by which these losses can occur needs to be well understood (Shue, 2010: 
148). The second component is that the conditions under which this mechanism would function 
are accumulating (Shue, 2010: 48). The first component was introduced in section 4.6 where 
the three causal mechanisms of informational failure, cognitive failure and ethical failure were 
explored. The following paragraphs will now consider how much these mechanisms are 
understood and whether they are well understood. I will argue that the conditions under which 
the psychological mechanisms would operate are not currently well enough understood to meet 
Shue’s criterion but that the informational and ethical mechanisms are.  
The relevance of the psychological mechanisms is clear, given the role that such mechanisms 
play in people making judgements about risk (Kahan, 2015). Nonetheless, the process of the 
psychological mechanisms is not yet fully understood, although the work of Lin provides 
reason to think that the overconfidence and optimism biases will be relevant. However, as 
explained in section 4.4, further research is required if we are going to be confident that these 
and other mechanism do have an impact on the moral hazard. In order to judge whether the 
conditions under which these psychological mechanisms would function are accumulating, one 
would probably need to be more certain about their content and how exactly they operate. 
Therefore, given our current level of knowledge, it does not appear that the psychological 
mechanisms meet Shue’s criterion because we do not seem to have knowledge of the conditions 
under which they would function.  
As for informational failure, two sources were identified, those of ignorance and false belief. 
The presence of ignorance about the risks, efficacy and promises of SSI was rationalised as the 
default state of affairs for the formal role-holders of power, given the specific and technical 
nature of this type of knowledge. False belief was not explored in detail. Ignorance is 
considered to be an important aspect of the informational failure mechanism, although further 
research could elaborate on how this mechanism functions in the case of SSI. There is already 
a well-established literature in economics on the role of ignorance as a causal mechanism for 
the moral hazard to occur. Nonetheless, this thesis does not provide a completely well-
understood account of informational failure due to the lack of understanding about the 
operation of false belief.  
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Despite this, we can consider the second component of Shue’s second criterion by asking 
whether the conditions leading to ignorance are accumulating. It is odd to ask whether the 
conditions for ignorance are accumulating, given that ignorance about the risks, efficacy and 
promises of SSI is taken to be the default state of affairs for many formal role-holders of power. 
Even if the conditions for ignorance are not accumulating, they appear to be sufficiently present 
that there is certainly a danger of a critical number of formal role-holders of power being 
ignorant about the risks, efficacy and promises of SSI.  
The final mechanism to consider is that of ethical failure. In section 4.6, moral corruption was 
identified as a mechanism by which ethical failure can occur. The conditions for moral 
corruption are accumulating due to the presence of the perfect moral storm (Gardiner, 2011). 
There is little reason to think that the elements of the perfect moral storm have reduced in 
strength. There are still significant disparities between the global rich and global poor which 
are constitutive of the global storm. There is still a strong divergence of interests between 
present and future generations which is a key feature of the intergenerational storm. And our 
best theoretical tools from economics, politics and philosophy seem to struggle to make sense 
of the problems which are posed by climate change and SSI, such as what is owed to non-
human nature. Given that the perfect moral storm still seems to be in play, and that moral 
corruption is compounded by the storm, and that ethical failure in this case can be a product of 
moral corruption, it seems reasonable to think that the conditions for ethical failure to occur 
are accumulating.  
So has Shue’s second condition been met? The answer is ‘yes’, in part. The mechanisms of 
informational failure and ethical failure do appear to tick both of Shue’s boxes; they are well 
understood and the conditions for their functioning seem to be accumulating. The same cannot 
be said of the psychological mechanism, however, since the content of this mechanism is not 
yet well understood in the context of SSI. Consequently, we cannot judge whether the 
conditions for this mechanism are accumulating.  
Shue’s third condition is that the cost of addressing the problem is non-excessive. Whether a 
cost is excessive is determined by comparing it to the magnitude of the potential loss and the 
other important demands on the resources which could be used to pay for addressing this loss 
(Shue, 2010: 149). As of yet, the question of excessive cost is not one which this thesis can 
answer, for it has yet to consider the possible strategies for addressing the moral hazard. That 
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is the task of the subsequent two chapters. Of the two solutions considered in this thesis, it will 
be argued that one does impose an excessive cost, yet the other does not.  
To summarise this section, there is an important role to be played by empirical evidence, yet 
so far it appears to have been used poorly: by Reynolds (2015), for example. It has been used 
poorly by focusing on a specific group of agents such as the general public and then 
generalising from this to say that the moral hazard does not appear to exist. Additionally, the 
type of evidence which is required has not been correctly conceptualised. It is not simply a 
question of establishing the probability of an agent experiencing the moral hazard. Instead, it 
is more appropriate to adopt Shue’s approach and seek evidence to explain the mechanisms by 
which the moral hazard may occur, and also to investigate whether the conditions for these 
mechanisms to operate are accumulating.  
There is the further question of what should be done in the absence of conclusive evidence that 
these conditions are being met. The choice appears to be: (1) do nothing to address the moral 
hazard until such evidence exists; or (2) act in the knowledge that such action may not be 
required if the evidence ultimately shows that Shue’s second condition of the loss being 
significant is not met. Given Shue’s third condition that action should be taken if the costs are 
non-excessive, this thesis adopts the approach that it is at least worth understanding how we 
could respond to the moral hazard in case it does exist, as long as the ways to address the hazard 
do not fall foul of the third condition.139   
  
                                                          
139 This approach appears to be consistent with the reports on geoengineering governance, which flag the moral 
hazard as a problem which may need to be addressed.   
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4.9 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has sought to provide a degree of conceptual clarity as to what the moral hazard 
concern is, which has thus far been absent from the philosophical literature and governance 
reports on SSI and the moral hazard. To do this the chapter engaged with the keys works on 
the moral hazard problem in the context of SSI. This engagement has allowed the thesis to 
identify five components of a complete moral hazard complaint, namely: the stage of SSI, who 
the relevant agents are, the mechanism by which the hazard occurs, what the impact of the 
hazard is, and why the hazard is bad. 
The five-variable understanding of the moral hazard complaint has allowed the chapter to 
achieve its goal of providing conceptual clarity as to how the hazard should be understood. 
This understanding of the moral hazard offers clarity for three reasons. Firstly, it makes it 
possible to identify incompleteness in a particular account of the moral hazard by noting the 
absence of one or other variable. Secondly, it draws attention to any vagueness in an account 
of the moral hazard. Such vagueness seems to be particularly common in the literature when it 
comes to the ‘who’ variable. Thirdly, it highlights divergent understandings of the moral hazard 
complaint when accounts of the hazard fill out the variables in distinctly different ways. 
Interestingly, the governance reports on SSI seem to suffer from all three of these 
shortcomings.  
This chapter proceeded by presenting an account of SSI which overcomes the first two of these 
concerns. That is to say, it is a complete account and it is not vague. According to this account, 
the moral hazard occurs at the research and development stage of SSI, the relevant agents are 
the formal role-holders of power, the casual mechanisms include informational failure, 
psychological failure and ethical failure, the impact of the hazard is that it has an adverse effect 
on mitigation efforts, and this is bad due to the fact that it would increase the likelihood of risks 
from climate change and SSI.  
The chapter also performed the further task of considering what empirical evidence would be 
required for the moral hazard concern to be taken seriously. In doing so it expressed scepticism 
about how empirical evidence has been used by people like Reynolds (2015) to cast doubt on 
the existence of the hazard, this was done by observing that the evidence is only about the 
general public, not any other relevant agents such as the forma role holders of power. It was 
argued that Shue provides a more plausible account of what empirical evidence would be 
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relevant, and that there is a need for such evidence to be sought. Despite the absence of some 
of the necessary empirical evidence, this chapter reasoned that it is still worth taking certain 
steps to address the moral hazard (such as understanding how it can be addressed) insofar as 







5 Secrecy and the Moral Hazard: Effective but not Desirable 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter I considered how the moral hazard complaint can be understood. In this 
chapter I build upon this understanding of the hazard to explore the possibility of secrecy as a 
tool to address the moral hazard which is presented by SSI. To do this I will explore an 
insightful account of secrecy which is provided by David Pozen. In order to understand what 
Pozen’s account of secrecy shows, I will apply it to the case of the development of the first 
atomic bomb, known as the Manhattan Project.  
Consideration of the Manhattan Project is particularly useful here due to the level of knowledge 
that we have about how secrecy in the Manhattan Project functioned. There are also some 
interesting similarities between the case of SSI and the Manhattan Project in terms of the 
development of a novel technology which is potentially harmful and requires extensive 
expertise. This will show how secrecy has functioned in practice. I will use Pozen’s framework 
to consider different scenarios of secrecy for SSI and what secrecy might look like in different 
contexts, before considering whether secrecy would address the moral hazard problem. I will 
argue that in a scenario in which secrecy does address the moral hazard, we have a plethora of 
powerful reasons to be sceptical about it. These reasons include considerations of publicity, 
procedural justice moral corruption and co-benefits. Therefore I will conclude that secrecy is 
not a morally desirable tool to address the moral hazard problem.  
Secrecy is remarkably powerful; it can be used to inflict harm as well as to protect individuals 
from significant harm. In the case of the moral hazard, there is a prima facie reason to think 
that secrecy may well address the moral hazard concern. As was established in Chapter 4, the 
moral hazard concern of interest to this thesis is that the research and development of SSI may 
have an adverse impact on the climate change mitigation efforts undertaken by the formal role-
holders of power.140 For this adverse impact on mitigation to occur, the formal role-holders of 
power require knowledge about the research and development stages of SSI in order for the 
casual mechanism to be activated. Therefore, if the formal role-holders of power lack the 
                                                          
140 It may seem odd to think of secrecy as a tool to be used against formal role-holders of power given that they 
are often the keepers of secrets, nonetheless I think this the oddness also makes it an interesting case to consider, 
particularly given its potential to work as a way to address the hazard which this chapter will demonstrate.  
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relevant knowledge to form an expectation about SSI, then their behaviour will not change.141 
Hence we have a prima facie case that secrecy about SSI would prevent a moral hazard 
occurring.  
This power of secrecy has not been noted by many other scholars. An exception is Albert Lin, 
who acknowledges that:  
[L]imiting the visibility of geoengineering efforts may offer one mechanism for 
countering people’s tendency to compensate for risk. Such a strategy would be 
troubling and should be avoided, however, as it is contrary to fundamental 
democratic values of transparency and public deliberation. (Lin, 2013: 709)  
This seems to be the extent of the literature on secrecy and the moral hazard in the context of 
geoengineering. This dismissal of secrecy in the literature on SSI and the moral hazard leaves 
an unexplored area which this chapter aims to fill. By expressing the logic in favour of secrecy, 
we will have a clearer idea of what Lin is rejecting on the grounds of fundamental democratic 
values.142 More importantly, we will have an image of how secrecy could be used to address 
the moral hazard concern. The chapter will then provide four reasons for finding this degree of 
secrecy undesirable due to: being an obstacle to procedural justice, enabling corruption, 
enabling moral corruption, and limiting the opportunities for co-benefits.  
Secrecy may appear to be at odds with chapter 3 of this thesis, where the case in favour of 
transparency, publicity and accountability was made in order to address moral corruption. It is 
true that these ideas are not compatible with secrecy (a point explored in more detail towards 
the end of this chapter), yet this is only a problem if one thinks that moral corruption is 
sufficiently serious. This thesis does not weigh these problems against each other. Instead it 
seeks to understand how these respective problems can be addressed. The tension only arises 
if one wishes to address both of these issues, although the thesis has sought to provide reasons 
why both these problems are worth taking seriously.143  
                                                          
141 Of course, an agent’s behaviour can still change for reasons which are not related to their expectations about 
SSI.  
142 This can be understood as the liberal theory objection to secrecy which is explored by the likes of Thompson 
(1999).  
143 Whilst I hold the view that it is worth addressing both of these problems, I cannot assume this would be true 
for everyone who seeks to address the moral hazard problem (we may even think that this is unlikely due to the 
fact that the moral hazard issue seems to be better known than the problem of moral corruption). Moreover one 
may have an alternative way to address the problem of moral corruption which does not rely on transparency, 
publicity and accountability. This alternative solution may well be compatible with secrecy. This is another reason 
not to be concerned by the apparent tension between the moral corruption chapter and the current chapter. 
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5.2 What is secrecy? 
 
To help conceptualise secrecy, I will engage with the work of David Pozen (2010).144 The 
importance of this section is that it provides a degree of conceptual clarity about what secrecy 
is. This is necessary for the chapter to be able to consider what secrecy could look like in the 
case of SSI governance and whether it is desirable or not. Pozen provides a sophisticated 
exploration of ‘deep secrecy’, a term which he traces to Kim Lane Scheppele (Pozen, 2010: 
262). According to Scheppele, deep secrecy exists when the secret is unimaginable to the 
individual from whom it is being kept secret. An example of this would be a well-planned 
surprise party (Pozen, 2010: 263). This is in contrast to shallow secrecy, which relates to secrets 
one might suspect to be the case. So if you expect your friends to have organised a surprise 
party for you because they do so every year, then the secret is a shallow one.  
The term unimaginable appears to be misleading and mistaken in this context. Events such as 
surprise parties are imaginable. The secret is not dependent upon whether the party can be 
imagined, it is dependent upon whether something is imagined and expected. Therefore it is 
more appropriate to understand a deep secret as being something which is not imagined, as 
opposed to something which is unimaginable.  I will use this modified understanding of deep 
secrecy in this chapter.  
Notably, Pozen observes that the idea of deep secrecy is almost ignored in the governance 
literature on transparency ( Pozen, 2010: 262). This is because the literature on deep secrecy 
follows Scheppele, whose level of concern with deep secrecy was transactions between 
individuals rather than at the level of the state.  An exception to this is found in the work of 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996), who apply the concept of deep secrecy to the 
state level Gutmann and Thompson argue that a shallow secret at the state level is when the 
citizens know that the state level secret exists but do not know the content of the secret. In 
contrast, they understand a deep secret at the state level as one where the fact that there is even 
a secret is concealed from the citizens. An example of a shallow secret at the state level is the 
codes to activate nuclear weapons; the citizens know that the secret exists but the code itself is 
still a secret.  
                                                          
144 There are several good works which engage with secrecy such as that by Bok (1982), De Lazari-Radek and 
Singer (2010, 2014), and Sagar (2013). The reason for engaging with Pozen here is due to his lucid focus on 
secrecy in the context of governance.  
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The purpose of introducing the Gutmaan and Thompson account of deep secrecy was to draw 
attention to how Pozen builds on them, Whilst Pozen holds the same broad understanding of 
what deep secrecy is he spends much more time conceptualising secrecy. Pozen, in contrast, is 
much more concerned with how to conceptualise secrecy (Pozen, 2010: 275). Consequently, 
Pozen’s article is of greater use in this part of the chapter, given that we are concerned with 
trying to conceptualise what secrecy is. In order to understand the depth of a secret at the state 
level (i.e. whether it is a deep secret or a shallow one), Pozen provides a set of challenges which 
need to be considered in relation to the practice of keeping secrets at the state level ( Pozen, 
2010: 266). I shall now explain Pozen’s framework and then apply it to SSI governance.  
Pozen argues that current applications of the idea of shallow and deep secrecy by the likes of 
Scheppele are unsatisfactory for three reasons (Pozen, 2010: 265-267). If we examine Pozen’s 
three reasons for concern with the way the idea of secrecy has been applied to date, we can be 
sensitive to these considerations when building up a clear account of secrecy. The first of 
Pozen’s concerns is that current understandings of secrecy are not sensitive to the fact that the 
depth of a secret exists on a continuum, as opposed to being a binary concept. To illustrate this, 
Pozen points to how one can have a vague sense that a secret exists, and how that sense can get 
ever stronger, and as this happens the depth of the secret is reduced, yet we may still classify it 
as a deep secret.  
Pozen’s second concern about how secrecy is classically applied is that thinkers like Scheppele 
consider secrecy as existing only between two agents: the keeper of the secret and the subject 
from whom the secret is kept. Pozen observes that this is clearly not true at the state level, 
where there can be multiple secret-keepers and multiple subjects from whom the secret is kept 
(Pozen, 2010: 266). This point will be seen more clearly later in this chapter when secrecy is 
applied to the case of SSI governance, given the number of actors who could partake in the 
secret-keeping and the number of subjects from whom the secret could be kept.   
Pozen’s third concern about secrecy is what he calls the ‘problem of specification’ (Pozen, 
2010: 267), which needs to be addressed in order to understand whether something is actually 
considered secret or not. Pozen’s point is that whether X is a secret or not depends on how it is 
understood, and he gives the example of the Manhattan Project to illustrate this. Basically, if 
one were to adopt a broad standard for the Manhattan Project, such as the US developing more 
powerful weapons during World War II, then it is unlikely to be considered a secret, since 
many people would have imagined that the US would undertake the development of more 
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powerful weapons when it was at war. Yet it is much more doubtful that people would have 
imagined the development of the nuclear bomb. Therefore, if one specifies that an account of 
the Manhattan Project secret should include detailed knowledge of the nuclear weapons which 
were being developed, then the Manhattan Project was indeed a very successful secret. Hence, 
depending on how much about the Manhattan Project was deemed a secret, the secret-keepers 
were either very unsuccessful or extremely successful at concealing the secret. Pozen’s point 
is that to judge the success of any secret, one requires an account of what exactly that secret is.  
When considering a case of secrecy, Pozen proposes that the secret should be evaluated against 
four indices. By considering these indices, he thinks that we will have a picture of secrecy 
which is sensitive to the three concerns about secrecy just explained.  He sets out the four 
indices as follows:   
The most productive way to conceptualize the depth of a state secret, I propose, is 
to evaluate it along four main indices, reflecting (1) how many people know of the 
secret, (2) what sorts of people know, (3) how much they know, and (4) when they 
know. (Pozen, 2010: 267) 
Unfortunately, Pozen fails to offer a justification for the relevance of these indices; he merely 
asserts that they are the most productive way to conceptualise deep secrecy. Nonetheless, 
despite the lack of argumentation for his indices, I think they are promising for our purpose 
here. I shall now outline the relationship between these indices and Pozen’s three questions, 
and by doing so offer a justification for using Pozen’s indices as a way of understanding the 
depth of a secret.  
The first two of these indices are clearly meant to account for Pozen’s second concern about 
there being multiple agents, since the answer to these indices will explicitly highlight the 
number and different groups of agents who know of the secret. The third and fourth questions 
are designed to obtain a clear picture about how much these agents know and when. This 
appears to speak to Pozen’s first concern about understanding secrecy on a continuum; by 
identifying how much an agent knows, it is possible, in Pozen’s terms, to locate where on the 
secrecy continuum they are. This also seems to have a bearing on Pozen’s third concern about 
the problem of specification. If one is trying to determine the specification of a secret, then 
knowledge about where the secret-holders are on the secrecy continuum would allow us to 





I shall now clarify the location of secrecy, the previous chapter expressed an understanding of 
the moral hazard problem as occurring at the stage of research and development. The question 
then naturally becomes what would need to be secret for the research and development of SSI 
to be a secret? The obvious answer is for the research and development itself to be a secret. 
Here I hold a slight more complicated view, whereby I think it is also the governance of SSI 
which needs to be a secret for the research and development of SSI. The reason for holding this 
view is based on the thought that if the relevant agents were aware of SSI governance then it 
is easy for them to imagine and expected SSI to be research and development, so SSI at most 
could only every be a very shallow secret form them. Yet if they are unaware of SSI governance 
it requires more imagination for them to think that SSI is being researched and developed, 
therefore the secret is deeper to these agents. 
 I shall now comment on each of the indices identified by Pozen as it applies in the case of SSI. 
Once I have done so the relevance of these indices for Pozen’s three concerns in relation to SSI 
ought to be clearer.  
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5.3 Answering Pozen’s questions 
5.3.1  How many people know about SSI governance?  
 
‘Three may keep a secret, if two of them are dead.’ Benjamin Franklin  
Pozen starts with the simple observation that the number of people who know a secret will have 
an effect on whether the secret is compromised or not (Pozen, 2010: 268). In other words, if 
fewer parties are aware of a secret then the total number of opportunities for the secret to be 
revealed, leaked or hinted at is reduced. The implications for SSI governance are clear, namely, 
that as more people become aware of the secret of SSI, the greater the risk of the secret being 
exposed. 145 Therefore, as more people know about it, the shallower the secret becomes. 146 
 
5.3.2  What sorts of people know? 
 
Pozen provides a particularly helpful point when considering what sorts of people know about 
the secret, which is that governments are not monolithic (Pozen, 2010: 269). This points to the 
idea that within a state there will be some members of the government who are aware of the 
secret of SSI governance, and some who are not. Who is and is not aware of particular secrets 
in a state will in part be a product of how secrecy operates within that state.147 This variation 
could exist across institutions, in terms of members of the executive, legislature, judiciary, civil 
service, military, universities and private research groups. 
 
5.3.3 How much do they know?  
 
Following on from Pozen’s previous question, once we have identified what sorts of people 
know of the secret, there is the question of how much they know. The point is a simple yet 
                                                          
145 There are different ways of understanding what the secret of SSI governance is, as will be made clear. This is 
simply a general comment about how it is easier for a secret to be revealed if more people know it, and that this 
is true independent of the content of that secret.  
146 This assumes that everyone is equally likely to keep the secret, which may or may not be true; it may well be 
the case that a larger group of trustworthy people are more likely to keep the secret than a smaller group of 
untrustworthy people.  




important one, which is that different agents can know of a secret to different degrees. To think 
otherwise is to make the mistake of thinking of secrecy in binary terms as opposed to a 
continuum. 148 When we conceive of secrecy as a continuum it makes sense that people can be 
aware of a secret to different degrees, hence there can be variation in how much people know. 
For example, consider one variable in the case of SSI governance: some agents may be aware 
that a governance institution for SSI exists, others may have knowledge about the functioning 
of SSI governance, and others still may know every decision that the governance regime makes. 
 
5.3.4 When do they come to know?  
 
Pozen explains that a secret may be deep when it is initially conceived, yet it may become ever 
shallower over time (Pozen, 2010: 27). An example in the case of SSI could be around 
deployment. If SSI were to be deployed, then the institution which governs SSI would probably 
not expect the deployment to be a secret. This is because the use of SSI is detectible. Some 
groups may be able to detect the deployment of SSI almost immediately, whilst others may 
take months or years to do so, but the secret will become shallower the further we get from the 
point in time at which SSI is deployed. This is due to SSI being easier to detect the further it is 
from the time of initial deployment.149 
 
5.3.5 Pozen’s understanding of secrecy 
 
Pozen’s four questions provide a starting point for understanding the depth of a secret which is 
held by a state. These questions exist in response to the three challenges that Pozen identified 
in relation to understanding the depth of a secret. These challenges are: (1) the fact that secrecy 
lies on a continuum; (2) having multiple agents who do or do not know the secret; and (3) the 
problem of specification, which is the question of how the secret is understood. The use of 
Pozen’s framework was defended towards the end of section 5.2 above. As explained, my 
                                                          
148 Pozen does not provide any criteria to identify when a deep secret becomes shallow. Instead, he provides these 
questions as a way to think about each case of secrecy. By answering these questions we should be well placed to 
understand where a case of secrecy lies on the secrecy continuum.  
149 For the time taken to detect the use of SSI, see (Lo et al, 2016; Lo et al, 2018; MacMartin, 2019).  
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purpose is not to challenge Pozen’s framework for understanding secrecy, but rather to use it 




5.4 Applying Pozen’s four questions to the case of the Manhattan 
Project: understanding secrecy 
 
In this section I will apply Pozen’s four questions to the case of the Manhattan Project. By 
showing how secrecy worked within this project we can gain insights into how it might work 
in the governance of SSI. Prior to this, I shall justify the relevance of the Manhattan Project for 
thinking about secrecy in the case of SSI governance.  
The relevance of this case is twofold. Firstly, it is a case of secrecy where there is a lot of 
information available. Importantly, there is enough information to provide sufficient answers 
to each of Pozen’s four questions. This means that the Manhattan Project meets some basic 
criteria in regard to being applicable in this case. Secondly, the Manhattan Project faced certain 
challenges similar to those which would occur in relation to the governance of SSI. SSI requires 
the development of a new technology which is potentially harmful and requires specialist 
expertise, just as the Manhattan Project did. This will make some features of the project 
particularly relevant for the case of SSI, such as compartmentalisation (which will be explored 
in this section). There are of course significant differences between these two cases as well. 
Not least, that SSI is not a weapon.150 Another note worth difference is how different society is 
now in contrast to the 1941 world in which the Manhattan project began. For example the 
nature of communication is dramatically different (consider all the communication done via 
the internet), the different nature of communication creates challenges for secret keeping which 
simply did not exist when the Manhattan project  
My claim here is not that a Manhattan project equivalent is possible in the case of SSI, which 
would be foolish; the claim is rather that it is sufficiently similar that we can learn about the 
practice of secrecy. This subsection concludes by drawing attention to these lessons, such as 
those of compartmentalisation, strong leaders and the capacity to generate funds without 
revealing what they are being spent on. The information we have about the Manhattan Project 
and these certain similarities are the reason why I choose to use the Manhattan Project as my 
case of secrecy, although other projects are surely also suitable. For example, one could run 
the same analysis with the case of the code-breakers at Bletchley Park.151 
                                                          
150 Although SSI may be used for military purposes (Cairns and Nightingale, 2014).  
151 This was also done in an earlier draft of this chapter.  
138 
 
The Manhattan Project holds a unique place in history: it was the first project to successfully 
develop the atomic bomb. The project began in the United Sates at the end of 1941 and it was 
led by General Groves. This means that it was led by the military rather than scientists, although 
the project had brilliant scientists working for it such as Enrico Fermi, Richard Feynman and 
Robert Oppenheimer.152 In May 1945 the bomb was successfully tested, and it was then used 
in August 1945. The scale of the project was huge, costing nearly $2 billion (approximately 
$30 billion in today’s terms), and it employed over 100,000 people (Jones, 1985).  
 
5.4.1 How many people knew?  
 
I understand this question in terms of what groups of agents knew about the Manhattan Project, 
as opposed to how many individual people knew. The reason for this is that it would be 
unhelpful and difficult to calculate the precise number of people, to the point of it being 
unknowable. In contrast, we can identify which groups knew the secret, and knowledge of this 
is helpful for understanding the nature of the project’s secrecy. For the purposes of this analysis 
I identify three relevant groups: the general public, employees of the project, and the 
government. There are different ways of dividing agents into groups, but the claim here is that 
the division into these three groups is appropriate for understanding secrecy in this case, given 
that the purpose is to provide tools for thinking about secrecy in relation to SSI governance.153 
This will also become clear by the understanding of secrecy which emerges in this section 
when we focus on these groups. 
 
5.4.2 What sorts of people knew?  
 
This question invites us to consider the composition of the groups identified by the previous 
question. The question here is one of whether there is any relevant variation between these 
groups in terms of the roles that they perform. With regard to the general public, there do not 
                                                          
152 Eight members of the project received a Nobel Prize at the time it started and a further 12 would receive one 
after the project was completed (Norris, 2004: 66). 
153 This is the reason why foreign powers are not included in this analysis, because although they are relevant to 
understanding the Manhattan Project generally, they do not play a significant role in the case of SSI governance 
at the global level.  
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appear to be any relevant variations in the composition of this group, whose role is that of 
citizens being protected by the state.  
When considering what sorts of people employed by the project knew the secret, the question 
invites us to consider what different roles existed within the project. If we consider all those 
who were employed by the Manhattan Project, there is a huge amount of relevant variation. At 
the top of the project’s hierarchy there were General Groves and leading scientists such as 
Oppenheimer. Lower down the organisation there were people who were directing smaller 
projects as part of the whole, and then there were other employees on these projects, since as 
with any kind of organisation there were administrative staff as well. Groves performed the 
role of leading the project, whilst lower down the organisational tree there were many scientists 
and universities carrying out separate tasks, such as the University of California which helped 
Ernest Lawrence to develop the electromagnetic process for separating atoms (Britannica 
Academic, 2019).  
It is clear that a project which employs 100,000 people is likely to have great variation with 
regard to the sorts of people who are part of the project. This is illustrated by Figure 4 below, 
which sets out the organisational chart for the Manhattan Project (Jones, 1985: 88–89).  
 






When considering which actors within the government knew about this project, the 
organisational chart is also helpful. It shows that some important members of the government 
were aware of the Manhattan Project. These were the Secretary of State for War, the 
corresponding Military Policy Committee, President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), and his top 
policy group. This is a relatively small number of actors from the government side, when we 
consider that the government of the United States includes the two legislative chambers of 
Congress (the House of Representatives and the Senate), which do not appear to have known 
about this project. In other words, the vast majority of people in government were ignorant of 
the project, with some noteworthy expectations who appear to be individuals trusted by 
President Roosevelt.  
 




There was clearly a wide range of employees involved in the Manhattan Project. Indeed, this 
range of employees poses one of the biggest and most intriguing mysteries about the project: 
how does a project manage to employ 100,000 people and still maintain secrecy? A key 
component of achieving secrecy in the Manhattan Project was the strategy of 
compartmentalisation. Compartmentalisation is the division of a task or project into particular 
pieces. For the Manhattan Project this meant keeping different teams with different roles 
separate from each other (Vermeir and Margocsy, 2012: 159).  
For example, the vast majority of physicists and engineers on the project did not interact. Part 
of the logic for compartmentalisation in the case of the Manhattan Project was that General 
Groves did not want any individual to know too much about how the whole project worked. 
Little more than a dozen people were really aware of what the project in its entirety was doing 
(Jones, 1985: 89). Therefore, the answer to our question is that most people knew very little. 
Many people working in teams may have had a sense that they were working on weapons 
research and development, but they did not know about the nature of the weapons that they 
were contributing to, and this was very much due to compartmentalisation.  
Other techniques were used to limit knowledge about the progress being made on atomic 
energy by the Manhattan Project in regard to people both within and outside the project. For 
example, American scientific journals agreed to stop publishing articles on atomic energy 
(Jones, 1985: 26). This resulted in the American atomic energy community effectively going 
silent, so that those outside the community no longer knew about their advances in atomic 
energy. This effectively restricted knowledge of the advances in atomic energy to those who 
were sufficiently high up the organisational tree of the Manhattan Project (Jones, 1985: 26).  
The effect of this would be that those lower down the tree, or who were not part of the 
organisational tree at all, would not be informed of these advances. Therefore, it appears that 
this decision contributed to keeping significant knowledge about atomic energy secret from 
many within and external to the project.154  This culture of secrecy continued on into the Cold 
War. It resulted in classified journals existing, where scientists could peer review and access 
each other’s work only if they had a sufficient level of clearance. 
                                                          
154 Interestingly, the Manhattan Project also provides some lessons about detecting secrecy. Georgii Flerov (a 
Soviet nuclear physicist) observed the silence from the American atomic energy community and predicted that 
this meant they were developing the atomic bomb. So if parts of the SSI community (small as it is) were to go 
silent, this could be an indicator that they are now performing research in secret. That is a possible answer to an 
important question, namely: what would indicate the existence of a secret SSI community?   
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Regarding variation in knowledge at the government level, clear variation has been identified. 
There was a small political community, apparently led by the President, which was aware of 
the Manhattan Project, in that they knew what was being developed. Whilst a few other political 
actors did too, Congress certainly did not know much about the project. President Roosevelt 
got Congress to provide the $2 billion dollars of funding without revealing the details of the 
programme. The extent of knowledge within Congress seems to be that it was providing $2 
billion for a weapons research and development programme which would be helpful to the war 
effort. This implies that the difference between the knowledge that Congress had and that of 
the general public who suspected that such programmes existed is that Congress knew the cost 
of these programmes.  
 
5.4.4 When did other groups come to know?  
 
In the context of the Manhattan Project, Pozen’s final question asks when other groups learnt 
about the secret. In one sense the secret of the Manhattan Project was revealed in August 1945 
when the atomic bomb was first used, since at that point the existence of the bomb was no 
longer a secret. Yet there were plenty of secrets connected to the Manhattan Project which were 
kept secret after 1945. Knowledge about how the bomb functioned was still a closely guarded 
secret because the US did not want other countries to develop this technology. Over time, 
however, more and more information has been revealed to the public, to the extent that we 
know about the Manhattan Project and we know how the project was organised and what was 
learnt on the project. In fact, the official history of the Manhattan Project has now been 
released, which provides a huge amount of information about it: 36 volumes in all.155 This 
illustrates two points: firstly, the secret may not last forever, and secondly, what is secret may 
change over time as people’s access to certain knowledge changes.  
 
5.4.5 Some lessons from the Manhattan Project about secrecy as a governance 
practice for SSI 
 
                                                          
155 These volumes can be found at https://www.osti.gov/opennet/manhattan_resources [accessed in January, 2018] 
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This section has sought to address Pozen’s four indices of an account of secrecy using the 
example of the Manhattan Project. The purpose of Pozen’s four questions is to build a picture 
of secrecy which is sensitive to the shortcomings of how secrecy has been understood in the 
past. As explained in section 5.2, these shortcomings concern whether a secret is understood in 
binary terms as being simply deep or shallow, being sensitive to the plurality of secret-keepers 
and subjects who are kept ignorant of the secret, and the problem of specification. Pozen’s 
indices fulfilled their purpose, for the picture of secrecy which they provide in relation to the 
Manhattan Project does not seem to suffer from these shortcomings. This can also be seen in 
the following paragraphs, where I shall draw attention to some of the empirical points from 
this analysis which will be of use for understanding how secrecy can function in the case of 
SSI governance. 
The Manhattan Project relied on extensive compartmentalisation, and the depth of its secrecy 
is in part a product of the function of compartmentalisation.156 Compartmentalisation is a 
strategy which both enabled the Manhattan Project to employ a great number of people and 
limited the risk that any one individual would be able to expose the secret of the project in its 
entirety. A noteworthy feature of compartmentalisation is that it seems to require a few 
visionaries who can guide the project whilst everyone else is kept in the dark about the true 
nature of the project. In the Manhattan Project this was General Groves and his trusted 
scientists. A further relevant lesson relates to not publishing scientific advances in public access 
journals.  
The ability of FDR to generate the funding for the Manhattan Project without telling Congress 
about it in detail shows that in some contexts funding can be obtained for these types of projects 
without the secret of the project being revealed. He was able to do this due to the presidential 
power to allocate military funds, as permitted by the Military Appropriations Act of 1944 
(Jones, 1985: 116). This shows that at least some states have mechanisms for allocating funds 
in particular circumstances in such a way that their legislature is unaware of how these funds 
are being spent, despite having the power to approve the national budget. If one wants the 
governance of SSI to be a secret, there may be a comparable question of how such governance 
can be funded whilst limiting types of knowledge about SSI from those who provide the 
funds.157   
                                                          
156 This strategy is not unique to the Manhattan Project; it was also practised in Bletchley Park (Grey, 2014: 112).  
157 The type of knowledge you would want to limit is contingent upon the account of SSI secrecy that you aspire 
to. This will be seen in the coming section.  
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It is interesting to note that identifying how much the government knew is one of the trickiest 
tasks from this section. What is clear is that FDR was aware of the Manhattan Project, and 
General Groves who led the project was directly reporting to him and was meant to be keeping 
FDR well-informed about the project. Yet knowledge of this project within the wider 
government seems to have been very limited. This is indicated by Figure 4 above showing the 
organisational chart of the Manhattan Project, where there are very few government officials 
with a role within the project. Comparable arrangements may be possible in the case of SSI. 
Which is to say that the head of government may know about how a project is developing 
without having a detailed idea of what actually happens within the project.  
Public information about the prospects of nuclear weapons seems to have been non-existent 
prior to and during the Manhattan Project. The press did not run stories about the possibility of 
nuclear weapons being developed (Jones, 1985). The lack of public information on nuclear 
weapons helped to keep the Manhattan Project a secret from those external to the project. One 
of the great challenges of a Manhattan Project-esque level of secrecy for SSI is the amount of 
publicly available information which already exists about SSI. Those who may be entirely 
independent of an SSI governance arrangement have access to a level of knowledge about SSI 
which means they can conceive of such a project. The lesson here is that while secrecy can be 
of benefit if the amount of publicly available information on the topic is limited, today there 
may be greater obstacles to secrecy in the case of SSI than there were for nuclear weapons 
development at the time of the Manhattan Project.  
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5.5  The secrecy scenario 
 
5.5.1 What is the secrecy scenario? 
 
By applying Pozen’s questions to the Manhattan Project, we have a clear picture of how secrecy 
can be conceptualised and an empirical account of how this secrecy can be realised. This will 
be helpful for thinking about secrecy both in theory and in relation to the practice of SSI 
governance. When considering the formulation of secrecy it is important to remember the level 
of governance which this thesis focuses on, namely global governance.  
The secrecy scenario presents a shallow formulation of secrecy, whilst being sensitive to the 
constraint of there being a certain level of knowledge about SSI in the public domain.158 To see 
that this is possible, consider whether the amount of knowledge of SSI in the public domain 
prevents any stage of SSI from being a shallow secret. The answer is no; the governance of 
SSI, its research and development, and the deployment of SSI can still be a secret. Mere 
knowledge about SSI does not prevent any of those stages of SSI governance from being a 
shallow secret, it merely prevents them from being a deep secret because the public can 
conceive of the possibility of SSI and the institutions to govern it.  
Therefore the version of secrecy I consider now for SSI is one which focuses on the governance 
process. Each stage of this process would be a shallow secret to anyone external to this project, 
that is, the general public, universities, and the vast majority of people in government.159 This 
is the information we need to answer Pozen’s question: we know who the relevant agents are, 
and the variation in the level of knowledge that each group of agents has access to.  
Internally, there would be extensive compartmentalisation, just like the Manhattan Project. 
There would be a few project leaders (the General Groves-type characters) who would be aware 
of most of the research and development activities which were happening in this SSI 
programme, but most of the employees would not be told what the true nature of the programme 
was. The task of researching and developing SSI would be broken down into a number of 
different small projects, such as understanding how long sulphur particles stay in the 
                                                          
158 An account of deep secrecy for the SSI governance process would be unable to factor in the level of public 
knowledge that already exists about SSI. The fact that we are able to imagine such an institution shows that such 
an institution cannot be a deep secret. 
159 Universities may be a problematic category if certain scientists from universities are required to partake in SSI 
research and development.. 
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stratosphere, what impact they have on the stratosphere, what happens when they come back 
into ecosystems, how they could be injected into the stratosphere, what the variations in 
regional impacts are, etc. These are just some examples of the different types of research 
questions which may be asked of SSI. The research carried out as part of these projects would 
take place insofar as is possible in a state of ignorance about the research being carried out for 
other parts of the programme.  
The level of internal secrecy can be further compounded with academic journals refusing to 
publish the outcomes of research, as happened with the atomic energy community working on 
the Manhattan Project refusing to publish their work. We can conceive of a comparable practice 
with SSI, where the results of research projects are not published anywhere. This would 
dramatically limit the set of people who know the outcomes of these projects. Alternatively, 
we can conceive of the less restrictive practice which occurred after the Manhattan Project was 
completed, where researchers were allowed to publish their papers, but only in secret journals 
which could only be accessed by those researchers with sufficient clearance to do so. Either of 
these practices is a tool for increasing internal secrecy by restricting the set of actors who are 
able to learn about the results of research projects that are happening within the SSI programme.  
Compartmentalisation combined with secrecy about research outcomes means that no single 
member of a research team should have the level of knowledge necessary to be able to expose 
the secrets of SSI. Consequently, there would be a high degree of internal secrecy.  
The secrecy scenario may appear to be wired and outlandish, this could be true. Yet it is still 
worth considering, a reason for considering the secrecy scenario is that it explores the 
possibility of secrecy as a tool which could address the moral hazard. As the chapter will argue 
that secrecy could address the moral hazard which is valuable to know, given our reasons to be 
concerned with hazard.160  
 
  
                                                          
160 Although the chapter does end up rejecting the idea of secrecy for reasons which are explained in the last 
section of the chapter.  
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5.5.2 Does the secrecy scenario address the moral hazard?  
 
The first question to ask of secrecy scenario is whether it is sufficient for addressing the moral 
hazard. The answer to this question has two parts. Firstly, the answer will focus on the account 
of the hazard which this thesis is interested in, and then it will consider how the account of 
secrecy may relate to other possible formulations of the hazard. The moral hazard concern that 
this chapter is particularly interested in is whether the commitment of the formal role-holders 
of power to mitigation efforts will be adversely affected through knowledge about the research 
and development of SSI due to how that knowledge interacts with a set of mechanisms. I will 
present the answer that, as articulated in this case, secrecy does not fully address the hazard in 
relation to the formal role-holders of power.  
Before explaining how the secrecy scenario would affect the formal role-holders of power in 
each state, it is important to recall the point made in section 4.3 in the previous chapter 
concerning the relevant agents. Namely, it is important to remember that there will be 
significant variation in the make-up of the formal role-holders of power across states. That is 
to say, some states may have very few formal role-holders of power, whilst others may have 
many more. For the conditions of the secrecy scenario to obtain, each state must only confide 
knowledge of the SSI governance regime to the minimum number of formal role-holders of 
power necessary.  
If we take the Manhattan Project organisational tree as a map of who may need to know in the 
US, it appears that the President, a Secretary of State, and a Policy Committee will need to be 
aware of it.161 If we were to transpose this to the case of SSI governance, then the only formal 
role-holders of power who would need to know from the US are the President and the relevant 
Secretary of State. Just two people. That is a tiny fraction of the total number of formal role-
holders of power in the US, given that there at least 545 formal role-holders of power in that 
country.162 This would mean that the secret-holders account for 0.37% of the formal role-
holders of power in the US.  Whilst other countries may for constitutional reasons have to 
inform more than two formal role-holders power of this governance regime, as long as the 
                                                          
161 There would of course be significant variation between the organisational tree of the Manhattan Project and 
the global governance of SSI, given that it would be a project which was being governed at the global rather than 
the domestic level.  
162 As explained in chapter 4 the number 545 comes from the 535 members of Congress plus the 9 members of 
the Supreme Court plus the President. The number is higher if the Cabinet is also included, but the number of 
cabinet members can vary with each administration. 
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number is comparable to that of the US, it appears that the conditions of  the scenario of secrecy 
do make SSI governance a shallow secret from the vast majority of formal role-holders of 
power throughout the world. Therefore, the formal role-holders of power for the most part 
would not experience the moral hazard at the research and development stage of SSI because 
they would predominately be ignorant of what was occurring.  
It is worth noting that the secrecy scenario appears well placed to deal with other formulations 
of the moral hazard concern. Recall one of the variables of a moral hazard complaint is that of 
who the relevant agent is, and possible answers ranged from individuals up to international 
governments and corporations. Well this account of secrecy seems to minimise the likelihood 
of many of these sets of agents becoming aware of SSI or subject to the moral hazard. In short, 
most of these agents are denied the knowledge that the governance regime exists because they 
are not part of it. And even if certain sub-sets of them are involved, such as small teams of 
scientists, then their knowledge is kept to a minimum due to compartmentalisation. Hence it 
may be the case that they would end up working for the regime without realising it.163 If we 
consider just the ‘who’ variable, then it would seem that the secrecy scenario is not only well 
placed to address the understanding of the moral hazard concern as it is used in this thesis, but 
also many other possible understandings of the hazard, because of the way it keeps the vast 
majority of possible agents ignorant of the knowledge that research and development into SSI 
is happening.  
 
 
5.5.3  The secrecy scenario as an obstacle to procedural justice  
 
I shall now consider a concern about the secrecy scenario preventing procedural justice. To 
articulate a concern of procedural justice in relation to this case, I shall consider some relevant 
ideas from John Rawls, Simon Caney and Marion Hourdequin. Rawls makes a useful 
distinction for those wishing to understand procedural justice, which is the distinction between 
perfect procedural justice and imperfect procedural justice (Rawls 1999: § 14). According to 
Rawls, perfect procedural justice means that a just procedure will produce a just outcome, 
whilst imperfect procedural justice means that a just procedure is more likely to produce a just 
                                                          
163 As appeared to be the case for some of the employees on the Manhattan Project.  
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outcome, but that it is not guaranteed. Because we are engaging with a case of imperfect 
procedural justice, the thought is that a just procedure is more likely to produce a just 
outcome.  
Caney elucidates the intuitive appeal of procedural justice like this:  
[T]hose who are involuntarily and profoundly affected by socio-economic forces 
are entitled to participate (or be represented) in the political process governing 
those socio-economic forces. (Caney, 2018: 3)  
Caney explains that there are at least two ways of understanding the claim being made here: 
one could look at the ‘affectedness version’ or the ‘subject-to-law’ version of the condition 
(Caney, 2018: 3). The subject-to-law condition may not make sense in the context of global 
SSI governance, for the decision taken by such an institution may not count as ‘law’.164 
Therefore, I shall focus on the affectedness version of Caney’s claim.  
The affectedness version is that those who are sufficiently affected deserve to participate or to 
be represented (Caney, 2018: 3). The affectedness principle is adopted by Hourdequin too, who 
holds the view that it is an important starting point which should be used to assess procedural 
justice for issues at the global scale, such as SSI (Hourdequin, 2019: 272–273). In the context 
of SSI, the affectedness principle may read as:  
Those who are involuntarily and profoundly affected by SSI are entitled to 
participate (or be represented) in the political process governing SSI.   
One appeal of the affectedness principle is that it acknowledges that people are not ‘mere 
subjects’; they have a right to influence the world in which they live even if that does not 
produce the best state of affairs understood in purely consequentialist terms (Caney, 2018: 4).  
There is an important distinction to make when considering the possibility of procedural justice 
in the case of the secrecy scenario, which is the distinction between representation and 
participation. Depending on the account of representation which one adopts, then Caney has 
left open the possibility of procedural justice being achieved even in the conditions of the 
secrecy scenario. Substantive representation, as explained by Hanna Pitkin (1967), is 
understood as the situation in which an agent’s best interests are represented165 without the need 
                                                          
164 Or the decisions made are not only those of creating ‘law’.  
165 Pitkin offers four accounts of representation; substantive representation appears to be the most relevant for this 
case if we want representation to be possible.  
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for participation. The conditions of the secrecy scenario do not preclude the possibility of the 
actors in SSI governance substantively representing everyone’s interests, although we may 
question the likelihood of this happening.  
An account of procedural justice built on substantive representation as outlined in the previous 
paragraph would not be appropriate for the case of SSI, however. The reason for this can be 
seen when we consider the work of Hourdequin on procedural justice and SSI (2016, 2018, 
2019). Hourdequin’s argument is that given the extensive impact of SSI, we would be depriving 
agents of autonomy if we were to exclude these agents from participating in SSI governance 
(Hourdequin, 2016: 43). To elaborate, Hourdequin holds the view that the SSI governance 
procedure should not claim to know what the problem and the solutions are. It should not make 
these types of assumptions or produce framings which contain such assumptions. To do so 
would be to make claims about SSI on behalf of other agents, which may affect their 
fundamental interests. If we are going to respect these interests and create a just procedure for 
SSI governance, then we owe these agents participation rather than representation, on 
Hourdequin’s account.  
In the case of SSI, it is not enough that a just outcome is created for all states (although that 
would be impressive); there is something important about the outcome being produced by a 
just procedure (Hourdequin, 2019: 272). This would require a system which grants sufficient 
participation to agents, based on a claim such as the affectedness principle. Consequently, the 
procedural justice objection to the secrecy scenario is that procedural justice understood in 
terms of participation is incompatible with the secrecy scenario Procedural justice is an 
important part of justice writ large, and therefore the secrecy scenario seems to be incompatible 
with justice.  
 
5.5.4 The danger of corruption  
 
‘Secrecy, being an instrument of conspiracy, ought never to be the system of a regular 
government.’ Jeremy Bentham 
 
Given the absence of procedural justice in the participatory sense, we know that many groups 
of vulnerable agents will not participate in the secrecy scenario of SSI governance. This 
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absence of procedural justice creates the conditions for a second objection to the secrecy 
scenario, namely the danger of corruption. The logic behind the corruption concern is 
eloquently expressed in the quote below by De Lazari-Radek and Singer, that those elites which 
hold power will be tempted to wield that power in a way which privileges their own interests.166 
Even if the lack of transparency does not lead to evils in any way comparable to 
those of oppressive colonial regimes, there are good grounds for objecting to 
dividing society into an elite and the masses. Whether it is nobles over peasants, 
whites over blacks, capitalists over workers, bolsheviks over the masses, or men 
over women, we know that those who are part of the elite will feel superior and 
have no difficulty in justifying, in their own terms, giving themselves privileges 
that in no way benefit – and often grievously harm – those they consider beneath 
them. (De Lazari-Radek and Singer, 2010: 53)  
In the context of SSI governance, the fear is that those who wield power will do so in a way 
which serves their self-interest, and by doing so, they will not give due weight to the interests 
of those who may not be part of this process, such as the global poor, future generations and 
non-human nature. For this to be a genuine concern, there needs to be a danger of there being 
an elite group with a distinct set of interests. The fear of corruption in the context of climate 
change can be seen in the work of Baer et al. (2010), and in the context of geoengineering in 
work by Gardiner (2011) and Hourdequin (2016, 2018, 2019). In this sub-section I shall 
therefore explain some of these writers’ concerns and by doing so build the argument that the 
secrecy scenario compounds the conditions for neglecting the interests of the vulnerable.  
The fear of elites privileging their own interests is one which is well-grounded in the climate 
justice literature. Paul Baer et al. observe that the rich in poor countries may have more in 
common with the rich in rich countries than with the poor in their own country (Baer et al., 
2010: 217).167 In context, therefore, the fear is that those who represent vulnerable countries in 
an SSI governance regime would focus on their own interests, which are closer to those of the 
people representing richer countries, as opposed to the interests of vulnerable people in their 
own countries.  
                                                          
166 The fear of corruption is supported by an examination of cases of corruption in government and observing that 
this has not been done with the intention of other people knowing about it (Warren, 1974: 550). Infamous 
examples of corruption, such as the Watergate affair, begin with secrecy (ibid.). 
167 Of course, there are reasons which go against this as well. For example, a sense of national identity might make 
the rich in a particular country feel they have more in common with the poor in that country as opposed to the rich 
people of a different country.  
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The idea of power being wielded by a group of elites at the expense of other morally relevant 
interests is captured by Gardiner’s analysis of the global and intergenerational storms. The 
global storm warns of the powerful nations being able to pursue policies which are in their self-
interest, which would impose costs on the global poor. Yet for there to be a danger of 
corruption, it is necessary that the elite, in this case the powerful Western nations, have a 
distinct set of interests when it comes to SSI. This difference in interests can be understood if 
we consider that there is likely to be regional variation in the impacts of deploying SSI, which 
will also affect participation patterns (Robock et al, 2008; Tilmes et al, 2013; Nalam et al; 
2018). A classic example of this is in regard to how the African monsoons may change.  
Moreover, interests do not only diverge when it comes to SSI deployment. There is a plethora 
of SSI decisions in relation to which interests may be different. This includes where the 
research happens, who does the research, what information is requested of researchers, and 
also, very importantly, who leads the research teams and who funds the research (Smith, 2018). 
One may hold the view that SSI research is a neutral practice in which states do not have 
divergent interests, but this is far from the truth. It is unsurprising to note that different states 
value different things and have different priorities and concerns, and this has already been 
played out in relation to SSI, with some SSI researchers modelling scenarios which they claim 
are good for all, while researchers from other countries have observed that they cannot make 
such a judgement because they have not factored in how SSI may affect what is valuable to the 
communities in these countries, such as fishing (Hourdequin, 2019). This example sheds light 
on how the research stage of SSI can give rise to conflicting interests.  
De Lazari-Radek and Singer articulate the fear that history is littered with elites pursuing their 
own self-interest, and the idea of the perfect moral storm provides reason to think that such 
elites also exist in the case of SSI governance. Consequently, we have reason to fear corruption 
in the case of SSI governance. This is compounded by an absence of publicity, which creates 





5.5.5 Moral corruption  
 
As I already argued in the chapter on moral corruption (Chapter 3), publicity is desirable in 
part due to the role it can play in addressing the problem of moral corruption. To remind the 
reader, the argument was that a well-functioning accountability mechanism would be helpful 
for addressing moral corruption, and that a well-functioning accountability mechanism requires 
publicity so that those who hold the relevant agents in an SSI governance institution to account 
have access to the relevant information about that institution. As I explained in Chapter 3, 
publicity is concerned with the general public being aware of information and being able to 
access and understand that information easily.168 Shallow secrecy requires that the information 
be withheld from the agent, while publicity requires that it be easily accessible by the agent. It 
is by definition impossible that something can simultaneously be made known to and kept 
secret from one and the same agent. Hence this sub-section will outline why the secrecy 
scenario could be undesirable because it would prevent a promising tool from addressing moral 
corruption.  
In the chapter on moral corruption I argued that moral corruption in the case of SSI governance 
is undesirable because it seems to degrade the quality of the SSI governance. The reason I gave 
as to why this is of concern is that it increases the likelihood of unfit actors being part of the 
SSI governance process. Accountability is a powerful tool to address moral corruption. Given 
the undesirability of moral corruption, publicity and its accompanying components for 
addressing moral corruption are important. Consequently, there is something deeply troubling 
about the secrecy scenario proposal because it seems to prevent the well-functioning 
accountability mechanism which can address the problem of moral corruption.  
Not only does the secrecy scenario prevent the use of the well-functioning accountability tactic 
to address moral corruption, it also creates remarkably fertile ground for moral corruption to 
occur. The structure of this concern is similar to the previous concern about corruption and 
self-interest. In the previous sub-section I made the point that corruption could occur if elites 
chose to pursue their perceived self-interest. In the case of moral corruption, the difference is 
                                                          




that elites convince themselves that the pursuit of their own self-interest to the detriment of 
others is morally permissible or necessary.  
 
5.5.6 Identifying co-benefits 
 
There are parts of the SSI ethics literature which are implicitly supportive of well-functioning 
publicity. An interesting case of this is the literature on the co-benefits of SSI, an idea which is 
put forward by Holly Jean Buck (Buck, 2012).169 The spirit of this idea is that deploying SSI 
will provide an opportunity to engage with ‘human development problems such as inequality, 
energy poverty, food security, and land access’ (Buck, 2012: 133).170 The link between this and 
publicity is that if one is going to evaluate the relationship between SSI and these other human 
development considerations, then there needs to be sufficient knowledge about SSI and these 
other areas of human development, in which case the relevant aspects of SSI cannot be kept 
secret. For example people who research how to address food security cannot consider the 
impacts of SSI on food security if knowledge about the effects of SSI are a secret form them. 
There are variations of course in regard to the level of knowledge which can be provided about 
SSI. Nonetheless, if one really wants to be able to identify and understand the co-benefits of 
SSI, then one needs knowledge about what SSI is and its likely effects.  
Some SSI researchers have taken the co-benefits of SSI into consideration. Harald Stelzer 
seems to be engaging in such a project when he proposes an evaluation framework to account 
for the normative aspects of any geoengineering technology, including SSI (Stelzer, 2017). 
This framework requires a consideration of how the impacts of geoengineering are linked to 
shared socio-economic pathways, as well as accounting for the impact, risks, feasibility and 
sustainability of the action (Stelzer, 2017: 150). As a result, the framework is designed in such 
a way that it should be able to account for all the benefits and burdens which are associated 
with SSI.  
An analysis in this spirit is provided by the work of Heyward, who tries to assess how 
geoengineering technologies relate to the sustainable development goals (Heyward, 2018).171 
                                                          
169 Buck focuses on solar radiation management (SRM) more broadly, of which SSI is one component.  
170 Joshua Horton and David Keith provide a comparable point when they argue that SSI could be used to the 
benefit of the global poor (Horton and Keith, 2016). This argument is considered in more detail in the following 
chapter.  
171 This is from a talk Heyward gave at a conference in Gratz.  
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Insofar as these goals provide an accurate representation of the challenges that human 
development faces in the near future, then it seems that this is a sensible way to understand the 
potential co-benefits of geoengineering for some of the greatest human development challenges 
that we face. Yet projects such as Heyward’s also require a certain level of publicity; Heyward 
needed to know about the effects of geoengineering in relation to other social issues in order 
to be able to map the co-benefits it could offer in terms of meeting the sustainable development 
goals. Those who value the notion of co-benefits should therefore see the importance of 
publicity in being able to recognise those co-benefits. The secrecy scenario creates a significant 
obstacle to identifying co-benefits because it prevents the publicity condition from being 
fulfilled. Insofar as an understanding of co-benefits is desirable, we have reason to be opposed 
to conditions of the secrecy scenario in the case of SSI governance.  
5.5.7 The secrecy scenario: summary  
 
The secrecy scenario is helpful, in that it illustrates the basic but vital point for this chapter, 
which is that secrecy can be articulated in such a way that it appears to address the moral hazard 
problem. Yet such a secrecy scenario seems to be highly undesirable.172 The often cited concern 
of corruption arising under conditions of secrecy does apply to this case. Moreover, it appears 
that the secrecy scenario presents a significant obstacle to achieving procedural justice, it is 
incompatible with our proposal to address moral corruption, and it limits the possibility of 
identifying co-benefits arising from the use of SSI.  
  
                                                          
172 One could ask whether there are weaker formulations of secrecy which could still address the moral hazard 
concern yet escape the criticisms of secrecy which have been offered here. I suspect that there are weaker versions 
of secrecy which could address the hazard; indeed, the secrecy scenario is meant to provide an extensive account 
of such secrecy. However, I suspect that insofar as an account of secrecy would address our account of the moral 




5.6 Alternatives to Secrecy  
 
The conclusion of this chapter may be unsatisfactory, as it has not provided a desirable way to 
address the moral hazard problem. It has shown how secrecy could work to address the 
problem, but then provided strong reasons to reject this solution. The reader may desire a 
positive solution to the moral hazard problem. If a simple positive solution to the moral hazard 
problem was available that would have been the focus of this chapter. In this part of the chapter 
I will comment on two other possible solutions to the hazard which are worthy of further 
exploration, although each raises their own problems 
The first solution to be considered is inspired by Wolff’s framework for thinking about 
decision-making about risk (Wolff, 2011, 2019). This framework was introduced in part 4.1.2 
of the thesis, to show the difficulties that arise if one wishes to understand SSI as a case of 
moral hazard in the technical sense. Specifically, it is unclear how we are to apply the idea of 
an insurer-insuree relationship to the case of SSI. I argued that we do not need to resolve these 
difficulties, if we follow the dominant understanding of moral hazard in the geoengineering 
literature.  
I stand by the claim that it is not necessary to understand the moral hazard in Wolff’s technical 
sense in the case of SSI. As chapters 4 and 5 have illustrated, we can explore the problem of 
the moral hazard of SSI without needing it to fit the insurer-insuree model. However here I 
want to grant the possibility that we can understand the moral hazard of SSI according to 
Wolff’s model, in order to explore a potential solution this opens up.  
 Wolff is explicit that his framework is inspired by Hermansson and Hansson’s work on risk 
(2007). Hermansson and Hansson explain that in any risk management problem there are at 
least three relevant parties: the party who benefits from the risk, the party who is exposed to 
the risk, and the party who makes the decision about whether the risky event happens or not 
(Hermansson and Hansson, 2007: 132). Wolff uses this analysis to create the table below, 




This table shows that the moral hazard problem in the technical sense can be avoided either by 
a change in the agents who have the decision making power, those who experience the benefits, 
or those who are subject to the burdens of the moral hazard. Therefore, I understand the table 
as pointing to four different possible paths we could take to address the hazard: 
Moving Decision Making Power: give decision making power to those who are burdened by 
the risk-seeking behaviour, or to an agent who does not receive any benefits or burdens from 
the risk-taking. According to Wolff’s table this means creating the structure of individualism, 
moral sacrifice, or adjudication.   
Moving the Benefits: Move the benefits of the risk-taking to those agents who are currently 
burdened by it. This means creating a structure of individualism or paternalism.  
Moving the Burden: Move the burdens of the risk-taking to those agents who currently benefit 
from it. Again this invites a structure of individualism or paternalism. 
Unify the Variables: Move the variables in order that the same agent has the decision-making 
power, as well as receiving the benefits and burdens of the risk-taking. The only position on 
Wolff’s table which unifies the variables is the individualism structure.   
Successfully doing any of the above would mean that the moral hazard concern in the technical 
sense of the term is solved. Instead there would be a different structure of the relationships 
between decision makers, beneficiaries and burden bearers, which may come with a different 
set of problems. Nonetheless the moral hazard concern in the technical sense would no longer 
exist. However, it is not clear that the underlying substance of the moral hazard concern is 
addressed in any of these four options. If the core moral hazard concern is an adverse impact 
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of mitigation levels, then this can still occur in any of four options. These options may solve 
the hazard in the technical sense of the term, but it is not clear that they would address the spirit 
of the hazard concern. 173   
Here I will limit my comments to the issue of whether these proposed solutions fall foul of the 
same objections which this chapter has raised against secrecy. Recall that procedural justice in 
this case requires that those who are involuntary or profoundly affected by SSI participate, or 
are represented in, the political process governing SSI. I understand this principle as meaning 
those who bear benefits or burdens from SSI are entitled to representation in SSI governance. 
This being the case, the only procedurally just arrangement is when you unify the variables, by 
creating the individualism structure. Any other move will always leave one set of affected 
agents outside the decision-making procedure; for example, giving sole decision making power 
to the burdened would generate a complaint of procedural unfairness from those who stand to 
benefit from SSI.174  
The other three objections which were raised to the secrecy proposal, those of corruption, moral 
corruption and inability to identify co-benefits, do not appear to apply to the four possible 
solutions outlined above. Each of these complaints are grounded in the effects of hiding 
information, which these other structures do not necessarily invite. For example, the concern 
about co-benefits is that secrecy deprives agents of the information about SSI necessary to 
identify potential co-benefits. Nothing about these other structures gives us a reason to think 
that such secrecy would exist.175 This does not deny the possibility that our objections to 
secrecy could apply to this case, but they would apply for reasons other than that of the 
concealment of information. 
There is one other solution I will offer, which is independent of Wolff’s framework, and 
perhaps the most intuitive one available. This is simply that wide ranging mitigation efforts 
now would avoid the moral hazard problem (Barrett et al. 2014: 529; Baatz, 2016). If 
                                                          
173 It might be easy to lose sight of the spirit of the moral hazard problem if it allows an agent to focus on addressing 
the problem in the technical sense of the hazard.  
174 The picture is slightly more complicated, ‘justly benefit’ would be a more apt description of whether an agent 
should be included in procedural justice. For example, we might think those who would benefit from owning 
slaves do not have a claim of procedural justice to take part in decisions about slavery, despite the benefit they 
receive from slavery. The reason for this is that the unjust nature of them owning slaves means the benefit that 
they receive from this practice is not just, and therefore should not have weight in any decisions about slavery. 
We may think that there are agents who could benefit from SSI in an unjust way, if so they would not be able to 
use their claim of benefit to partake in a procedurally just SSI arrangement.  
175 Although nothing ensures that secrecy would not exist in this case, but then the complaint is about secrecy not 
the trichotomous relationship between decision makers, beneficiaries and burden bearers.  
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mitigation can be ensured, then the moral hazard problem goes away; since the hazard concern 
is about how mitigation efforts are adversely impacted by SSI.176  
The question then is does it seem plausible to think that mitigation efforts can be ensured? 
Consider a world in which a legally binding agreement exists which makes the future research 
and development of SSI contingent upon the meaningful mitigation efforts. This could have 
some force in preventing the hazard from SSI. The effectiveness of this proposal is in part 
dependent on whether the formal role holders of power really think that this mechanism is 
binding. If the formal-role holders of power think that future generations would be able to 
circumvent these mechanisms if mitigation efforts do not happen, due to a reason such as crisis, 
then they do not face that incentive to mitigate now. And can succumb to the psychological 
and ethical failures which induce the hazard.  
To conclude this subsection, the idea of finding solutions via Wolff’s table and ensuring strict 
mitigation efforts are both worthy of further exploration. However, they both face challenges, 
and run the risk of not solving the underlying substance of the hazard problem. Using Wolff’s 
table runs the risk of only addressing the hazard in a technical sense. The strict mitigation 
approach would address the spirit of the hazard, although it is hard to imagine what could be 
done to provide confidence in such an approach. 
  
5.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter set out to achieve two aims. Firstly, to investigate whether secrecy could work as 
a response to the moral hazard problem. Secondly, to consider whether this would be a 
desirable response. I have argued in this chapter that the secrecy scenario could indeed be an 
effective response to the moral hazard concern. However, I also argued that we have at least 
four reasons to find secrecy undesirable because of the impact it would have in relation to 
procedural justice, corruption, moral corruption and co-benefits. To make this argument the 
chapter applied itself to three tasks. Firstly, it drew upon Pozen’s work on secrecy to answer 
the descriptive question of what secrecy is. Secondly, it answered the empirical question of 
what secrecy might look like by applying Pozen’s account to the Manhattan Project. It 
                                                          
176 Although the counter factual trajectory formulation of the hazard is still available in this scenario, see part 4.2 
of this thesis, specifically figure 3.  
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considered what could be learned from the Manhattan Project in relation to secrecy in SSI 
governance, such as using the tool of compartmentalisation. Finally, in the normative section, 
the chapter discussed a set of ethical objections to the secrecy scenario 
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6 The intergenerational justice challenge in SSI governance 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter I seek to address the intergenerational problem of inclusion. The motive for this 
is that a procedurally just SSI governance arrangement would in some form include future 
generations.177 Yet it is unclear what form this inclusion should take.  The need for the 
discussion in this chapter is compounded by the complete absence of proposals to include 
future generations in SSI governance reports (Morrow, 2017).  
Despite there being plenty of governance reports, none of them account for the inclusion of 
future generations. This is an indictment of these reports and an indicator of moral failure. The 
reports fail to take one of the most vulnerable groups (future generations) into account in their 
proposals for SSI governance, despite paying lip service to their relevance and vulnerability 
(Chhetri et al., 2018, XI). Academic literature on procedural justice in SSI governance also 
fails to account for future generations, Callies (2019a: chapter 6) offers an account of 
procedural justice in for SSI governance institutions which only accounts for present 
generations. This is due to future generations being particularly challenging to account for in 
procedural justice.  This chapter will therefore provide proposals for how future generations 
could be included in SSI governance. By doing so, the hope is that future reports will not be 
able to claim that there is an absence of proposals to include future generations within SSI 
governance arrangements.  
This chapter starts by considering representation as a way to achieve inclusion. The chapter 
then presents the idea of A Statement of What is Owed to the Future, and how this could be 
used to help certain mechanisms which are designed to represent future generations. It will 
demonstrate that A Statement of What is Owed to the Future is helpful when it comes to 
applying some of the emerging tools which can be used to protect vulnerable groups, 
specifically: ombudspersons and constitutional protections. 
Moving beyond the emerging tools for protecting future people, the main proposals presented 
in this chapter result from focusing on an alternative tool, that of the decision-making stages 
                                                          
177 There is literature which points to the importance of including future generations in SSI decision making such 
as (Hourdequin, 2012, 2016, 2018, 2019; Smith 2012, 2018, Callies; 2019a). Moreover the impotence of including 
future generation is a plausible interpretation of what a well-designed accountability mechanism would look like, 
the importance of which was argued for in chapter 3.  
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of SSI governance and asking how future generations can be represented in this decision-
making process. The chapter argues that including a second chamber in the decision-making 
process provides a suitable mechanism for achieving the representation of future generations 
in the decision-making process and thus complying with the principle of inclusion. Importantly, 
it will be argued that a second chamber would also benefit from A Statement of What is Owed 
to the Future. This proposal for a second chamber in the decision making stage of SSI 
governance is quite distinctive, given that there is general a lack of literature on second 
chambers for future generations, with the exception of Mackenzie (2016). Although this 
proposal is distinct from Mackenzie due to be it being at the international level and having a 
different understanding of what a second chamber should do. To clarify the scope and aims of 
this chapter. The chapter does not argue for a second chamber full stop. It argues that a second 
chamber appears to be a promising tool to address the problem of intergenerational inclusion 
in SSI governance. We could understand this as the chapter presenting a political theory case 
in favour of a second chamber. Yet this is not enough to say that we should have a second 
chamber in SSI governance. To make that judgement we would require knowledge of the 
impacts of second chambers on a much deep and interdisciplinary level. The type of knowledge 
which is processed by the institutional design, and international relations literature ( Keohane, 
1984, 1988; Fearon, 1998; Koremenos et al, 2001; Zürn, 2004;  Raustiala, 2005; Moe, 2006; 
Fioretos, 2011). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to settle any debates in the institutional 
design literature, instead by making a case in favour for a second chamber the chapter also calls 
an interdisciplinary engagement with the relevant literature on institutional design, specifically 
to understand the implications of setting up a second chamber for SSI governance.  
This chapter interacts in interesting ways with parts of the perfect moral. A perfect moral storm 
raises the point that our tools from political theory are bad for thinking about the problems 
associated with climate change (the theoretical storm), and that we face a strong temptation to 
pass much of the problem and harms of climate change onto future generations (the 
intergenerational storm). This analysis serves many functions. On one level, it is a warning 
about the challenge that humanity faces if it is going to overcome climate change, because it 
has to be able to navigate this perfect moral storm. Yet it also poses a challenge for political 
theorists, perhaps a call to arms, by identifying the problems that they have to be able to make 
sense of in their own work. This chapter can therefore be understood as a way of trying to 
163 
 
engage with this challenge of the perfect moral storm.178 The inclusion of future generations is 
clearly relevant in terms of achieving procedural justice, yet how to do so is perplexing. Hence 
the problem of inclusion, which I understand to be a component of the theoretical storm.  
 
  
                                                          
178 Gardiner acknowledges the importance of trying to take account of future generations in climate governance 
by engaging with the intergenerational and theoretical storms in his article ‘A Call for a Global Constitutional 
Convention Focused on Future Generations’ (Gardiner, 2014: 305).  
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6.2 How should future generations be included: participation or 
representation?   
 
A principle of inclusion could be realised in at least two ways. One is for the group in question 
to meaningfully participate in SSI governance; the other is for it to be well represented in SSI 
governance. In this section I will consider the possibilities of participation and representation.  
We have reasons to think that a principle of participation is preferable, for example there is 
work in the literature on ethics of SSI which makes the point that vulnerable agents ought to 
be recognised in SSI governance (Hourdequin; 2016; 2018; 2019). Recognition in turn requires 
those agents to be able to engage with the governance process and exercise their voice. It is 
clear what the problem is though if we are thinking of future generations, they are yet to have 
a voice to exercise. Given the voicelessness of future generations it is clear that participation 
would not be a plausible way to include future people.  
Representation does not necessarily require the voice which participation does.179 Although 
there is still a challenge if one wishes to think of representation as a means to achieve inclusion. 
Which is what is meant to be represented? When we think of representative systems we might 
think that one of at least two functions are being achieved by this representation. We may think 
that we are representing preferences or representing interests of the relevant agents.  
Yet when thinking of the interests or preferences of future generation we have an epistemic 
problem (Karenin, 2016: 86). This refers to our inability to know the specific preferences and 
interests of future people. The epistemic problem is exacerbated by the problem of plurality 
(Karenin, 2016: 87), which observes that across time and space there will be a great variation 
in preferences. It strikes me that these features make it remarkably challenging to anyone who 
would wish to try to take the preferences of future generations into account.  
Yet this problem is not insurmountable, nor even particularly problematic for certain interest-
based accounts of engaging with the problem of voicelessness. The reason for this is that certain 
interests are not contingent upon the particular person in question because they exist simply in 
                                                          
179 This may be part of the reason why representing future generations has started it taken seriously in the literature 
about institutions which are meant to help climate justice be achieved (Gardiner, 2014; Lawrence, 2014; 
Stevenson & Dryzek, 2014; Heyward & Roser, 2016). Additionally there is an understanding that the 
representation of future generations is a desirable way to achieve both climate and intergenerational justice (Van 
Parijs, 1998; McKinnon, 2011; Roser & Seidel, 2017; Lawrence & Kohler, 2018). 
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virtue of being human (Karenin, 2016: 86).180 Given that we have the epistemic power to know 
the specific interests of future people insofar as they are human, the question then becomes one 
of what can be done to represent those interests in the shared politics of the current era. In the 
absence of future generations being able to represent their own interests, I propose as the next 
best alternative that those interests be represented in a meaningful way by the present 
generation. This move seems to be supported in the literature on future people which, whilst it 
does consider representation, does not (insofar as I know) take the idea of the participation of 
future people seriously.  
The problem of voicelessness is the relevant obstacle to the participation of future generations 
under discussion in this chapter. Therefore I shall proceed by proposing ways to address the 
problem of voicelessness for future generations in SSI governance. This is a lower bar than that 
of participation, which seems to demand the presence of the agent in order for them to exercise 
their voice and reason. 
  
                                                          
180 A similar logic has been used by Shue (1980), and I take Simon Caney to be doing something similar in his 
chapter ‘Climate Change, Human Rights, and Moral Thresholds’ (2010), when he chooses a minimal account of 
human rights and demonstrates that such an account is sufficient to show that those human rights are threatened 
by climate change. 
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6.3 A good minimum: A Statement of What is Owed to the Future 
 
In this section I shall introduce an integral part of the strategy which this chapter offers for 
addressing the problem of intergenerational inclusion. The idea is that there should be a 
statement of what is owed to future generations. Such a statement should not be seen as a 
definitive account of all things that are owed to future people. It is a statement of a minimum 
which is owed to them. Such a statement should therefore outline a minimal account of the 
interests of future generations.181 The reason for being interested in this statement is that it 
could be used to improve the functioning of mechanisms which are designed to account for or 
protect the interests of future generations. To consider this proposal, the section will do two 
things. Firstly, it will explain what the statement is, and secondly, it will consider how the 
statement relates to another important proposal regarding future generations, that being 
Gardiner’s Global Constitutional Convention for future generations (Gardiner, 2014). The 
motive for considering this is that A Statement of What is Owed to the Future could be a useful 
part of the strategy to enable their inclusion in an SSI governance institution.  
 
6.3.1  The declaration 
 
The statement, or declaration, of what is owed to the future will be a document which outlines 
what future generations are owed by the present generation.182  The declaration can be 
understood as functioning in the way declarations have done in the past when they are designed 
to protect fundamental interests. Notable examples of this include the UN Declarations of 
Human Rights, the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child, and the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The Statement of What is Owed to the Future needs to be 
                                                          
181 I use the term interests, which loads such a statement towards a conversation about the rights of future people, 
due to interests providing the foundation for prominent rights theory. If rights are not the appropriate metric of 
what is owed to future people, then it may well be the case that the language of interests is inappropriate for such 
a statement. However, it appears that there is no neutral term for a metric of what is owed to future people. Added 
to which, the language of interests has the advantage of avoiding non-identity-related problems, insofar as a set 
of interests can be held by any possible set of future people, regardless of their specific identity. The reason for 
interests loading the conversation in the direction of rights is that interests can be a strong source of rights.  




supported by the vast majority of states in the same way as these other examples which have 
been adopted by the UN General Assembly.  
The content of the declaration would be determined by those who draft and sign it. This is in 
order to be sensitive to the way in which declarations generally come into existence.183 Yet this 
creates the risk that the statement would not be even minimally just. For example, the statement 
could proclaim that nothing at all is owed to future people. I shall assume that the declaration 
which is agreed to will be minimally just. This assumption is not a probabilistic claim that such 
a statement is likely to be minimally just;184 it is based on the premise that the problem of 
intergenerational inclusion is a serious one, and consequently it is worth considering the more 
promising strategies to address it.185  
I shall now consider what a minimally just declaration may look like. This is helpful insofar as 
it provides an example of the core content of the declaration, which we can take to be 
illustrative of any declaration of what is owed to future generations which might be agreed to 
by states. To consider what the core content of the declaration may look like, I shall draw on 
an article by Simon Caney in which he outlines how a minimally just account of human rights 
would apply to the case of climate change (Caney, 2010).186 In the article he argues that if we 
accept a minimal account of human rights – i.e. life, health and subsistence – we are able to 
make substantial demands in the context of climate change, given that climate change threatens 
these minimal rights (Caney, 2010: 166–169).  
I propose that the declaration of what is owed to the future could adopt a Caney-like minimal 
account for future generations. In other words, that future generations have the right to life, 
health and subsistence. For the purposes of this chapter I shall understand part of the core 
content of the declaration as a version of Caney’s minimal account of human rights oriented 
towards future generations. Keeping in mind nonetheless that the content will not be 
determined by philosophers, but by those who actually write and sign the treaty.  
                                                          
183 There may also be normative reasons as to why it is important for the declaration to be drafted by these law-
makers, perhaps on the grounds of legitimacy.  
184 On the contrary, if one accepts the usefulness of the statement, then a serious question is under what conditions 
a just version of this statement is more likely to occur.  
185 Whilst it may be an interesting question whether an unjust declaration of what is owed to the future could be 
of use for addressing the problem of intergenerational inclusion, it is not the question which this chapter will 
explore.  
186 This bears a relation to Henry Shue’s account of basic rights, in which he outlines a minimal set of rights which 
need to be realised if any other rights are going to be protected.  
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The benefits of such a minimally just declaration are at least threefold. Firstly, such a minimum 
should be reasonably acceptable to many reasonable persons, for it is not contingent upon a 
specific sophisticated account of intergenerational justice, but merely what is at the least owed 
to future people on many accounts of intergenerational justice. This means the acceptability of 
the statement should not hinge on a position one adopts about the currency of intergenerational 
justice. This is important due to the variety of currencies available for intergenerational justice 
and a lack of agreement about which the appropriate one is. The classic currencies of 
distributive justice, such as welfare (Page, 1983), resources (Barry, 1999, 2005), and 
capabilities (Page, 2007; Gutwald et al, 2014) have all been applied to the intergenerational 
context.187 Determining the appropriate currency is an unenviable task, a strength of this 
statement is that statement should not be contingent upon an answer to this question.  
Secondly, such a minimum, if met, ought to provide a sufficient state of affairs for future 
generations. This does not necessarily mean that the state of affairs would be just or optimal 
for future people, but that they would live in a world in which at least their basic interests were 
fulfilled.188 This is similar to how if everyone’s basic interests were protected today, then there 
would be no extreme poverty. It does not mean justice has been achieved (assuming that the 
content of justice is greater than the meeting of basic interests), but it is also good in the same 
sense that no one is subject to the harm of extreme poverty. 
The third benefit of such a minimal account is that the statement should be applicable to those 
institutions which are meant to engage with the policy that affects these interests. This will 
become much clearer once I have applied this statement to the specific proposals for decision-
making procedures which can give weight to the interests of future generations. Although there 
will of course be challenges in applying the principles from this statement to public policy.   
The spirit of these three points is that a minimal account ought to be acceptable to many people, 
and it will still be helpful for protecting future generations. 
 
                                                          
187 For a good overview of the currencies of intergenerational justice see Page (2007) as well as Vrousalis (2016), 
the issue is also covered briefly in Caney (2018). For a critique of the egalitarian currencies of intergenerational 
justice see Beckerman (1999). 
188 Of course, there are questions about how sufficiency is understood in relation to justice, and for some, the 
measure of justice for future people may well be that of sufficiency (Benbaji, 2005; Brown, 2005; Casal, 2007: 
297–298). Arguably, Rawls also holds a sufficiency view with his account of just savings.  
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6.3.2 A Statement of What is Owed to the Future as complementary to a Global 
Constitutional Convention Focused on Future Generations 
 
Such a statement can be understood as constituting part of what is called for by Gardiner in his 
article ‘A Call for a Global Constitutional Convention Focused on Future Generations’. The 
aim of such a convention is to provide a ‘constitutional system that appropriately embodies 
intergenerational concern’ at the international level (Gardiner, 2014: 305). The scope of the 
statement that I am proposing is the same as Gardiner’s, as it should outline the interests that 
can be applied to any international governance regime that raises intergenerational concerns 
(although this chapter will only focus on the application of the statement to SSI governance).189   
The Statement of What is Owed to the Future could be understood as a component of the 
Convention, which will provide ‘a set of norms (rules, principles or values) creating structuring 
and possibly defining the limits of government power or authority’ (Gardiner, 2014: 306). It is 
unclear how demanding it would be to create this set of norms. Gardiner does mention that this 
should be understood in a minimalist sense, in which case this may effectively be the same 
thing as A Statement of What is Owed to the Future. For the statement in effect places a 
restriction on what governments can do by stating what they should not violate. Yet the creation 
of rules, principles or values may be much more demanding than what A Statement of What is 
Owed to the Future can achieve. Given the ambiguity of what is being called for by Gardiner 
in this instance, I presume there to be a benefit in calling for an explicit Statement of What is 
Owed to the Future, which is the type of document that a Global Constitutional Convention 
ought to produce.  
Gardiner explains two attractive features of a Global Constitutional Convention. Firstly, the 
Convention is based in political reality. By this Gardiner means that the Convention 
understands the relevant issue at hand, i.e. climate change, and the reasons why we have failed 
to respond to it ( as explained in Gardiner’s perfect moral storm), and that an alternative system 
is required to address intergenerational problems (Gardiner, 2014: 306). The second attractive 
feature is that the Constitutional Convention does not respond to political reality by entering a 
state of despair (Gardiner, 2014: 306). It uses the political reality in the correct way, and by 
                                                          
189 It is interesting to note that although the statement is motivated to engage with the idea of including future 
people in regard to SSI governance, because it provides a minimal account of what is owed to future people, it 
might be expected that it would also be applicable to cases other than SSI (such as food, heath and sustainability), 
due to future generations having minimal interests which are applicable in other policy areas as well.  
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understanding the problem at hand, the Convention can then proceed in such a way that it is 
sensitive to the nature of the problem. I understand this account of political reality as 
emphasising the need for responses to a problem like intergenerational inclusion as being fit 
for purpose.  This provides an additional reason for thinking that the statement at least needs 
to be minimally just, if it fails to be minimally just it would appear not to take the nature of the 
problem seriously.  
It is worth distinguishing between political reality and more common but similar sounding 
terms, such as political feasibility. Political feasibility is a concept which is used to rule out 
proposals which cannot be implemented, and to rank proposals according to the likelihood of 
them being implemented (Gilabert and Lawford-Smith, 2012: 815). Taking political reality 
seriously could sound as if one taken feasibility constraint very seriously. Importantly this not 
the case, taking political reality seriously does not require one to consider the likelihood of 
whether the response can be implemented, but whether the response is sufficient given the 
nature of the problem.  
A Statement of What is Owed to the Future should be able to retain these two attractive features 
of Gardiner’s Global Constitutional Convention. Firstly it does not respond to the problem of 
intergenerational inclusion by entering a state of despair instead there is the creation of A 
Statement of What is Owed to the Future with the goal of helping mechanisms function to 
represent future generations. This Statement shall also be grounded in political reality. I 
understand this as the statement being sensitive to the obstacles which are presented in order 
for it to be fulfilled. Consequently the statement should draw attention to the demandingness 
of its content and how the present global system fails to achieve what the statement requires. 
By doing so the statement sets up the challenge which is meant to be addressed.   
It should be noted that this section does not provide a strong defence of the Statement of What 
is Owed to the Future. Instead, it has pointed to the benefits of setting a minimum standard and 
how this relates to Gardiner’s Global Constitutional Convention. The case in favour of this 
statement will become clear throughout the chapter. The case is grounded in how different 
proposals for the inclusion of future generations benefit from A Statement of What is Owed to 
the Future. The chapter will draw attention to these benefits after analysing different proposals 





6.4 Applying A Statement of What is Owed to the Future to the tools which 
are meant to protect future generations 
 
A Statement of What is Owed to the Future could work in conjunction with some powerful 
tools for taking future generations into account. These tools comprise the use of ombudspersons 
and constitutional protections. The reason for looking at these particular tools is that they have 
been vividly defended in the contemporary literature on designing institutions to protect future 
generations (Gonzalez-Ricoy and Gosseries, 2016).190 Moreover, the idea of having 
ombudspersons for future generations has already been practised in Hungary (Gonzalez-Ricoy 
and Gosseries, 2016: 4). Similar practices have been adopted elsewhere, such as in Israel, 
where there is a commissioner for future generations, and in Finland, which has a committee 
for the future. I will now proceed to illustrate how A Statement of What is Owed to the Future 
is able to facilitate the use of these tools. 
 
6.4.1 Constitutional protections 
 
Constitutional protections for future generations are advocated by Iñigo González-Ricoy 
(2016). The idea is that certain interests of future generations can be given legal protection 
within the framework of a constitution. González-Ricoy argues that constitutional protections 
have at least three advantages. Firstly, they reduce short-termism by creating a cost for policy-
makers if they try to remove these protections (González-Ricoy, 2016: 173). Secondly, they 
can reduce long-term uncertainty: if a constitution is designed to protect long-term projects 
such as protecting the future then agents may have more faith in those projects (González-
Ricoy, 2016: 176).191 And thirdly, constitutions can be informative in regard to society’s values 
                                                          
190 Although there are also other noteworthy proposals to protect future generations, broadly speaking these 
proposals either focus on ensuring that office holders are more future friendly, or that office holders are have 
greater incentives to be future friendly (Gonzalez-Ricoy and Gosseries, 2016: 8-9). Examples of ensuring that 
office holder are more future friendly include ideas such as having some seats in a parliament put aside of 
membership of environmentally friendly groups (Dobson, 1996), or youth quotas for a parliament (Bidadanure, 
2016). This is in contrast to providing incentives, or mechanisms for office holders to be more future friendly, for 
example Caney among a set of proposals argues that governments should provide a manifesto of the future (Caney, 
2016: 136).  
191 As opposed to long-term projects being pursued when there are no long-term constitutional protections.  
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(González-Ricoy, 2016: 178).192 This can happen by constitutions challenging its citizens to 
reflect upon the importance of the values which are entrenched within it (González-Ricoy, 
2016: 178).193 
However, González-Ricoy also highlights that there are reasons to be concerned about 
constitutional protections, not least the uncertainty about whether we may harm future people 
with our choice of constitutional protections (González-Ricoy, 2016: 171). This is an old 
concern about constitutions, on which Thomas Jefferson was particularly vocal (Jefferson 1999 
(1789), although there is plenty of recent literature which tries to dampen the force of this 
concern (Gosseries, 2008, 2014)  
Yet there is a more immediate concern with such constitutional protections when it comes to 
global SSI governance. The problem is that there is no global constitution, and therefore there 
is no appropriate framework that the interests of future generations can be protected within. 
However, this need not be the case, and González-Ricoy explains that three conditions need to 
be met for constitutional entrenchment to happen:   
First, they are included in a legal document (i.e. the constitution) with normative 
superiority over ordinary statutes… Second, they can only be amended by means 
that are more stringent than those of ordinary law-making procedures… Third, 
they are enforceable by some independent body (typically a constitutional court). 
(Iñigo González-Ricoy, 2016: 172)  
If González-Ricoy has identified the relevant criteria, then it appears that constitutional 
entrenchment is possible at the global level, even in the absence of a global constitution. If we 
consider the formation of a global SSI governance regime, then such a regime can be founded 
on a document which has superiority over the documents that such a regime can produce. The 
process for amending the founding document can be made more challenging than that for 
ordinary decisions taken by the governance regime. Finally, this document can be designed in 
such a way that it is enforceable in international courts. The possibility of the founding 
document of SSI governance having this constitutionally entrenched character also raises a set 
                                                          
192 America seems to offer a clear example of a case where many agents identify with particular values within the 
constitution, such as the value of free speech or the right to bear arms.  
193 The good of this would in part be contingent upon the desirability of those values. In this case thinking about 
the value of future generations appears to be a worthwhile value.  
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of legal questions about the document concerning its legal status and how it would relate to 
international courts.194 
We can understand the relationship between constitutional protections and the statement of 
what is owed to the future in at least two ways. The first is that the statement could be 
informative of the constitutional protections which future generations are granted. The second 
is it could be considered a constitutional protection in itself .The answer to this is contingent 
upon the status of the statement. I will now outline the logic of these two positions..  
If we accept the possibility of putting constitutional protections in place for future generations, 
then there is still the question of what should be the content of these protections.  A Statement 
of What is Owed to the Future may be helpful in answering this question. As such a statement 
provides an account of the minimal interests of future people, it contains much of the 
information that is required for constitutional protections to be formulated. The question then 
becomes one of what are the relevant interests from this statement which ought to be protected 
via a constitution. If the interests which the statement takes into account are genuinely the 
minimal ones, then we can expect the constitution to include all of these interests in order to 
be considered minimally just. Similarly, if there are any weighty additional interests which are 
not listed in A Statement of What is Owed to the Future, then we can expect a debate on whether 
those interests should be protected. Therefore the scope of interests accounted for in 
constitutional protections may be greater than A Statement of What is Owed to the Future 
The statement can also be understood as a form of constitutional protection. To do so would 
require that the statement meets the three conditions set out in the previous page: it would need 
to have greater force than an ordinary statute, it would have to be harder to amend, and it would 
have to be enforceable. Constitutional protections require enforcement mechanisms. If we were 
to understand the statement as form of constitutional protection we have an additional reason 
to be concerned with what mechanism could guard the content of the statement. 
  
                                                          






An ombudsperson’s concern is to ensure compliance with whatever rules, treaties and laws 
exist (Beckman and Uggla, 2016: 126).195 In order for an ombudsperson to carry out their 
function, they require some account of the relevant rules to which they are holding an institution 
to account. A Statement of What is Owed to the Future can provide such an expression of the 
rules.196 If A Statement of What is Owed to the Future sets out the rights of future generations, 
then an ombudsperson should have the power to act when the SSI governing body appears to 
violate these rights. A Statement of What is Owed to the Future gives an ombudsperson for 
future generations the information that they require to function.  
Yet ombudspersons lack formal power and cannot enforce compliance with any of their 
recommendations (Beckman and Uggla, 2016: 124). It is tempting to understand this as a 
disadvantage of the ombudsperson system. After all, the interests of future generations are very 
significant, and it may appear that we are underestimating the seriousness of the problem if we 
task the protection of these interests to an actor with no formal power.  
However, such a view fails to account for certain advantages of an ombudsperson, because the 
lack of formal power allows them to avoid concerns about democratic legitimacy (Beckman 
and Uggla, 2016: 124). The legitimacy argument states that if the ombudsperson could enforce 
compliance then there would be a problem as to whether the ombudsperson would be 
considered legitimate, given that they are not elected and exercise power over elected 
representatives (Beckman and Uggla, 2016: 124). The prospect of an ombudsperson may seem 
unsatisfactory: if an ombudsperson is not a constraint on power, then what is the point? Here 
the literature teaches that ombudspersons can be a constraint on power even if they lack formal 
power, by generating popular support for their work from the electorate, to which politicians 
in turn respond (MacKenzie, 2016: 35).197  
                                                          
195 Beckerman and Uggla note that the idea of an ombudsperson for the future has been vigorously defended, 
citing Weiss 1992, Slaughter 1994, Aguis 2006, Shoham and Lamay 2006, Javor 2006, Gosseries 2008 and Gopel 
2012 (Beckman and Uggla, 2016: 117). 
196 Rules being understood in a loose sense of the term, due to the fact that ombudspersons do not require 
extensively detailed legislation; they merely require legally valid documents on the basis of which to ask questions 
(Beckman and Uggla, 2016: 126).  
197 This popular support creates pressure for those with power to be sensitive to the judgement of the 
ombudsperson (MacKenzie, 2016: 35). 
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It is worth noting that ‘ombudsperson’ may not be the appropriate name for an international 
actor (such as one who might act within the type of SSI governance institution which we are 
considering), but an equivalent is surely capable of being created.198 A comparable set of actors 
within the international system is that of the UN Special Rapporteurs. These are independent 
actors who have the relevant expertise to report on a special issue within a given mandate 
(Freedman, 2014: 112).  
Yet there are important differences between ombudspersons and UN Special Rapporteurs. For 
example, rapporteurs are subject to strict term limits, which in total cannot exceed six years. 
This does not seem to be the case for ombudspersons, and in fact, one of their appeals is that 
they are able to think over the longer term. A term limit would go against the functioning of an 
ombudsperson if it encouraged them to adopt more short-term interests. Additionally, an 
ombudsperson performs a function which is closer to that of mediation, whilst a rapporteur’s 
role is purely advisory. If a special rapporteur is an inappropriate equivalent for an 
ombudsperson, then this just creates an opportunity for SSI global governance to contribute to 
the development of global governance more generally, by pioneering the international 
ombudsperson.  
The question which will permeate this chapter is what mechanism we should employ to enact 
the statement of what is owed to future generations. Ombudspersons are a plausible way of 
trying to uphold the statement of what is owed to future generations. Yet they are not without 
their shortcomings. I shall draw attention to an important shortcoming of an ombudsperson as 
a way to protect future generations, and then consider a second chamber as a mechanism which 
can protect the content of a statement of what is owed to future generations, whilst not suffering 
some of the important shortcomings of an ombudsperson.    
Ombudspersons do not appear to have a strong influence at the time at which a decision is 
made. They exercise their power after a decision has been made. Considerations of procedural 
justice remind us that, insofar as it is possible, we should represent the interests of future people 
when decisions are being made which affect them. 199 There is a simple instrumental reason to 
think that this is important, which is that if the interests of future people are properly 
represented then decisions should not be made which are detrimental to these interests. The 
absence of the ombudsperson from the decision-making procedure opens up the door for 
                                                          
198 The role of the ombudsperson appears to exist at the national level only.  
199 For more details on procedural justice see part 5.5.3 of this thesis.  
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decisions which are harmful to future generations. Whilst the ombudsperson may eventually 
help this decision be overturned, it would be preferable if these decisions were not made in the 
first place.  
One may think the difference between a second chamber an ombudsperson is not too important, 
if both eventually reject unjust decisions towards future generations, why would it matter if 
this rejections happens in a second chamber or by an ombudsperson. One answer is that an 
ombudsperson may not be able to reverse all the impacts of a future effecting harmful decision.  
It is desirable that the mechanisms for protecting A Statement of What is Owed to the Future is 
consistent with the demands of procedural justice. Therefore, I want to find a mechanism which 
represents the interests of future generations at the time at which a decision is being made.  
This should not be understood as a claim that second chambers are always better than 
ombudspersons, or that ombudspersons are procedurally unjust. Instead the claim is that second 
chambers are better at meeting the demands of procedural justice for future generations in the 
case of SSI governance. Yet there will be future effecting decision which do not require a 
second chamber to be considered procedurally just, for example decisions made by local 
councils about infrastructure projects. In this case it may be sufficient for there to be an 
ombudsperson to whom complaints can be made in the grounds of how future generations are 
effected by the decision.200 
Yet there will be cases where considerations of procedural justice are not weighty, and 
ombudsperson would be more appropriate.  For example in the UK there is an ombudsperson 
for complaints about communication companies. It would be odd to think that a second 
chamber would be required due to considerations of procedural justice to make sense of 
communication decisions instead. 
To summarise this section: A Statement of What is Owed to the Future should be easily 
accessible and understandable. Specifically, such a statement should be beneficial for the 
functioning of some of the most prominent tools available for protecting the interests of future 
people: ombudspersons and constitutional protections. In addition, A Statement of What is 
                                                          
200 The reason why the demands of procedural justice vary can in part be understood as a product of the weight 
and relevance of the interest which the effected parties have. In SSI governance the interests of future 
generations are very strong given that there minimal rights can be threatened, the weight of interest demand 
that procedural takes these interests sufficiently serious. In contrast infrastructure projects do not appear to 
threaten the rights of future generations, the stakes for future generations are not as high in these decisions, , 




Owed to the Future can be understood as being complementary to Gardiner’s Global 
Constitutional Convention. Moreover we have reasons to think that a second chamber is more 
desirable than ombudspersons in this case due to their ability to come close to meeting the 
demands of procedural justice. 





6.5 A second chamber? Giving weight to the interests of future generations 
 
The previous section considered some prominent tools for the inclusion of future generations 
in SSI governance. I will now consider a different tool for how the interests of future people 
can be accounted for in SSI governance. Therefore, the focus now moves away from the 
emerging tools for protecting the interests of future generations to a consideration of tools for 
including future generations when the decision is actually being made. Specifically, I am going 
to focus on the decision-making procedures which occur within some form of a decision-
making chamber. (Some people may be more comfortable with alternative language to describe 
this chamber, such as a decision-making body or organ, which is the preferred language used 
in certain UN institutions). I will consider how such a chamber ought to be designed to take 
the interests of future people into account.  
 
6.5.1 A second decision-making chamber  
 
The proposal which I will consider for giving weight to the interests of future people is that of 
a second decision-making chamber.201 It is not uncommon for a second chamber to be charged 
with considering a different set of interests from those of the primary decision-making 
chamber, in the hope of improving the quality of legislation which is produced from the 
decision-making process as a whole. The thought here is that a second chamber could be 
charged with specifically protecting the interests of future generations.202 In this sub-section, 
the main consideration is how a second chamber should be formulated. To do this we will 
engage with the work of MacKenzie (2016), who argues in favour of three principles to 
determine the composition of second chambers at the national level which are meant to protect 
future generations.  
                                                          
201 Including future generations at the point in time in which the decision is made is one of distinctive advantages 
of a second chamber from the other tools which have been considered. The consideration of a second chamber in 
this context is also interesting for there is a distinct lack of literature on how second chambers can represent future 
generations, although there is broader on how institutions can be incentive to account for future generations 
(Caney, 2016; Ekeli 2016; Iñigo González-Ricoy; 2016). 
202 This is in contrast to the primary chamber where the initial decision within the SSI governance process occurs. 
More will be said later about the relation between these two chambers.  
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Prior to exploring the benefits of a second chamber I will first provide the reader with the 
necessary tools to make sense of chambers at the global level of SSI governance. As was 
explained in section 1.3.2 of the introduction, the level of governance that this thesis focuses 
on is the global level. Here I wish to draw attention to a particular aspect of my understanding 
of global governance, which is that there has to be a space where decisions about SSI are 
formally made.  
This space would be comparable to the formal decision-making space which exists in many 
global institutions such as the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council and the UN 
Economic and Social Council, as well as international organisations outside the UN such as 
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation: there is 
a process within each of these organs where decisions are formally made. Considering the UN 
General Assembly, for example, representatives of all the member states come together for 
debate, each member state has one vote, and depending on the decision at hand either a simple 
majority or a super majority will be required for the decision to be approved. A detailed 
articulation of how those organs function is not necessary for our analysis, since the analysis 
is not contingent upon a detailed picture of the function of a primary chamber. It merely 
requires an understanding that there can be formal spaces in the international arena where 
decisions are made on particular topics. Given that our focus is on SSI governance, I propose 
we understand a primary governance chamber as a space in the international arena where the 
vast majority of states come together to make decisions about SSI.203  
A second chamber is a separate space to that where the primary decisions are initially made in 
regard to SSI governance (such as an assembly of states, although there is variation concerning 
what this process would actually look like). Decisions made by the primary chamber would 
then be subject to scrutiny by a second chamber. I envisage this second chamber as having two 
distinct sets of powers in regard to the decision-making. Firstly, it should be able to propose 
amendments to decisions made by the primary chamber.204 The nature of these amendments 
would be restricted to those which can be justified as protecting the relevant interests outlined 
in A Statement of What is Owed to the Future. The second potential set of powers would relate 
                                                          
203 If the idea of this type of global governance of SSI were to be advocated for there would be complicated 
questions around how such an institution would relate to other global governance bodies such as the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which may seek to claim some jurisdiction over the governance of 
SSI. Such questions are put to one side for the analysis in this chapter, which is only interested in the potential 
benefits of a second chamber, not the legal relationship between potential chambers and current international 
governance regimes.  
204 This is in the spirit of the power which the UK’s House of Lords has in the legislative process.  
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to preventing a decision being passed by being able to challenge it in an international court of 
law.205 This power has been proposed by Kristian Ekeli, although rather than suggesting the 
establishment of a second chamber per se he proposes that this power be given to minorities 
within a chamber (Ekeli, 2016).  
Here I shall comment on the balance of power between the second and primary chamber, in 
order to make the idea of a second chamber clearer. A simple understanding of the balance of 
power between the primary decision-making chamber and the second chamber is that the 
second is a constraint on how the primary chamber can behave in regards to how its actions 
affect future generations. It wields a veto power over decisions, which prevents the first 
chamber violating the interests expressed in A Statement of What is Owed to the Future. This 
veto power may make the second chamber sound very powerful, but it can only wield that 
power in very specific circumstances, namely when the primary chamber violates the interests 
set out in A Statement of What is Owed to the Future. There are further details to be determined 
about the balance of power between these chambers, such as should the second chamber have 
any greater power than that of a veto in specific circumstances? The appropriate balance of 
power between chambers and other institutions is a concern to be determined by experts of 
institutional design in consultation with others to work out the desirable balance 
MacKenzie (2016) argues that a randomly selected second chamber could be well placed to 
consider many intergenerational concerns. Helpfully, he provides three criteria for addressing 
the ‘short-term tendencies of elected legislatures’ (MacKenzie, 2016: 285). I shall now explore 
MacKenzie’s criteria and consider how they could be applied to the case of a second chamber 
for SSI governance.   
The first criterion is one of independence (MacKenzie, 2016: 285). For MacKenzie, 
independence appears to mean that the representatives need to be independent of the political 
pressures which induce short-term thinking. That is to say, they are not subject to the electoral 
pressure which drives short-term thinking and action. If independence does relieve the pressure 
of short-term thinking, then that appears to be a sensible condition to have for a chamber which 
is charged with defending the interests of future generations.  
In the context of SSI global governance I agree with Mackenzie’s first criterion of 
independence. MacKenzie expresses this by arguing that the participants in the institution 
                                                          
205 The question of which international court would be appropriate is one for scholars in other fields to answer, 
probably legal scholars.  
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should not be elected by the people. This coheres with the common practice of global 
governance institutions where no representatives are elected by the people. This should mean 
that these representatives would not suffer from the short-term incentives of an electoral 
cycle.206 Nonetheless, other provisions may also be required to help representatives to be truly 
independent; for example, there is a danger that representatives might be subject to other short-
term pressures, such as their job being contingent on short-term gains for the country that they 
represent. 
MacKenzie’s second criterion is that of representativeness. By this, MacKenzie means that the 
chamber should represent the full range of interests which exist within the general population 
(MacKenzie, 2016: 285–286).207 The particular interests that MacKenzie seems to have in mind 
are those of where different time horizons can be adopted.208 There is a question about how 
representativeness should be understood in the context of a second chamber for SSI 
governance. The function of representativeness for MacKenzie is that the full range of interests 
should be accounted for and properly represented.  
The proposed chamber does not meet Mackenzie’s stand of representativeness because a full 
range of interests are not represented within it. Instead a core subset of full range of interest is 
represented within this chamber. Perhaps an ideal second chamber would represent a full range 
of interests of future generations, yet the epistemic barriers to knowing this full range, a 
minimal core set of interests has an appeal.  
The third criterion which MacKenzie highlights is that of deliberativeness. As he argues, this 
is a way of improving long-term thinking thanks to the provision of information about the 
impacts of long-term action and how actions are interrelated and therefore can have an impact 
upon the long term. This feature appears to be helpful, given that the influence of SSI decisions 
on the interests of future people is complicated and not easily understood. A well-structured 
                                                          
206 One could fear that the institution would not be legitimate if participants are not elected (Bodansky, 1999). 
This type of concern is addressed in work on global governance institutions which argues that they can be 
legitimate even if the participants are not elected, as long as certain conditions are meet such as them being 
accountable (Grant and Keohane, 2005; Buchanan and Keohane, 2006). 
207 Mackenzie’s account of representativeness can be a bit confusing insofar as much of it is focused on how 
demographic representativeness is good for achieving representativeness of time horizons, for the proposes of my 
account I am focusing on the his end goal of representativeness of time-horizons as oppose to his mean of 
achieving this via demographic representation.  
208In context time horizon means the period of time which an agent is interested in. For example a short term time 
horizon on climate change would be to consider its impact in the coming year. Whilst a long term time horizon 




deliberative process seems desirable in order to have a clearer understanding of how a decision 
would affect the interests of future people.  
I accept MacKenzie’s point that deliberativeness is important for understanding the impacts of 
any decision on future generations. He points to the usefulness of providing the relevant 
information for a deliberative process to function well. I have little to add here. A well-
functioning deliberative process clearly seems to be able to help second chambers account for 
the interests of future people. The question is one of how such a process could be designed, 
which is not one I address in this thesis.  
The second chamber should cohere with MacKenzie’s standards of independence, 
representativeness and deliberativeness. As explained, the powers of this chamber would range 
from being able to amend decisions made in the primary chamber to being able to challenge 
the decisions of the primary chamber in an appropriate court of law. Having presented an image 
of how a second chamber could be understood in this context, the question now is why we 
should find it desirable to have a second chamber. The following sub-section will therefore 
offer a defence of this proposal for a second chamber. 
  
 
6.5.2  A defence of second chambers, considering the arguments from history 
 
The previous sub-section articulated some of the core features of a second chamber. I shall now 
defend the focus on second chambers. Second chambers have an extensive history and they are 
arguably as old as democracy, with second chambers being used in ancient Greece and the 
Roman Republic (Shell, 2001: 6). Many arguments have been offered in favour of second 
chambers, and here I shall outline the view of three pre-eminent thinkers on the topic, namely: 
Aristotle, Madison and Mill. The arguments they make are not designed for a second chamber 
at the global level of governance, however. Therefore, once their arguments have been 
considered, the case will not yet have been made that these arguments are necessarily relevant 
to the evaluation of a second chamber at the global level.   
Aristotle defended the ancient Greek system of a ‘mixed government’ by arguing that 
representing different interests would help society remain stable (Aristotle: IV–V; Biondi, 
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2007: 189; Russell, 2001: 19).209  In contrast to this view, John Stuart Mill argues in favour of 
a second chamber which should be composed of states-people who lack any class interest or 
prejudice (Mill, ([1861] 1968: chapter 13). This is very different to Aristotle’s idea that the 
second chamber should represent particular classes and it is fun to see how such contrasting 
ideas can both lead to support for a second chamber.  
James Madison, the fourth president of the United States, was also in favour of two chambers, 
arguing at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia that the role of the second chamber 
was ‘first, to protect the people against their rulers, second, to protect the people against the 
transient impressions into which they themselves might be led’ (quoted in Patterson and 
Mughan, 1999: 14). The theme of Madison’s thinking is that second chambers are protective 
chambers for a particular set of people, and this will be revisited in the next paragraphs. Whilst 
Madison had chambers at the national level in mind,210 his argument applies to a second 
chamber at any level of governance.  
There is nothing special about national-level governance to mean that the national level is the 
only level at which second chambers are appropriate. The appropriateness of having a second 
chamber at any level is contingent on the type of power it has in relation to the primary 
chamber. Both Mill and Madison appear to have similar motivations for finding a second 
chamber desirable; namely, they both think that it improves the quality of decision-making.  
Mill holds this view in part due to this thought that a second chamber will be composed 
members who are devoid of class interests or prejudices, for Mill this helps the members of a 
second chamber be good states-people (Mill, 1861: chapter 13). By this I take him to be making 
the same point as Madison when Madison argues that a second chamber should ‘protect the 
people against the transient impressions into which they themselves might be led’. A way of 
doing this is to have good states-people in the second chamber who can judge when transient 
impressions occur.  
There is another link between Mill and Madison as well. Mill’s fear is that absent a second 
chamber, the first would be despotic. Madison expresses the same concern when he thinks that 
a second chamber is required to protect the people from those who rule them. We have plenty 
of reasons to fear the despotism of a primary chamber in the governance of SSI. This can be 
                                                          
209 The name mixed government is used because the ancient Greek system of governance is still significantly 
different from contemporary government arrangements, at least in the Western world (Russell, 2001: 19). 




seen by the background condition of the perfect moral storm, which creates plenty of incentives 
for despotism and moral corruption (as was explained in Chapter 3). This is one of the strongest 
points in favour of a second chamber in the case of SSI: to prevent intergenerational despotism, 
or what Gardiner calls the ‘tyranny of the contemporary’.  
To clarify the thought is not that the second chamber would have agents who are better 
motivated to care about future generations. The thought is that a second chamber can be 
designed in such a way that the second chamber performs its task of representing the interests 
of future generations. If this role is performed properly then it should be a counter-weight to 
the potential despotism of the first chamber. In this sense the chamber is perhaps much more 
aligned with Madison’s vision than Mill’s, for Madison’s vision does not seem to rely on the 
second chamber having good states people. Although Mill’s idea of good statespeople being in 
a second chamber has some appeal, and would be welcome if it were to happen, the strength 
of the second chamber is not contingent upon there being good statespeople in it in this case. 
As observed earlier, Aristotle and Mill both offer arguments in favour of a second chamber 
which stand in stark contrast to each other. Despite the lack of agreement between them, they 
both identify some desirable features of the second chamber that I am considering in the context 
of SSI governance. Aristotle is right that it is a particular social group which is going to be 
represented, namely, future generations.211 Yet Mill is also right in that a talented states-person 
may be better placed to do a good job at representing their interests, because of the complexity 
of these interests (Mill, 1861: chapter 13). Again, there appears to be no reason to think that 
this argument would only apply to the national level, for nothing about it is contingent on the 
make-up of national-level governance. There is a specific group – future generations – and 
talented people may be better placed to represent their interests.  
I will now turn to consider the type of concerns that someone could express if they were to use 
the logic of Abbé Sieyès, one of the political thinkers of the French Revolution. On the subject 
of second chambers he observed that ‘if a second chamber dissents from the first it is 
mischievous; if it agrees, it is superfluous’ (Baldwin, 2001: 171). I think Sieyès’s argument 
does have an intuitive appeal, and so the question to ask is whether it can be articulated in terms 
of global governance. Certainly, we could argue that if we have a primary decision-making 
chamber which is sufficiently representative of the present generation and if the will of this 
                                                          
211 Future generations may not be understood as a social group in the classic sense, but they are the type of group 
which Aristotle seems to have in mind; namely, a group other than that which is already represented in the 
decision-making process.  
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chamber is thwarted by a second chamber then it would seem that the second chamber had 
created a problem. Likewise, if the second chamber agreed with the first then it would not seem 
to have contributed anything, so what would be the point of it?   
Yet I do not think the argument has much to offer in our particular context.212 Even if a second 
chamber were only ever to agree with the decisions of the first, it could offer more legitimacy 
to that decision by confirming that the decision does not violate the interests of future people 
and therefore does not violate the basic demands of intergenerational justice. And if the second 
chamber disagreed with the decision of a first, this does not necessarily make it mischievous. 
In context, it just means that the first chamber has failed to make a decision which is compatible 
with the relevant interests of future people.213 To label this type of second-chamber function as 
mischievous is to make a strong claim that the present generation owes less to future people 
than the protection of their interests.  
A more contemporary thinker, Meg Russell identifies three key benefits that a second chamber 
can offer: detailed scrutiny, a different perspective, and asking the primary chamber to think 
again (Russell, 2000: 262). The first point seems to be in the spirit of Mill and Madison, that 
of preventing despotism. In order to check whether proposals are despotic or not, the chamber 
provides a preventative function favoured by the need to scrutinise proposals which come 
before the chamber. The point about providing a different perspective follows closely on from 
this scrutiny, since the scrutiny is done with the perspective of the interests of future generations 
in mind. Russell’s third point is premised on a relation between the two chambers where the 
second has power to send decisions back to the first and ask it to reconsider the whole or parts 
of the decision. Again this is the type of the power which a second chamber could have if it 
deems that a decision does violate the interests of future generations as they are set out in the 
declaration of what is owed to the future. Russell captures three of the key benefits of a second 
chamber in our case.   
 
To summaries, there are a range of interesting and perhaps conflicting arguments which have 
been offered to defend the use of second chambers. Madison and Mill offers a particularly 
compelling argument which is that a second chamber can be designed to prevent the despotism 
                                                          
212 Although I think it definitely makes sense to apply this argument to chambers at the global level for the reasons 
given in the earlier paragraph about Madison. However, the relevance of the argument is due to how it offers a 
commentary on the relationship between two chambers, not because of the chamber being at the national level.  
213 This has parallels with how second chambers can be understood as constitutional guardians. The parallel is 
that they seek to protect something, as opposed to advocating particular policies.  
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of the first. This thought is combined with an idea which can be seen in the work of Aristotle, 
which is that the chamber can represent the interests of a particular group such as future 
generations. Whilst the arguments from these thinkers seem to be designed with second 
chambers at the national level in mind,214 there does not appear to be a reason as to why they 
can be applied to a second chamber at the international level.215 
  
                                                          
214 With the possible exceptions of Aristotle who may have had city states in mind as oppose to nations, given the 
time that he was writing.  
215 It is important to note that this thesis is just focused on SSI governance not broader question of international 
climate or environmental governance. The arguments about a second chamber presented in this chapter may be 
applicable to these broader questions. Yet exploring the possibility of applying this second chamber argument to 
environmental or climate governance is beyond the scope of this thesis. There may even be an oddness to accepting 
the view that that SSI governance should have a second chamber yet that other significantly future effecting issues 
at the global should not. 
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6.6 Would a second chamber also suffer from moral corruption?  
 
One may wonder whether the problem of moral corruption is going to be relevant in the second 
chamber. The potential for moral corruption clearly exists in this chamber, and is something 
that a well-designed second chamber would have mechanisms to guard against. Perhaps a 
variation of the transparency, publicity and accountability solution presented in chapter 3 
would be appropriate for guarding against moral corruption in a second chamber as well. Yet 
we do have reason to think that members of the second chamber would be less susceptible. 
One reason for thinking that a second chamber would be less likely to experience moral 
corruption is that the members would not be subject to as many incentives for short-termism, 
which invites moral corruption.216 Short-termism is when net benefits are given to the present 
generation at the expense of future one. Elections invite short-termism for many reasons, 
ranging from voter preferences, to political gamesmanship, to the force of special interest 
groups (Mackinze, 2016: 24-27).217 Consider the point that it is hard for politicians to 
persuasively communicate the idea that policy will produce a benefit for the future, this is 
difficult due to the complicated nature of such claims, and the uncertainty to which they are 
subject (Mackinze, 2016: 27). The thought is that it is easier for politicians to persuade the 
electorate of the possibility of net present benefits than net future benefits. This is one amongst 
many reasons why elections could invite short-termism and moral corruption, for they invite a 
focus on net-present benefits. A second chamber would not be subject to elections so avoids 
this source of short-termism, thereby avoiding  a source of moral corruption.  
A more powerful reason for thinking that moral corruption would not be as prevalent in the 
second chamber is the remit of this chamber. The second chamber is future generations focused 
and, more importantly, it is future generations focused with a minimally just Statement of What 
is Owed to the Future reminding the members of their task, which is to protect the content of 
that statement. Contrast this to a primary chamber, which is not bound to pay attention to A 
Statement of What is Owed to the Future. The primary chamber has a huge and complicated 
range of interests to account for, thus it is understandable (although not permissible) for the 
interests of future generations to be neglected. Such moral corruption may occur  through 
negligence, by failing to give due consideration to future generations amongst all the other 
                                                          
216 Moral corruption could occur when justification for the short-termism is offered.  
217 For a proper exploration of the sources of short-termism see Mackenize (2016). 
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interests they consider, or at the other end of the spectrum, moral corruption could be a product 
of a more sinister disregard of the worth of future generations.  
This also shows that the reasons to think that the second chamber is less susceptible to moral 
corruption are independent of the moral character of the agents; it is not a claim that the second 
chamber would have more virtuous agents. If you were to have equally virtuous agents we will 
still have more corruption in the primary chamber, due to the way that the respective chambers 






6.7 A link between these proposals and A Statement of What is Owed to the 
Future 
 
I shall briefly comment on the relationship between my proposals for giving weight to the 
interests of future people and A Statement of What is Owed to the Future. In short, A Statement 
of What is Owed to the Future may provide a suitable account of the interests which could be 
protected by the proposals for giving weight to the interests of future people.  
A Statement of What is Owed to the Future provides a heuristic for thinking about future people. 
Thinking about the future is challenging, and this should therefore ease the challenge for 
policy-makers. The statement will provide a clear account of the relevant interests of future 
people and by doing so it should help policy-makers think about future people in the same way 
that any clear document about X should help a non-expert to think about X.  
Yet the benefit is more than this. A Statement of What is Owed to the Future does not only 
provide a clear way to think about the interests of future people; it could also engage with some 
interesting psychological mechanisms. First, it could produce an anchoring effect, and it should 
encourage policy-makers to think about future people in this particular way. This means that 
when decision-makers are faced with a decision about future people, they should be able to 
think about it with A Statement of What is Owed to the Future in mind, because this will be the 
first standard against which the policy should be compared. This assumption is based on an 
understanding of human psychology, which points to the informative power of the first piece 
of information which is made available to an agent about a particular topic.  
There is reason to think that a priming effect will be produced by A Statement of What is Owed 
to the Future. That is to say, the existence of A Statement of What is Owed to the Future is 
going to mean that people are more likely actually to consider what is owed to the future. And 
this need not be restricted to SSI if it is clear that the statement has applicability to other 
questions of governance and future people.  
There is also reason to think that A Statement of What is Owed to the Future will reduce friction 
around talking about the interests of future people. The idea of friction is anything that presents 
an obstacle (Leventhal, et al, 1965; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008: 75-78). Imagine a situation in 
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which you wish to have a dialogue about how action X affects the interests of future people. In 
this situation, one likely obstacle concerns what is meant by ‘the interests of future people’. 
However, if there is already a document in which the interests of future people are clearly 
stated, then a significant obstacle to the conversation is removed.   
This is not the place for a complete psychological analysis of the impact which A Statement of 
What is Owed to the Future may have. Nonetheless, as outlined above, we do have reason to 
think that such a document could help us engage with those facets of human psychology which 
would persuade the present generation to take the minimal interests contained within A 





6.8 Can future generations genuinely be included within an SSI governance 
arrangement? 
 
Are there genuinely satisfactory ways for the inclusion of future generations within an SSI 
governance arrangement? As with so many issues, the answer to this question is ‘yes’ in some 
senses and ‘no’ in others.  
If we think of the ideal of inclusion, then the answer is ‘no’. As explained at the beginning of 
this chapter, the ideal of inclusion can be met by the meaningful participation of that group 
which is meant to be included. Yet in the case of future generations this is clearly impossible, 
and therefore we must settle for representation as the tool for including future generations. 
Insofar as representation is not the ideal form of inclusion, then we can express dissatisfaction 
with representation being the tool which has to be used to try to achieve inclusion.  
It is perhaps important be aware of and express the imperfect nature of representation as a way 
of including the interests of future generations. This may be valuable to avoid complacency in 
our treatment of these interests. Nonetheless we would be also be in remise if we were to use 
the imperfect nature of representation to lambast an SSI governance institution which sought 
to account for interests of future generations in this way. Firstly it would be making a positive 
move to include the interests of a vulnerable group, and that is a valuable endeavour. Secondly 
many governance systems use representation as a form of including the interests of people. A 
critique of representation as form of inclusion should have a much broader target than just an 






6.9 A criticism: the proliferation of the second chamber as a problem-
solving tool – how many chambers do you want?! 
 
I shall now consider some of the criticisms of using a second chamber as a way to address the 
problem of inclusion.  
The first criticism I will consider relates to why a second chamber (rather than some other 
possible option) should be used to address the problem of the inclusion of future generations. 
Second chambers are can be powerful bodies, and there is a plethora of problems which they 
could be used to engage with, such as preventing the weaponising of SSI, or trying to achieve 
the most just state of affairs possible, or being a more inclusive place of deliberation; a place 
where every marginalised voice has a chance to speak. The powers of this chamber are 
absolutely huge. Hence we have to ask whether it is justifiable or defensible to provide such a 
narrow focus for the functioning of a second chamber.  
A criticism with perhaps a similar starting point is that if we allow future generations to have 
their own chamber, then every group with a cause will want their own chamber, and we will 
end up with a system in which there are 50-plus decision-making chambers. Such a system 
seems to be undesirable on practical grounds alone, for a system with 50-plus decision-making 
chambers would be in danger of being highly slow and inefficient. Therefore one may argue 
that it is better not to entertain the notion of a second chamber because it is just the start of a 
slippery slope.  
The response to both of these criticisms starts by highlighting the nature of the second chamber 
which is being proposed. It is a chamber which is meant to protect the basic interests of future 
generations. It serves to prevent profound injustices to future people. It is not about creating an 
optimal state of affairs or achieving complete justice for anyone; it is about the protection of a 
minimal set of interests which ought not to be violated. These interests have a special status in 
that they are a basic component of justice. The other concerns raised do not have that same 
status, and therefore they do not have the same need to be protected through a second 
chamber.218 Of course, there may well be other considerations of basic justice that may deserve 
protection through a second chamber, such as marginalised voices and non-human nature. This 
                                                          
218 Additionally, these other concerns could be subject to different solutions. For example, there may be other 
tools for bringing marginalised voices into the decision-making process which do not require a second chamber.  
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would lead to questions of how a second chamber could be designed which protects all 
components of basic justice. This is not a question I can answer here, although it is one which 
is clearly important, and the account of how a second chamber could function for protecting 
the interests of future generations is clearly relevant for such a question, insofar as protecting 





6.10 Conclusion  
 
To conclude this chapter, it is clear that the abstract principle of including future generations 
is one which can be realised in a plethora of ways. I have argued in favour of starting with a 
simple idea in the form of A Statement of What is Owed to the Future. This statement can 
provide a strong foundation for some emerging tools which can be used to protect people’s 
interests: ombudspersons and constitutional measures. Moreover, this statement could also 
have other benefits, for example by reducing friction between policy-makers who engage with 
the interests of future people. It should also have a priming and an anchoring effect, as 
explained in this chapter.  
The chapter has considered how the principle of inclusion should be understood, and it has 
identified participation as the ideal way of meeting the standard for a principle of inclusion. 
However, given the impossibility of achieving this, the chapter has focused on representation 
instead as the way of meeting the standard for a principle of inclusion. In order to do so, the 
chapter has considered using a second chamber as a way of accounting for the interests of 
future people in an SSI governance decision-making procedure. The reason for selecting a 
second chamber as a suitable mechanism is based on the argument that a second chamber is 
most likely to provide a high quality of deliberative space to consider the interests of future 
generations, since that would be the sole purpose of the chamber.  
Finally it is worth recalling that how this chapter understands the argument which is presented 
in favour of a second chamber. It has presented a political theory argument in favour of a second 
chamber. Yet prior to being able to determine if a second chamber is a suitable way of 
protecting the interests of future generations there would have to be an engagement with the 
experts on institutional design. Therefore I understand this a chapter as presenting a case for 
thinking that a second chamber is a good way of representing the interests of future people. If 





This thesis is motivated by the importance of having a clearer picture of some of the ethical 
worries about SSI that its governance must address. To contribute to this picture the thesis 
examined three under explored issues that an ethical SSI governance arrangement should 
address. Namely those of moral corruption, moral hazard, and the inclusion future 
generations.  
The moral corruption chapter focused on how moral corruption could be addressed. This is 
useful insofar as addressing moral corruption appears to be absent from governance reports on 
SSI, and the political theory literature. The argument in this chapter was that a well-functioning 
accountability mechanism could be well-placed to address moral corruption. The chapter drew 
attention to the fact that transparency is already a common proposal in governance reports on 
SSI, so these reports may at first glance may already be well- designed to address moral 
corruption as well. The chapter argued this was not necessarily the case due to the reports 
tending to have articulations of transparency which failed to appreciate the relationship that it 
has with publicity and accountability. Therefore this chapter offers two key points; one that 
well-functioning accountability is a promising was to address moral corruption, two that well-
functioning accountability requires transparency and publicity and that this point is neglected 
in current proposals for transparency in SSI governance reports.  
The first moral hazard chapter focused on how the moral hazard complaint should be 
understood. The chapter was a product of the short-comings from the governance reports and 
philosophical literature on SSI and the moral hazard, where a clear and satisfactory account of 
the hazard appears to be absent. This chapter argued that a complete moral hazard complaint 
should have an answer to 5 different variables; the stage of SSI, who the relevant agents are, 
the mechanism by which the hazard occurs, what the impact of the hazard is, and why the 
hazard is bad. By doing this chapter has sought to provide a degree of conceptual clarity to the 
hazard which is necessary if the hazard is going to be addressed. Moreover this degree of clarity 
hopefully sheds light on a concept which has a reputation of being vague and ambiguous, and 
drawn attention to the sources of such ambiguity (disagreement or vagueness about how the 
variables are understood). Finally the chapter applied Henry Shue’s framework of threshold 
likelihoods to justify taking the hazard as problem seriously even though there is an absence of 
empirical evidence about whether it does affect all the relevant agents ( in our case the formal 
role holders of power).  
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The following chapter considered secrecy as a tool to address the moral hazard problem. The 
reason for taking secrecy is that secrecy has been mentioned in the moral hazard literature as 
possible solution (Lin, 2013: 709), yet the possibility and desirability of secrecy in the case of 
SSI governance have not been well explored.219 The chapter drew on the work of Pozen and 
applied it to the Manhattan Project to build a picture of the concept and potential mechanism 
of secrecy. This enabled the chapter to build a scenario of the secrecy scenario in SSI 
governance which it argued was fit to address the moral hazard that the thesis is interested in 
as well as many other potential accounts of the hazard. The rest of this chapter focused on 
considering reasons we have to be opposed to the secrecy scenario. And concluded that unless 
the likelihood or badness of the hazard becomes much greater, then the secrecy scenario does 
not appear to be price worth paying to address the hazard, hence it should be absent form SSI 
governance. A contribution of this chapter is that it elucidate that idea of secrecy in the context 
of SSI governance, and may by doing so provide a clearer picture of what it is that many of us 
have strong reasons to be opposed to.  
The final chapter sought to address the intergenerational problem of inclusion. The motive 
behind this chapter is that future generations are very important yet it is unclear how future 
generations should be included in SSI governance, this again is a problem which is true of the 
philosophical literature and governance reports on SSI. Governance reports on SSI are 
particularly in remise on this issue where they sometimes pay lip service to the importance of 
future generations but fail to proposal any meaningful mechanisms to account for them. The 
chapter in argued in favour of A Statement of What is Owed to the Future as a tool which can 
help facilitate the inclusion of future generations. The argument progressed to ultimately 
endorse a second chamber for future generations in SSI governance. The contribution of this 
chapter is that it provides tools and ways to think about including future generations which 
have been absent from literature and governance reports on SSI governance.  
The above few paragraphs have presented the content of these chapters in isolation, whilst they 
do standalone in addressing issues which are of interest ethic concern for SSI governance, they 
are also deeply related problems. Here I shall provide a few comments on the relationship 
which exists between these chapters. Perhaps the most obvious relation is how the secrecy 
chapter defies the proposals from the moral corruption chapter and the chapter of 
intergenerational conclusion. It is doubtful that the conditions of secrecy could be met if there 
                                                          
219 Or if they have, it has been done in secret.  
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was a well-functioning second chamber to represent the interests of future generations, 
although this is not logically impossible.  
The relationship between the moral corruption and moral hazard concerns has already been 
explored in chapter four. Where the point is made that moral l corruption may be a type of 
ethical failure which leads the hazard to occur. The point was that moral corruption degrades 
the quality of public discourse around SSI. And if the quality of discourse if worse than the 
formal role holders of power may be more susceptible to acting in a way which has an adverse 
impact on mitigation levels.  
It is worth drawing attention to the relationship between the well-functioning accountability 
mechanism which was proposed in the moral corruption, and the proposed second chamber to 
address the problem of intergenerational inclusion. The thought is that a second chamber 
contributes to a well-functioning accountability. Failure by decision makers to abide by the 
statement of what is owed to the future in their decision would result at least in those decisions 
being held to account in the second chamber, or depending on the relationship with that 
chamber and other courts, the chamber taking that to a court to hold the decision to account. 
These proposals appear to appear to be complementary to each other  
The thesis has provide ways to think about the problems of moral corruption, moral hazard and 
the intergenerational problem of inclusion, which could contribute to how these problems are 
addressed in the literature on SSI governance and broader philosophical literature on the these 
topic.   
This thesis, as all works do has its limitations. Two clearly come to mind when considering the 
moral hazard. The first of which is that it does appear to be contestable how seriously the moral 
hazard should be taken given that we lack empirical evidence about the likelihood of the 
relevant agents experiencing the hazard.220 Secondly the thesis was unable to offer a 
satisfactory way of addressing the moral hazard problem. It was only able to offer secrecy 
which we have strong reasons to reject. Additionally the accountability mechanism which was 
proposed to address the problem of moral corruption is unlikely to be fit to fully address the 
moral corruption, the chapter offers a partial solution to the problem.  Lastly it is clearly not a 
complete project, a complete project provide guidance on all the ethical concerns with SSI 
                                                          
220 Although it did try to argue that such evidence was not strictly required via Shue’s threshold likelihood 
framework, nonetheless the case for taking the hazard seriously may be more compelling if there was 
empirical evidence which provided reason to belief that the relevant agent may experience the hazard.  
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which were raised in the literature review. This clearly not a complete account of the limitations 
of the thesis, you the reader, probably have your own list. Nonetheless they are ones which 
stand out to me as the key limitations of this project.  
The last limitation pointed to the fact that there is a plethora of concerns about SSI, and this 
thesis has only been able to consider three. This points to how this type of project could be 
developed. Simply by expanding the sphere of ethical issues which attention is given to. One 
could also look at a different sphere of governance and consider how SSI governance at the 
national level could be fit to address these ethical concerns. For example, one could ask the 
question of whether a second or additional chamber at the national level holds any promise for 
addressing the problem of intergenerational inclusion in SSI governance. 
Alternatively one could consider a different type of geoengineering technology and explore 
whether these problems exist, and whether the proposed ways to address them would work for 
negative emission technologies. Given the inclusion of negative emission technologies in 
models to achieve 1.5 degrees this arguably a very pressing area of inquiry. Alternatively this 
project could be expanded in a different way. Which would be to consider the problems of 
moral corruption, moral hazard and the intergenerational problem of inclusion, and seeing 
whether the proposed understandings and solutions to these problems transfer to other issues. 
For example other new future effecting technologies like AI may raise the intergenerational 
problem of inclusion in governance, would the tools proposed address the intergenerational 
problem of inclusion in AI governance?  
The day may not be too far in the future when SSI is governed. We have choice at the moment 
what to do in light of the suspicion that that day is not too far away. I think that we have a duty 
to ensure that those who seek to govern SSI have the tools they need to do so in an ethical way. 
The part we can play is by clearly understanding the nature of the problem and thinking of tools 
and strategies which may be fit to address these problems, and being ready to clearly 
communicate this to those who seek to govern SSI. This thesis has made a contribution by 
engaging with a few of the issues. When the dawn of SSI governance emerges we as ethicists 
must be well prepared to communicate the nature of the problem and potential solutions to 
those who seek to govern SSI. If we are not, our failure may condemn the world to a state of 
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